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ABSTRACT  
   
Without scientific expertise, society may make catastrophically poor choices 
when faced with problems such as climate change. However, scientists who engage 
society with normative questions face tension between advocacy and the social norms of 
science that call for objectivity and neutrality. Policy established in 2011 by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) required their communication to be 
objective and neutral and this research comprised a qualitative analysis of IPCC reports 
to consider how much of their communication is strictly factual (Objective), and value-
free (Neutral), and to consider how their communication had changed from 1990 to 2013. 
Further research comprised a qualitative analysis of structured interviews with scientists 
and non-scientists who were professionally engaged in climate science communication, 
to consider practitioner views on advocacy. The literature and the structured interviews 
revealed a conflicting range of definitions for advocacy versus objectivity and neutrality. 
The practitioners that were interviewed struggled to separate objective and neutral 
science from attempts to persuade, and the IPCC reports contained a substantial amount 
of communication that was not strictly factual and value-free. This research found that 
science communication often blurred the distinction between facts and values, imbuing 
the subjective with the authority and credibility of science, and thereby damaging the 
foundation for scientific credibility. This research proposes a strict definition for factual 
and value-free as a means to separate science from advocacy, to better protect the 
credibility of science, and better prepare scientists to negotiate contentious science-based 
policy issues. The normative dimension of sustainability will likely entangle scientists in 
advocacy or the appearance of it, and this research may be generalizable to sustainability. 
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IMORTANT TERMS 
1. I use the Oxford Dictionary’s definition of advocacy: “public support for or 
recommendation of a particular cause or policy” (OED, 2013). 
2. The term scientist advocacy will be used in this dissertation to refer to advocacy 
by scientists. While there is no scholarly consensus on the precise definition, 
scientist advocacy is generally considered to occur when scientists urge a course 
of action or express public support for or recommendation of a particular cause 
or policy (AAAS, 2012). 
3. I use the Oxford Dictionary’s definition of communication: “the successful 
conveying or sharing of ideas and feelings” (OED, 2013). 
4. I use the word mitigation in the context of climate change, which refers to human 
intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases 
(IPCC, 2014) 
5. For this dissertation, the use of the terms science or sustainability science will 
refer to a body of knowledge, a group of people or their organizations, or the 
process of scientific discovery (Gauchat, 2012). 
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CHAPTER 1 
When I had the privilege in 2007 of accepting the Nobel Peace prize on behalf of the 
IPCC, in my speech on the occasion I asked the rhetorical question “Will those 
responsible for decisions in the field of climate change at the global level listen to the 
voice of science and knowledge, which is now loud and clear?” I am not sure our voice is 
louder today, but it is certainly clearer on the basis of new knowledge. I hope the world at 
large and this august audience would shape their actions on the basis of scientific 
evidence on all aspects of climate change and projections of the future, a future that we 
are all responsible for. (Pachauri, 2012) 
Rajendra Pachauri, Chairman - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), November 2012. 
Problem Statement 
As visualized by scholars, sustainability science1 involves an explicit normative 
role for scientists: to solve sustainability problems and influence societies to develop a 
more sustainable trajectory. But the communication, advocacy, and persuasive demands 
of this role are poorly conceived and its challenges underestimated. Focusing on solutions 
extends scientific activity beyond describing past or present states to include prescribing 
action to achieve some normative future state. In other words, to not just persuade the 
academy about how things are or have been but to also persuade society about how things 
                                                 
1 For this dissertation, the use of the terms science or sustainability science will refer to a body of 
knowledge, a group of people or their organizations, or the process of scientific discovery (Gauchat, 
2012). 
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ought to be. To the “is” of normal science2, sustainability adds the “ought” of 
sustainability science. Scientists have long been capable of argument within the norms of 
persuasion involved in the peer review process but have not developed effective 
persuasive capabilities to support the new normative role in which they may be 
prescribing costly action in the present to generate some future or unseen benefit for 
society. In an exemplary problem like climate change, a more than two decades long 
effort to persuade global societies to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions five percent 
below 1990 levels has failed, and global emissions have instead risen by more than fifty 
percent since 1990 (EPA, 2014). Based on these results, sustainability science needs an 
improved communication strategy to operationalize the normative role envisioned for 
sustainability scientists. 
As with Pachauri above, scientists often reveal the expectation that their scientific 
credibility and authority should be sufficient to convince societies to accept their policy 
recommendations. But this has not been an effective strategy for influencing decision-
making in contentious sustainability problems relating to climate change. In assuming the 
role of problem solver, sustainability scholars have presumed that scientists possess the 
requisite influence to guide policy decisions, but they have both underestimated the 
challenge and overestimated scientist’s capabilities. In taking the mantle of problem 
solver, sustainability scientists enter a realm where, unlike the peer review process, there 
are no rules, and no referee, and science is but one input in a complex and fickle 
decision-making process. While scientists have been successful historically in advocating 
                                                 
2 The term normal science refers to scientists describing past or present states within existing theoretical 
frameworks which only change gradually with the addition of new knowledge (Kuhn, 1962). Normal 
science is largely descriptive and not prescriptive. 
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for environmental policy, it has largely been out of the sight of the public and non-
controversial. But with sustainability problems like climate change, the solutions that 
scientists have advocated would be socially disruptive and costly, and their prescriptions 
have become controversial and met with public and political resistance sufficient to 
stymie scientist’s policy recommendations, particularly in the U.S. Indeed, many 
governments have put off climate policy action, arguing that it would be too costly. 
Without the influence of science, society may make catastrophically poor 
decisions, and to improve scientists’ influence on important science-based but 
contentious policy issues, sustainability scientists need improved communication skills, 
to both understand and appropriately respond to the values and world views of other 
stakeholders, and to influence decision making. Improved understanding of other 
stakeholders is required to develop plausible policy recommendations, and improved 
persuasion is required to more effectively influence the decision-making process. 
Background 
Scientists often feel a moral obligation to not only warn society of dangers they 
discover through their research but to also advocate for change that would reduce or 
eliminate the danger (AAAS, 2012; Steneck, 2012). Environmental scientists have for 
decades demonstrated a personal interest in the outcomes of their science by openly 
advocating for more protective environmental policy, such as discontinuing the use of 
DDT. But with the growth of the environmental movement, scientist advocacy3 has 
                                                 
3 The term scientist advocacy will be used in this dissertation to refer to advocacy by scientists. While 
there is no scholarly consensus on the definition, scientist advocacy is generally considered to occur when 
scientists urge a course of action or express public support for or recommend a particular cause or policy 
(AAAS, 2012). 
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become increasingly controversial and met with social resistance from industry and the 
political right (Steneck, 2012). Scientists who advocate for solutions to social-ecological 
problems may face economic, social, and political resistance from entities that are 
threatened by their recommendations. As in the case of climate change, scientists’ 
advocacy may produce mixed results or outright failure. 
Scientists commonly persuade by leveraging their scientific credibility, (their 
ability to inspire trust in their work), and their scientific authority (their expertise). 
However, scientist advocacy conflicts with science's internal behavioral norms thought to 
govern scientists’ behavior and preserve that scientific credibility and authority (Nelson, 
2009). Some scholars continue to argue that science must be neutral (value-free), 
objective (solely fact-based), and disinterested (scientists must not have a personal 
interest in the outcomes of their science). It is thought that these qualities help ensure that 
scientists do not possess a partisan agenda and that they remain trusted sources of 
credible information. Scientists have propagated and jealously guarded this reputation 
and as a result, society largely believes that scientists adhere to these norms (Jasanoff, 
1987; Mulkay, 1976). 
Science has never been truly objective or neutral because scientists are subjective 
human beings whose personal values and biases influence their choice of research, their 
methodologies, their questions, observations and measurements, and their interpretations 
of their research results (Kaiser, 2000). However, this inherent subjectivity is ancillary 
and distinct from the explicit normative intent in sustainability, in which scientists intend 
to solve problems and do commonly develop an interest in the outcome of the problems 
they study. Ethical questions about whether or not scientists should advocate have 
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resulted in some controversy within society as well as the academy, creating a significant 
and unmet challenge to the normative dimension of sustainability. 
Although in controversies like climate change the stakes for society may be high, 
some scholars, including climate scientists, continue to argue that scientists should avoid 
advocacy (Edwards, 2013; Jasanoff, 1987; Merton, 1973; Mulkay, 1976; Sarewitz, 2011). 
Indeed, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has formally embraced 
objectivity and neutrality in communication, in an explicit effort to preserve their 
credibility. Although sustainability scholars posit a normative role for scientists, the 
academic question remains whether scientists should advocate for the solutions they 
develop, and that is a dilemma which these scholars have not satisfactorily addressed. 
Many climate scientists develop ideas for solutions to the problem, and in response some 
scientists such as James Hansen become active advocates while others such as Tamsin 
Edwards argue that scientists should never advocate. Between those extremes resides a 
great deal of confusion, misunderstanding, and controversy. Many sustainability 
scientists who are intent on solving problems are thrust into this milieu largely 
unprepared for the communication challenges involved in striving to implement their 
solutions, and many are in denial that this work may entail advocacy or the appearance of 
advocacy. 
Confounding the problem is the fact that the scientific community has not 
precisely defined scientist advocacy, and debates about when it occurs and under which 
conditions (Nelson, 2009). Many scientists believe they avoid advocacy with objectively 
structured language such as: “If the goal is to avoid climate change, then greenhouse gas 
emissions must be reduced.” These scientists hold that such a statement is not advocacy 
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(J.M. Scott & Rachlow, 2011). Other scholars insist that advocacy may be an 
unavoidable condition of the political milieu rather than an artifact of individual 
scientists' behavior. For example: the otherwise academic question of the presence or 
absence of an earthquake fault may become controversial if the location is later 
considered for siting a nuclear plant. In this case, an objective scientific opinion about the 
existence of the fault is no longer possible and any scientific opinion tendered will be 
aligned with or against the siting of the nuclear plant, and tantamount to advocacy for one 
side or the other (Sarewitz, 2012). Using this argument in the case of climate change 
then, any alignment to the primary global mitigation policy is tantamount to advocacy for 
that policy. 
In 2011, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) 
convened a conference on scientist advocacy and, although not formally conclusive, 
observed that advocacy may be nearly unavoidable, and that scientists are increasingly 
pressured to engage in advocacy (AAAS, 2012). In sustainability, scholars have explicitly 
called for a normative role for scientists to influence how social-ecological systems 
should evolve (R. W. Kates et al., 2001; Reid, 2010; Wiek, Withycombe, & Redman, 
2011). But scholars have gained no consensus as to how scientists should realize this role. 
I argue that advocacy is an unavoidable complication of the normative intent in 
sustainability, and that new research is needed to understand the challenges of scientist 
advocacy better so that scientists, who choose to, can advocate more effectively. 
Research Context 
Climate change is a prime exemplar of a sustainability problem and involves more 
than twenty years of active scientist advocacy. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 
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human activities are largely responsible for the observed global warming4 over the past 
century, and will lead to dangerous climate change. Societies urgently need to take action 
to substantially reduce their GHG emissions in order to mitigate the threat to human 
civilization. This statement represents the fundamental consensus of the vast majority of 
climate scientists and many scientific societies, scientific academies, the U.S. 
Government, and intergovernmental bodies like the IPCC (NASA, 2014). IPCC scientists 
predict that climate change will have undesirable impacts such as sea-level rise, 
biodiversity loss, increased drought, increased storm intensity, floods, disease, and crop 
failure, all of which threaten Earth’s life-support systems, and that substantial and 
sustained reductions of GHG emissions will be necessary to mitigate the risks (IPCC, 
2007, 2013b). 
From the earliest indication that climate change might be dangerous, climate 
scientists have worked to persuade society about the risks and of the need for action to 
manage those risks, but the distinction between risk assessment and risk management is 
easily blurred (Jasanoff, 1999). Climate scientists’ credibility and authority regarding the 
risks of climate change may be damaged when they advocate for action to manage those 
risks. But many climate scientists insist that the science is clear and directly implies the 
solution, suggesting that the scientific facts about the problem can answer the subjective 
policy questions involved in solving it. Climate scientists have largely failed to convince 
societies to take action to mitigate climate change, which some scientists view as a 
rejection of the science. However more Americans accept the facts of global warming 
                                                 
4 Global warming leads to climate change and, while technically distinct, the terms are largely 
interchangeable in common scientific and public use (Schuldt, 2011). 
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than support enacting climate policy (PEW, 2014). The scientific community has largely 
failed to contemplate the essential feedback that society has rejected scientists’ policy 
ideas but not necessarily the science. 
Since climate change is linked to GHG emissions, it is a simple logical connection 
that emissions should be cut and this is the scientific basis for climate change mitigation 
and the impetus behind the scientific community imploring society to take action to 
reduce GHG emissions. However, societies do not yet share climate scientists’ sense of 
urgency, and global emissions of GHG have risen despite scientists’ advocacy to reduce 
them (IPCC, 2013b). Advocates of emissions reduction blame the rise partly on the 
United States (U.S.), which has resisted global treaties to reduce GHG emissions. The 
U.S. is a leading emitter of GHG and must reduce its emissions as a part of any 
mathematically feasible plan to reduce global GHG emissions. While the scientific 
consensus that human activity contributes to climate change has strengthened with each 
new IPCC Assessment Report (AR) (Christ, 2008), concern among Americans about 
climate change has lagged, and Americans have ranked global warming low among 
priorities for their President and Congress (PEW, 2013, 2014). Furthermore, many U.S. 
politicians avoid pursuing climate policy because their constituents do not see the 
urgency of the problem and are more concerned about other social challenges. While 
concern about climate change has been lowest mostly among political conservatives 
(PEW, 2013), this group has proven sufficiently influential to stymie climate policy 
proposals. Neither Mitt Romney nor Barack Obama campaigned on climate change in the 
2012 presidential elections, nor did any of the four moderators in the presidential debates 
mention the issue (Broder, 2012). Essentially, the consensus risk assessment of the 
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climate science community has not conveyed to the public or to policy makers at a rate 
necessary to facilitate the policy development that scientists recommend. Many in the 
scientific community perceive this to be a deficiency with the public understanding of 
climate science and believe that increasing the quantity and quality of scientific 
information will remedy the problem and convince society to follow their advice. 
By 2014 the IPCC had released its fifth AR, which stated in the strongest terms 
yet the panel’s consensus about climate change and the need for reducing GHG 
emissions: 
Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes 
in all components of the climate system. Limiting climate change will require 
substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2013b, p. 
19). 
Segments of modernized economies, which are invested in and dependent on 
fossil energy, have perceived the call for emissions reduction as a threat, and have 
opposed climate scientists’ prescription for GHG emissions reductions. Since climate 
scientists have consistently invoked the scientific credibility of their research as the 
foundation for their authority to advocate for policy change, their opponents have just as 
consistently attacked the credibility of the science as a means to resist the scientific 
authority to prescribe that change. Numerous groups opposing the scientific consensus 
persistently attack the credibility of climate science, claiming, for example, that actual 
global temperatures have failed to rise according to IPCC predictions (see Figure 1) and 
that the science, and therefore the science-based recommendations, are wrong. A cursory 
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internet search produced many arguments similar to the chart below, which attacked the 
science as a means to oppose prescriptions based on climate science. 
 
Figure 1. The superimposed 5-Yr. average temperature track is apparently not following 
the IPCC projected range. (C3Headlines, 2013) 
IPCC opponents have also resisted the authority of the scientific community, 
bristling at the perceived increase in dictatorial, normative, and prescriptive language 
used in scientific communication. The American Enterprise Institute published the chart 
below (see Figure 2) in a 2010 article, Science Turns Authoritarian (K. P. Green & 
Alaghebandian, 2010), claiming that society was increasingly bombarded with dictates 
based on science, and that scientists were behaving more like partisans and less like 
objective scientists, particularly in climate science. At least one scholarly review has 
debunked this argument (Tobis, 2010), but internal scientific standards have not been 
sufficient to maintain public trust in scientific credibility and authority. For example: 
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leaked emails at the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia in the United 
Kingdom during 2010 and the resulting bad publicity made many non-scientists conclude 
that climate scientists were hiding unfavorable data in order to pursue a partisan agenda. 
Two separate internal reviews cleared the East Anglia scientists of wrongdoing, but the 
incident was a global scandal, and public trust in science and public acceptance of 
climate science declined in the leak’s aftermath (Jasanoff, 2010; Ward, 2010). 
 
Figure 2. plots the increase in authoritarian language used by scientists (K. P. Green & 
Alaghebandian, 2010) 
Climate scientists’ credibility and authority to prescribe actions for society 
continues to be under persistent attack from economic and political interests that are 
threatened by climate scientist’s proposals to limit climate change. Public and political 
will for climate policy in the U.S. lags the scientific consensus recommendations, the 
U.S. Congress has not enacted climate policy, and global emissions of GHG continues to 
rise sharply (IPCC, 2013b). The scientific community’s climate change communication 
  12 
(CCC) strategy has thus far failed to sufficiently convince the world at large, and 
especially Americans, of the dangers of climate change and the need to take action. 
My research examines current CCC practice to better understand the effects and 
challenges that occur when scientists are advocating or are thought to be advocating. In 
CCC practice many climate scientists engage in advocacy, which waives objectivity, 
neutrality, and disinterestedness. I argue that the assumption that science is credible and 
authoritative based on traditional scientific objectivity and neutrality is an illogical 
foundation for scientist advocacy. I propose that scientists consider advocacy strategies 
from other disciplines that do not presume credibility or authority. Boundary 
organizations in science, which are designed to span organizational, intellectual, and 
values barriers, have demonstrated the necessity to develop credibility, saliency, and 
legitimacy with their audiences as a precondition for effective stakeholder engagement 
(Clark et al., 2011). The business community considers sales to be a boundary function, 
bridging between vendor and customer to develop mutually beneficial agreements. While 
there is resistance within the scientific community to the idea (AAAS, 2012), I propose 
that business to business (B2B) communication in customer service, essentially sales, can 
provide more effective strategies for scientist advocacy than solely relying on scientific 
credibility and authority. In sales, credibility is continuously negotiated with the customer 
and is dependent upon the emergent relationship between vendor and customer. I argue 
that stakeholder engagement strategies may be improved with the norms of results 
oriented management which offer sustainability scientists organizational principles that 
have been shown to improve results attainment. 
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Aim 
The aim of my research is to diagnose weaknesses in present sustainability 
communication practices, as manifested in CCC, and to propose other strategies to help 
scientists who choose to advocate do so more persuasively. However, there remains a 
great deal of uncertainty regarding precisely what comprises scientist advocacy and 
whether or not scientists should advocate. Furthermore, there remain unreconciled 
conflicts between the normative dimension of sustainability and the social norms of 
science that call for objectivity, neutrality and disinterestedness. These are problems of 
significant proportion and while I propose interdisciplinary knowledge that may have 
potential to improve persuasive communication effectiveness, the scope of a dissertation 
is insufficient to deal conclusively with the normative and definitional dissonance 
regarding scientist advocacy. Instead, this research has focused on unearthing a problem 
set as a means to open a discussion about scientist advocacy in sustainability. 
Scope 
I examined scientist advocacy in sustainability within the context of climate 
change. Because climate change is a sustainability problem, scientist advocacy in climate 
science is essentially scientist advocacy in sustainability, and my research may be 
generalizable to scientist advocacy on other sustainability problems. This dissertation 
includes a review of the scholarly literature about advocacy, about the normative role in 
sustainability, and about the present CCC milieu. Scholars exhibit wide disagreement on 
the ethics and conception of advocacy and I do not attempt to resolve this dispute. Nor do 
I attempt to definitively establish precisely what behavior comprises scientist advocacy. 
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Instead, I propose a new way to think about advocacy that offers opportunity for 
scientists to improve their persuasive skills and become more effective advocates. 
My empirical study includes a content analysis of IPCC communication in which 
I used the scholarly literature to develop a conceptual definition for scientist advocacy in 
order to contemplate its prevalence in CCC. My original research continues with the 
analysis of interviews with scientists and non-scientists who were professionally engaged 
in CCC. The analysis of IPCC communication and the interviews reveals an incoherent 
and problematic present conception and practice of scientist advocacy in CCC and in 
sustainability. In my conclusion I synthesize the preceding chapters and propose that the 
boundary spanning norms of strategic planning, results-oriented management, and B2B 
sales comprise a useful strategic and tactical approach to advocacy in climate science and 
in sustainability. 
Overview of the study 
The first four chapters of this study provide background and context for the 
original research presented in the last three chapters. Chapter One introduces the 
problem. Chapter Two examines scholarly views on scientist advocacy. Chapter Three 
examines the normative role of sustainability science. Chapter Four describes theories of 
science communication and discusses current CCC practice. Chapter Five analyzes the 
content of CCC seen from the IPCC. Chapter Six presents and analyzes the results of 
twenty-one structured interviews with professional climate science communicators. 
Chapter Seven concludes with a synthesis of my research. I discuss how my findings can 
be applied to climate change and sustainability communication. I discuss the limitations 
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of my research and identify opportunities for future research relating to advocacy in 
sustainability. 
 
Figure 3. Overview of the Study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SCHOLARLY PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENTIST ADVOCACY 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 examines the scholarly literature that deals with scientists advocating in 
favor of particular outcomes that are related to their research. Examples include arguing 
for climate change mitigation, environmental protection, sustainable development; either 
generally or for specific policy proposals. After introducing the subject and providing 
historical background, the chapter explores scholarly definitions for advocacy, and 
arguments about whether or not scientists should or do advocate, or whether scientists 
can ultimately avoid advocacy. Finally the chapter synthesizes the literature and draws 
conclusions. 
Scientists routinely engage in internal advocacy, for example, by applying for a 
grant, supporting a graduate student, or persuading colleagues of their theories or points 
of view, or they may advocate for more funding or autonomy for the scientific enterprise 
in general (Steneck, 2012). These varieties of advocacy are not of interest in this 
dissertation because they are common in science, do not bear significant direct 
implications to society, and the related policy issues are largely benign. Instead, I am 
interested in the growing prevalence of scientists advocating for a specific policy such as 
carbon-trading, or for a class of policies like GHG reduction. In this kind of advocacy, 
scientists argue in favor of policy or action that they deem necessary for the betterment of 
society. This kind of advocacy can become controversial and meet with social and 
political resistance. Some scholars refer to it as scientist advocacy and I will use that term 
henceforth in this dissertation.  
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Scientific research is commonly funded by the public, through the government, 
and many scientists feel an obligation to contribute to the greater social good and 
therefore advocate for action or policy that they believe would reduce dangers to society 
that they discovered through their research. Yet, the conception of advocacy within the 
scientific community is incoherent, and its practice undeveloped. The scholarly literature 
reveals a common understanding that scientist advocacy involves supporting or arguing 
in favor of something, for example: social change or policy action. But there is no 
scholarly agreement about what specific scientist behavior is and is not advocacy. 
Advocacy in science is important because it conflicts with broad prevailing conceptions 
about what science is, and how scientists should behave. 
Historical Background 
For more than 100 years, environmental scientists have debated about whether 
they must remain neutral observers of the environment or whether they are morally 
obliged to advocate against environmental degradation. By the mid-twentieth century, 
scientists advocating against environmental degradation began to gain pubic recognition. 
Rachel Carson’s 1962 book Silent Spring described environmental degradation caused by 
man-made chemicals, and brought scientist advocacy to the public in an unprecedented 
way (Carson, 1962). Many view Carson’s book as the birth of the environmental 
movement, in which society conceded a great deal to the authority of science and 
responded with an explosion of pro-environmental action. Carson’s writing is emblematic 
of an important transition in which science began to assume a visibly critical and 
proscriptive role in society. 
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However, scientist advocacy for policies to conserve, preserve, and reclaim the 
environment began to be controversial with the rapid growth of environmental regulation 
during the 1970’s, and the era of innocence for scientist advocacy waned (Jasanoff, 
1987). Political conservatives, who in 1974 trusted science more than either moderates or 
liberals, bristled at the mounting regulation; and by 2010 they trusted science less than 
moderates or liberals (Gauchat, 2012). Scientist advocacy has become more controversial 
with the increasing incidence and scope of environmental policy proposals, such as 
climate-change mitigation, and the issue of scientist advocacy has become one of public 
importance, and one that sparks contentious debate (Jasanoff, 2010; Ward, 2010). 
Carl Sagan’s campaign against President Reagan’s anti-ballistic missile shield is 
an example of controversial scientist advocacy. In the mid 1980’s, a group led by Sagan 
campaigned against President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The scientists 
thought that SDI would make nuclear war more likely, which would result in 
environmental catastrophe; not only from war but due to a rapid global cooling they 
called nuclear winter. They used climate research about the cooling effect of aerosols to 
predict that sustained winter conditions would engulf the Earth as the result of even a 
modest nuclear exchange. Before the work was peer-reviewed Sagan published in the 
Sunday New York Times magazine on the subject and created a sensation. However upon 
review, Sagan was found to have published data from the top of the error bars and was 
forced to concede the cooling outcome of nuclear war was just as likely to result only in a 
modest cooling or a nuclear autumn (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). In his advocacy, Sagan 
waived objectivity, neutrality, and disinterestedness and exaggerated his research results. 
This was controversial within society and the scientific community and proved disastrous 
  19 
to Sagan’s scientific credibility on the subject. Although Oreskes and Conway reported 
the episode in their 2010 book Merchants of Doubt, Oreskes did not recognize Sagan’s 
loss of credibility as important and she later defended his exaggeration of the data as 
justified to adequately express the danger to society (Oreskes, 2013). 
Much has been written about whether scientists should remain neutral and 
objective, or whether they may or should advocate. The literature on scientist advocacy is 
extensive but divergent, revealing a range of views, many of which espouse conflicting 
normative perspectives. Many scholars recognize that scientists should avoid advocacy in 
order to preserve their credibility as reliable sources of objective scientific information 
(AAAS, 2012; Edwards, 2013; Jasanoff, 1987; Merton, 1973; Mulkay, 1976; Sarewitz, 
2011, 2012; Steneck, 2012). In Jasanoff’s words: “The authority of science is seriously 
jeopardized when scientists are called upon to participate in policy-making” (Jasanoff, 
1987, p. 197). Other scholars consider advocacy and science to be inextricably linked—
both are socially relevant and commonly founded on concern for human wellbeing—and  
therefore science cannot be kept separate from advocacy about what courses of action will 
be best for humans. In this light some scholars argue that scientists have a moral obligation 
to advocate to the best of their ability to prevent the social harms that might arise if they did 
not advocate (Kaiser, 2000). Adding to the confusing array of normative perspectives is the 
fact that the scientific community has not precisely defined scientist advocacy. 
Defining Scientist Advocacy 
The question of whether or not scientists are advocating depends on how scientist 
advocacy is defined. Scientist advocacy is broadly understood to occur when scientists 
support a specific policy or a class of policies, but the scientific community does not agree 
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about exactly what behavior constitutes advocacy. Some scholars hold that scientist 
advocacy comprises more than just communicating research results through routine 
scientific-communication channels, and that it must also include consciously promoting, 
developing, or assessing policy (Lackey, 2007; Nelson, 2009). Others point out that 
scientist advocacy can occur inadvertently whenever the scientist is unaware that he or she 
is advocating.  Such situations may give rise to the possibility of covert or unintentional 
advocacy for a policy or a class of policies (Lackey, 2007; Sarewitz, 2012). 
 With growing interest in and controversy surrounding scientist advocacy, the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) convened a conference 
workshop on Advocacy in Science to examine the subject (AAAS, 2012). While the 
workshop did not produce a consensus AAAS statement, the proceedings help to illustrate 
the difficulty of defining scientist advocacy. Workshop conferees thought that advocacy for 
a specific policy included any attempt to influence an outcome—“to tell an external 
stakeholder, ‘This is what you should do!’ It is a deliberate, purposeful, public expression 
of an opinion or point of view” (AAAS, 2012, p. 2). This perspective does not exempt from 
advocacy any statements of opinion that are linguistically structured to be objective and 
that do not technically support any policy. The 1989 AAAS policy on lobbying defined it 
as: “Grass roots lobbying generally is any attempt to influence any legislation through an 
attempt to affect the opinions of the general public” (AAAS, 1989). Under the AAAS 
guidance on lobbying, it would be very difficult for a scientist to publicly express their 
opinion relating to a policy without being thought to advocate in some way. 
Other scholars claim that making a statement that is or might be relevant to policy 
is not the same as advocacy, and that the speaker’s intent determines whether or not they 
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are advocating. Take, for example this statement: “If the goal is to reduce climate change 
then we must reduce emissions.” Some scientists consider such a statement to be objective 
and neutral because it doesn’t directly stipulate specific policy (J.M. Scott & Rachlow, 
2011). The IPCC takes this position; in 2011 it established a formal communication policy 
that recognizes the need to remain objective in order to preserve credibility and the Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5) Physical Science Basis; Executive Summary contains an 
exemplary objectively structured statement. Excerpts from IPCC communication policy 
and the AR5 quote are found below:  
IPCC Communication Policy, 2011: 
The remit of the strategy – as described in the Guidance – is to support the 
“ability of the IPCC spokespersons to provide neutral and objective statements 
that are grounded in the assessments reports” as “this will be essential to 
preserving the trust and confidence placed in the IPCC by decisions makers and 
other key audiences.” (IPCC, 2011c, p. 23) 
IPCC AR5 Physical Science Basis; Executive Summary: 
Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes 
in all components of the climate system. Limiting climate change will require 
substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2013b, 
p. 19). 
The 2013 statement from the IPCC was structured to be neutral and objective but it 
is normative and it supports the policy of emissions reduction which some scholars believe 
is advocacy. Although stated as fact, both sentences are actually opinion. Climate change is 
politically contentious and any expression of opinion in contentious political contexts will 
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be seen as advocacy despite the attempt to remain objective (Sarewitz, 2012). Thus, 
although scientists and scholars do not agree what exactly constitutes advocacy, the 
scientific community provides a variety of arguments in favor of or against scientist 
advocacy. I’ll first examine arguments against scientist advocacy. 
Arguments against Scientist Advocacy 
During the 20th century, philosophers of science developed for scientists a 
framework of behavioral norms that were thought to ensure the integrity, credibility, and 
reliability of science. Merton (1949, 1973) proposed institutional imperatives for the 
sociology of science, which included objectivity, neutrality, and disinterestedness. Merton 
argued that without disinterestedness, the expert authority of scientists could be abused in 
the pursuit of a partisan agenda (Merton, 1973), thus defining a clear conflict between 
Mertonian norms and scientist advocacy. Scientific credibility is thought to be the ability 
for scientists to inspire trust in their work, and objectivity, neutrality and disinterestedness 
are thought to be necessary to establish and maintain credibility.  
Other scholars have argued that scientific credibility was a special variety, one that 
was strictly internal, among scientists; and that attacks on scientific credibility by non-
scientists should be ignored (Nelson, 2009). This view, however, seems problematic 
considering that non-scientists’ attacks on the credibility of climate science have damaged 
public trust in science (Jasanoff, 2010; Ward, 2010). Philosophers of science continue to 
debate the necessity and attainability of the Mertonian norms and I will not engage in that 
debate. Suffice it here to note that many scholars continue to insist that scientific 
objectivity, neutrality, and disinterestedness remain essential to preserving scientific 
credibility and that advocacy contravenes every one of these. Hence, according to them, 
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advocacy by scientists damages scientific credibility, with the public losing trust in 
scientists who are thought to be acting as partisans and advocating. 
Jon Krosnick (2012) confirmed that people lost trust in scientists and doubted the 
facts of their science even when scientists only assessed policy options without openly 
advocating. In his study, public trust in science declined in every measure when scientists 
offered policy advice. When contrasted with the views of respondents who had heard 
scientists only discussing climate science, those who had viewed scientists also offering 
policy advice recorded: 
1. Lower trust in what the scientists said. 
2. Lower perceptions of the accuracy of what the scientist said. 
3. A lower percent of scientists the respondent trusted. 
4. A reduction in the amount of government action the respondents thought 
was required to address climate change. 
5. A reduction in the percent of respondents that would endorse ten different 
policies to reduce emissions. 
6. A reduction in the percent of respondents that believed in the existence of 
climate change. 
7. A reduction in the percent of respondents that believed that climate change 
was caused by human activity. 
 (Krosnick, 2012). 
The implications of Krosnick’s work are important: Public audiences decide when 
scientists are operating in areas outside of their expertise. Scientists’ credibility with public 
audiences is negatively impacted when they weigh in on policy issues, which forebodes 
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attempts the scientific community may undertake to persuade society beyond the facts of 
the science. Scientists’ credibility with public audiences on matters beyond the underlying 
science is not mediated by the credibility and authority of the underlying science. 
 The basis for most arguments against scientist advocacy is that it conflicts with 
aspects of science; including the basis for scientific credibility and the widely held 
perception that science is an objective and neutral endeavor. On this subject, Sheila 
Jasanoff (1987) wrote: 
Much of the authority of science in the twentieth century rests as well on its success 
in persuading decision-makers and the public that the Mertonian norms present an 
accurate picture of the way science 'really works'. Unlike politics, science is 
'disinterested' and 'objective' and, unlike religion, it is 'skeptical'. Accordingly, alone 
among major social institutions, science is believed capable of delivering a true 
picture of the physical world. Scientists have been quite successful in protecting 
this claim of exclusivity, jealously guarding their power to define the public image 
of science, and warding off competing claims by rival disciplines, particularly 
religion and various manifestations of 'pseudo-science' (Jasanoff, 1987, p. 196). 
The essence of this argument against scientist advocacy can be summed up as 
follows: The scientific community, and to some degree society, perceive that scientific 
inquiry produces factual information that forms an empirical basis for developing scientific 
knowledge. The reliability of this scientific knowledge depends upon accurate and 
impartial observation. Scientific credibility relies upon scientists establishing and 
maintaining their objectivity and neutrality. When scientists demonstrate a personal interest 
in the outcomes of their science, when they become advocates, they waive objectivity and 
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neutrality and bring into question their credibility and the empirical basis for their 
conclusions. For these reasons, many scholars claim that scientists should avoid advocacy 
because it undermines scientific credibility and authority (AAAS, 2012; Edwards, 2013; 
Jasanoff, 1987; Lackey, 2007; Merton, 1973; Mills, 2001; Mulkay, 1976; Nielsen, 2001; 
Rykiel, 2001; Sarewitz, 2011, 2012; Steneck, 2012; Tomasso, 2007; Wiens, 1996). The 
climate scientist Tamsin Edwards is unequivocal on the subject:  
I believe advocacy by climate scientists has damaged trust in the science. We risk 
our credibility, our reputation for objectivity, if we are not absolutely neutral. At the 
very least, it leaves us open to criticism. I find much climate skepticism is driven by 
a belief that environmental activism has influenced how scientists gather and 
interpret evidence (Edwards, 2013). 
Another argument against scientist advocacy is that it is incompatible with the very 
nature of science. This argument asserts that science is objective and therefore 
irreconcilable with advocacy, which is subjective. Much of this argument relates to the 
differences between science and policy. Scientific findings are assumed to be fact-based, 
neutral, impartial, objective, relatively certain, and narrowly defined. Policy is thought to 
be informed by values, biases, opinion, uncertainty, and the need to include information 
that is beyond the scope of the science. For example, science is not asked to decree that 
something is ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ but policy questions often force such designations 
(Rosenzweig, 2001). However, the argument that science is entirely objective and 
advocacy is entirely subjective does not hold up. Both policy and science involve objective 
and subjective questions. For example; environmental management decisions often deal 
with the idea of natural regulation, which involves objective elements of the scientific 
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concept of regulation along with subjective philosophical elements associated with 
defining natural. Scientists also wrestle with unavoidably subjective questions, such as 
defining an endangered species, a sustainable harvest, and ecological restoration (Huff, 
1999). In these ways, scientists often commingle subjective and objective questions in their 
work, which undermines the argument that science is purely objective as a rationale for 
avoiding advocacy. 
Many scholars argue that science and advocacy are simply separate and dissimilar 
activities (Martin, 2006; N. H. McCoy & Atwood, 2005; Nielsen, 2001; Tracy, 1996; 
Wiens, 1996). The extreme form of this argument claims that advocates speak out in favor 
of something, while scientists do not speak in favor of anything; that advocates care about 
their causes, while scientists are ambivalent about their hypotheses (E. McCoy, 1996). 
An argument that society may make against scientist advocacy is that scientists may 
be inclined to advocate based purely on the scientific assessment when policy decisions 
routinely require the negotiation of both facts and values. Part of the argument for scientific 
neutrality holds that if policy-makers rely on scientist’s views in areas beyond the 
scientist’s expertise, they risk making poor decisions (Steneck, 2012). This argument 
implies that scientists should give advice only in the areas of their scientific expertise, but 
policy decisions often cannot be made based on science alone. Pielke Jr. (2007) argues that 
only in the simplest of contexts can facts dictate action. He calls this Tornado Politics, and 
explains it as follows: A tornado is approaching (uncontested fact); everybody wants to 
survive (uncontested values); everybody wants to get to shelter (uncontested course of 
action) (Pielke Jr., 2007). Policy challenges are almost never that simple, and the scientific 
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assessment alone, however reliable, may be insufficient to decide policy controversies.5 
Sarewitz (2004) used the 2000 U.S. presidential election to point out that even the simplest 
of questions can sometimes not be resolved by fact but must be mediated by judgment. The 
simple numeric question of which candidate, Al Gore or George Bush, received the most 
votes in Florida could not ultimately decide the outcome. The U.S. Supreme Court stopped 
the counting of hanging chads, etc., and was required to make the decision not withstanding 
which candidate received more votes (Sarewitz, 2004). 
Arguments for Scientist Advocacy 
While many scholars claim that scientists should never advocate, others argue that 
scientist advocacy may be justified in some circumstances. In this argument, scientific 
neutrality is context dependent, requiring nuance and care to articulate appropriately 
(Coady, 1993). For these scientists, neutrality towards policy questions with dire 
consequences, such as climate change, may be personally repugnant in the same way that it 
would be repugnant to be neutral about child abuse. While the social norms of science call 
for neutrality, it may only be appropriate in the absence of moral consequences.  
In the presence of moral consequences, scholars argue that scientist advocacy is 
appropriate in order to prevent the social harm that might occur if they failed to advocate 
(Kaiser, 2000; Lubchenko, 1998; Noss, 1992). In this argument, scientists may have an 
obligation to advocate based on possessing greater knowledge about the potential harm. 
                                                 
5 In a related rationale, society may argue that scientists should not advocate because of continued uncertainty 
about their science. While scientists and scholars accept that science may never completely remove 
uncertainty, society is less cognizant about this aspect of science. However, this debate manifests more to the 
credibility of the science in question than to a categorical argument against scientist advocacy. To wit, climate 
scientists and climate change deniers continually argue about the credibility of climate science and whether 
there is enough scientific certainty about climate change to justify the proposed mitigation policies.  
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The argument is based in the rationale that scientists as citizens are morally obliged to 
serve society, and part of that obligation is to work to avoid social harm. It is also thought 
unethical for societies to prohibit scientists from participating in the fundamental rights and 
responsibilities that all citizens enjoy and that the moral weight to advocate outweighs any 
conflict that might exist between advocacy and science. 
Other scientists argue that the dichotomy between neutrality and advocacy - facts 
and values - is false, and advocacy in science is nearly unavoidable. They use this logic to 
justify scientist advocacy. (Barry, 1996; Decker, 1991; Ehrlich, 2000; Freyfogle, 2002; 
Kaiser, 2000; Rutburg, 2001). The core of this argument is that science is unavoidably 
value-laden and that scientists make value judgments as a matter of their routine, therefore 
scientists cannot logically be precluded from advocacy on the basis that it is value-laden. 
The arguments for and against scientist advocacy are varied and reflect divergent 
scholarly perspectives on the subject. The 2011 AAAS workshop on scientist advocacy 
recognized that the scientific views on advocacy were inconclusive and did not form a 
coherent argument either for or against scientist advocacy. However, the AAAS also 
recognized the growing prevalence and controversy of scientist advocacy, and 
recommended additional research to understand it, to improve the effectiveness of scientists 
who advocate, and to develop ethical norms to guide scientists who engage in advocacy. 
Ethics for Scientist Advocacy 
The process in which scientists advocate within their profession, for grants or in 
support of their theories, is governed by rules and guidelines such as peer review and grant 
application processes, but few guidelines or rules are available for scientists when they 
advocate outside of their profession. Steneck (2012) proposed that a set of norms might be 
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developed using existing policies for scientific conduct in research as a basis for advocacy 
outside the profession (Steneck, 2012). Some scholars question whether the norms for 
scientific conduct would be a good fit for scientist advocacy, while others decry the 
restrictions that rules would impose and prefer that scientists be free to advocate in any 
manner they chose (AAAS, 2012). NASA scientist Gavin Schmidt (2103) argued that 
scientists must provide their expertise to society otherwise the void would be filled by 
ignorance but he argued for specific behavioral norms for responsible scientist advocacy 
(Schmidt, 2013). The subject of responsible scientist advocacy is not entirely new and 
Schmidt cited the Stanford scientist Stephen Schneider who had earlier argued for norms to 
guide scientists when they choose to advocate (S. Schneider, 1996). 
Many scientific societies play an advocacy role and provide practical and normative 
guidance for their members on advocacy, but their organizational purposes are divergent 
and so is their guidance on advocacy. Some societies eschew advocacy, others promote it 
and provide assistance to their members for when they interact with society and policy-
makers. For example, Federation of Associations in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
(FABBS) has an Advocacy Division whose stated purpose is to issue public statements in 
support of behavioral and brain science and to provide guidance for taking action in 
advocacy by providing how-to information and links for contacting elected 
representatives regarding issues about science. The Ecological Society of America (ESA) 
through their Advocacy Division provides ESA letters, Capitol Hill briefings, 
congressional visits, and participates in coalitions. In addition, they provide policy 
resources on how to take action, contact Congress, and offer a team of rapid response 
experts (AAAS, 2013). 
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Establishing norms for scientist advocacy is complicated by the absence of a 
unified or precise definition of scientist advocacy. Some scientists have resisted the idea of 
working toward a single definition for scientist advocacy and preferred to just avoid the 
word advocacy altogether, because of perceived negative connotations with it (AAAS, 
2012). Clearly more work is needed to provide ethical guidance for scientist advocacy but 
that is beyond the scope of this dissertation and I will leave that to other scholars. 
Scientist Advocacy may be Unavoidable 
Some scientists persist in the notion that science and advocacy are distinct 
activities. Scientists perform research, and explain their results, and may even engage in 
policy advice - all of which they believe do not involve advocacy unless the scientists also 
urge a particular course of action (Hixon, 2000; Lackey, 2007; Pielke Jr., 2007; J. M. Scott 
et al., 2007; Steneck, 2012). However, some scholars have argued that even advising 
policy-makers about the implications of their scientific findings should be considered 
advocating: 
Even to merely provide policy-relevant information unavoidably involves 
interpreting, filtering, and synthesizing facts. Although this processing of facts falls 
within the purview of scientists, it is not a purely objective activity as implied when 
scientists say they are merely providing facts. Insomuch as interpreting, filtering, 
and synthesizing facts is a normative activity, providing facts routinely represents 
advocacy for some position. Consequently policy assessment and the provision of 
policy related facts would seem to be kinds of advocacy… If so, advocacy by 
scientists would seem nearly unavoidable, and scientists might be wiser to better 
understand what constitutes appropriate advocacy and expend less effort pondering 
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whether they should advocate… Perhaps scientists are unqualified to recognize the 
value-ladenness of merely providing facts”. (Nelson, 2009, p. 1096) 
Sarewitz (2012) argued that in post-normal6 environmental controversies -- when 
the stakes are high, the facts are uncertain, action is urgent, and values are contested -- 
scientist advocacy is unavoidable. Scientists may then find themselves occupying a 
position of advocacy from which no claims of neutrality or disinterest can exempt them. In 
these conditions, scientists do not need to explicitly support a particular policy to be 
perceived as an advocate, they need only assert their scientific facts in the presence of 
competing scientific facts. In post-normal conditions, neutrality can only be achieved by 
refusing to comment or participate in the debate in any way (Sarewitz, 2012), a position 
that many scientists feel they cannot ethically abide. Furthermore, refraining from taking a 
position about detrimental prevailing conditions that are favored by the dominant cultural 
and institutional interests may comprise de facto support for the status quo. For some 
environmental scientists, phenomena like climate change are clearly bad, scientists should 
know that they are bad, and they delude themselves by thinking they can take a neutral 
position. Sarewitz (2012) argued that scientists may be covert, or inadvertent, advocates, 
and that they should not continue to pretend that they can remain neutral in divisive 
controversies (Sarewitz, 2012). 
To make this point, Sarewitz (2012) used a hypothetical situation in which a 
sedimentologist finds an unconformity in a local fossil record and concludes that the 
                                                 
6 Funtowicz and Ravetz coined the term post-normal science in 1991, arguing that traditional problem-
solving strategies are limited by the character of new global environmental problems in which decisions 
require evaluations of future states which are unknowable (Funtowicz, 1991). Kuhn (1962) articulated the 
concept of normal science in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962). 
  32 
unconformity was the result of uneven erosion. The issue is of purely academic interest 
until the location is considered for siting a nuclear power plant and a geologist reviewing 
the professor’s theory claims that the unconformity is actually an earth quake fault. At this 
point, the opinion of the sedimentologist is no longer merely academic, it now matters and 
the issue is in contention between those in favor of the power plant and those opposed. The 
sedimentologist, Sarewitz argues, can no longer have a neutral opinion; their perspective 
will be controversial and involuntarily support the nuclear plant or oppose it. The only way 
for the sedimentologist to not support one side or the other in the presence of such a 
controversy is to refuse to take any position whatsoever, in which case the scientist also 
waives their scientific expertise (Sarewitz, 2012). Similarly, Farrell (2011) argued that that 
in post-normal conditions scientists can no longer provide objective and value-free policy 
advice, instead the process becomes a political act (Farrell, 2011). It may be impossible for 
scientists to make an objective statement when, as with climate change, the problem 
involves such a broad array of values, and so much controversy. 
Conclusion 
Scientists are in positions similar to doctors and judges who are expected to be 
impartial and unbiased, and provide objective analyses through rational thought. But this 
expectation unavoidably results in their not just providing relevant facts but assessing the 
meaning of the facts, to create knowledge, resulting in their taking positions on how people 
should behave and be treated (Nelson, 2009). In this way, facts and values are inextricably 
linked. Like doctors and judges, scientists may not be able to avoid developing normative 
perspectives about policy options. IPCC communication policy specifies neutrality and 
objectivity, and scientists carefully word their reports to comply. Yet many IPCC scientists 
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and senior administrators verbally advocate in favor of climate policy, which 
simultaneously erodes the panel’s claim to neutrality and objectivity, and feeds an 
unproductive debate about IPCC neutrality and credibility.  
Scientists who advocate face conflict with the social norms of science and the 
abiding void of coherent guidance about scientist advocacy. A synthesis of the related 
literature does not resolve important questions regarding exactly what comprises advocacy 
or whether scientists should engage in it. However some conclusions can be drawn: 
1. With the growing interest in solving sustainability problems, such as climate 
change, deliberate scientist advocacy is becoming common. Scientists who 
advocate or are thought to advocate, suffer an attendant loss of credibility 
regardless of their individual opinion about whether or not they engage in the 
behavior. 
2. Scientist advocacy is unavoidable in controversial problems such as climate 
change. When the science and the proposed solutions are closely linked, and when 
society is divided on the issue, it is impossible for scientists to take a neutral 
position, and they will align with one side or the other. 
3. The behavioral norms of science do not prevent scientists from participating as 
citizens in solving problems that face society. However, this does not preclude 
scientists from suffering damage to their credibility if they advocate or if they are 
thought to advocate. 
4. Many scientists feel a moral obligation to warn society of dangers that they 
discover through their research. While there is a distinction between risk 
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assessment and risk management, in controversial issues even risk assessment is 
tantamount to advocacy. 
The literature offers a range of conceptions regarding scientist advocacy, most of 
which address the social norms of science in some way, but the results are divergent. At 
one extreme only direct lobbying in support of specific legislation is considered advocacy, 
exempting other forms of support for a desired outcome, and preserving compliance with 
the social norms of science. At the other extreme, scholars argue that any form of support 
for a desired outcome, even casual or inadvertent support, is advocacy. 
However, none of these arguments prevent public audiences from losing trust in 
scientists when they venture beyond their scientific expertise. Scientists’ credibility with 
the public is not mediated by scientistic rationalizations that parse definitions for advocacy. 
Public trust in science suffers when scientists participate in policy discussions, which 
presents challenges to the efforts of sustainability scientists when they advocate for 
implementing their solutions to problems such as climate change. Chapter three examines 
sustainability in more depth. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE NORMATIVE ROLE OF SUSTAINABILITY 
Introduction 
Chapter 3 examines the scholarly literature on the normative dimension of 
sustainability in which scientists develop and attempt to implement problem solutions for 
society. For example, in developing solutions, sustainability scientists must make 
normative decisions about the preferred future state. After introducing the subject and 
providing historical background, the chapter explores the challenges of the normative role 
envisioned for sustainability scientists, particularly the potential for scientists to engage 
in advocacy while developing and implementing the solutions that they develop. Finally 
the chapter synthesizes the literature and draws conclusions. 
Chapter Two revealed the lack of coherent guidance for scientists regarding 
advocacy, and this chapter discusses the potential for scientist advocacy to manifest in 
sustainability. According to prevailing social expectations, scientists seek to understand 
and describe the nature and functioning of their research subjects from a fact-based and 
value-free perspective, and scientists avoid including personal interests in their research. 
According to this traditional understanding, a scientist studying an animal would 
endeavor to satisfy their academic interest, while accepting its existence, past 
development, and present state without judgment. Scientists would traditionally not be 
expected to decree what is good or bad about the animal, or to determine what changes 
should be made to it, or to decide whether it should exist at all. To this primarily 
descriptive function, sustainability science adds a prescriptive or normative role in which 
scientists also determine what might be problematic with the present state, and how the 
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problem might be solved. The normative role places scientists in situations in which they 
will engage in the policy process and might advocate or be perceived to advocate. 
The academic debate about scientist advocacy continues unresolved but this has 
not deterred sustainability scholars who have articulated an explicit normative role for 
sustainability that is likely to entangle scientists in advocacy. Sustainability ideally 
requires scientists to make judgments about problematic present states and to develop 
plans for transitions to preferable future states. More than just identifying solutions for 
sustainability problems, scholars expect sustainability scientists to engage decision-
makers and society in order to persuade them to implement the solutions they develop. 
Other than to claim it for scientists, little attention has been given to the persuasive 
challenges the normative role presents to sustainability scientists. 
Some scholars simply ascribe the normative dimension to sustainability without 
explicitly identifying the role solely for scientists (Wiek, Withycombe, & Redman, 
2011). Others have argued for a new kind of science, for a normative function 
specifically for scientists (R. W. Kates et al., 2001). In a review of the literature on 
sustainability, Wiek (2011) identified five personal competencies necessary for those 
working in sustainability, one of which was normative competence. Some scholars have 
studied methods for improving stake-holder engagement (Talwar, Wiek, & Robinson, 
2011), and boundary structures that might improve sustainability scientist’s normative 
effectiveness (Clark et al., 2011), however, scientist advocacy has largely not been 
addressed in the context of sustainability. 
Sustainability scientists habitually leverage their scientific credibility and 
authority when attempting a normative influence with society or decision-makers, such as 
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IPCC Chairman Rajendra Pachauri imploring the world to heed the increasingly credible 
recommendations of science to reduce GHG emissions (Pachauri, 2012). But the 
credibility of scientists suffers when they discuss solutions, and I argue that this 
represents an important barrier to the normative role envisioned for sustainability, and 
this barrier has received little scholarly attention. 
Historical Background 
 The eighteenth century German forester Carl von Carlowitz proposed active 
human management to preserve the perpetual output of forest resources, and he is 
credited as being the first to use the term “sustainability” (Scoones, 2007). Likewise, 
modern sustainability involves active human management to preserve Earth’s life-
support systems indefinitely for future generations. The foundational philosophy of 
sustainability is to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising 
the needs of future generations (WCED, 1987). Scientists have determined that the 
air, water, and food needed for future generations may be threatened by current 
human practices, and that societies must take action now to prevent further 
environmental degradation and to protect Earth’s life-support systems for the future 
(Goldstein, 2011). Humans have for millennia held various moral, ethical, 
philosophical, and practical ideas about caring for the environment, but sustainability 
adds to these the idea that human survival may be threatened unless societies identify 
and change their environmentally detrimental behavior. Modern sustainability 
involves economic elements such as sustainable development, and social elements 
such as the concept of sustainable livelihoods. However neither is relevant without a 
viable life-support system on Earth. In this sense, sustainability is fundamentally an 
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environmental management challenge, and the history of environmental management 
involves normative elements that are inherent in sustainability. 
 By the early 20th century, some environmental scientists and political leaders 
were calling for an end to the idea of nature as an unlimited resource that could 
indefinitely absorb the impacts of exploitation. President Theodore Roosevelt’s 
comments during his 1907 annual address reflect the growing realization that 
foresight and effective management would be required to preserve environmental 
resources for future generations: 
We must maintain for our civilization the adequate material basis without 
which that civilization cannot exist. We must show foresight, we must look 
ahead… there must be the look ahead, there must be a realization of the fact 
that to waste, to destroy, our natural resources, to skin and exhaust the land 
instead of using it so as to increase its usefulness, will result in undermining in 
the days of our children the very prosperity which we ought by right to hand 
down to them amplified and developed (Roosevelt). 
Through most of the twentieth century, American environmental policy reflected 
the values and assessment found in Roosevelt’s words. Normative judgments about how 
the environment should be managed mingled the philosophies espoused by John Muir 
and Gifford Pinchot. Both argued for environmental stewardship, but Muir thought nature 
should be preserved more for its intrinsic value, while Pinchot thought it should be 
conserved for its perpetual economic benefit to society (Meyer, 1997). National parks 
like Yosemite were established, aligning with Muir’s philosophy by permanently 
foregoing the potential economic benefits of some areas in favor of preserving the land in 
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its natural state for future generations. For some other lands, U.S. policy gave primacy to 
harvesting the natural resources needed for a prosperous country, while perpetuating the 
land’s economic benefit, reflecting Pinchot’s philosophy about conservation.  In 
considering the same environmental challenges, Muir and Pinchot developed 
significantly different norms about how we should treat the environment, demonstrating 
the possible variance that could be found in normative judgments even among those in 
favor of protecting the environment. 
At mid-century, the naturalist Aldo Leopold advocated a land ethic: “A thing is right 
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is 
wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold, 1949, pp. 224-225). The normative nature of the 
discourse about how humans should treat the environment ultimately evolved into a 
debate that formally recognized an ethical question. By the 1970’s, this debate had 
become the sub-discipline of philosophy called Environmental Ethics. It is important to 
bear in mind how individual ethics, values, and philosophy enter into any discussion 
about how humans should treat the environment, and to contrast that with the traditional 
intent in science to develop knowledge that is based on empirical evidence. 
Both before and shortly after World War Two, the scientific process was largely 
viewed to be objective and neutral and scientific communication priorities involved the 
tradition of peer review and publishing mainly in scientific journals. In this model, 
science produced research and communicated the results. It was a narrow, one-way, 
linear channel of communication. There would have been little public awareness of 
scientific progress except in the case of sensational events like the atomic bombing of 
Japanese cities, or medical advances like the invention of the polio vaccine. 
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But World War Two produced unprecedented government interest, funding, and 
discoveries through scientific research that prompted President Roosevelt’s 1945 
assignment for the head of the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development, 
Vannevar Bush, which was; “What can be done, consistent with military security, and 
with the prior approval of the military authorities, to make known to the world as soon as 
possible the contributions which have been made during our war effort to scientific 
knowledge?” (Bush, 1945). Bush’s answer was that science was the next frontier and the 
rightful concern of government, which should fund research not just for national security 
but to fight disease and to improve public welfare. Bush imagined public welfare would 
include new, better and cheaper products and processes, such as DDT, which was first 
widely used as an insecticide in the 1940’s and thought to be safe, but by the 1960’s DDT 
was found to seriously harm the environment (EPA, 2012). And who could have 
imagined in 1945 that the fight against disease would later place scientists in conflict with 
tobacco companies? 
In the post war period, research was perceived to provide scientific breakthroughs 
that improved products and processes and this perception left society with a positive view 
of science. Political ideologies were neutral about science, and politicians of both parties 
were deferential toward science (Gauchat, 2012). Political conservatism had for years 
been linked to environmental preservation and Republicans were more likely to be 
associated with conservation than democrats (Weart, 2008). In the post war years, the 
public perceived that scientists worked independently on projects of individual interest 
and made discoveries that eventually benefitted society. The scientific community had 
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little direct influence on society, and the public enjoyed substantial trust in the scientific 
process. But this would change. 
During the 1950’s, public and political trust in science remained generally 
ascendant as science produced many advances that met Bush’s conception of benefitting 
society. Cooperation between scientific experts and decision makers was unproblematic; 
scientists provided technical information which administrators used to make policy. The 
authority of science was related to the perception that science was dedicated to the 
Mertonian norms of objectivity, neutrality, and disinterestedness (Jasanoff, 1987). 
Scholars thought the nature of public trust in science was associated with its cultural 
achievements, its valuable expertise about how things worked or how to fight disease. 
Essentially, trust in science linked modern social systems with scientific progress and 
technical innovation. A few scholars began to wonder if there might be limits to the 
ascendant public trust in science, in which case distrust of excesses of power and 
authority might lead to public anxiety about science. But through the 1950’s political 
parties and their respective ideologies continued to be fairly neutral and deferential about 
scientific research and the scientific community (Gauchat, 2012). 
 In spite of the ongoing interest during the 20th century in preserving nature's 
intrinsic and economic value, by mid-century scientists were discovering that 
environmental degradation was occurring in new and surprising ways. Rachel 
Carson’s 1962 book, Silent Spring, alerted a large portion of the American public to 
unanticipated problems caused by the widespread use of pesticides and fertilizers. 
Carson argued that chemical products previously thought to harmlessly enhance 
modern lifestyles and economic productivity were concentrating upward in the food 
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chain and threatening both the environment and human health (Carson, 1962). 
 During the 1960’s, scientists increasingly challenged the view of modern 
technological innovation panaceas because they were discovering environmental 
degradation that, in their expert scientific view, was related to the technologies. 
Scientists leveraged their scientific credibility and authority to advocate against the 
environmental degradation they perceived, and in favor of changes that would 
protect the environment and humanity. In this way, scientists were using empirically 
tested science and their scientific authority as a basis for normative arguments in 
favor of better environmental stewardship. Public perceptions about science 
continued to include notions of neutrality, objectivity, credibility, and technical 
expertise that were employed in socially beneficial contributions to society, such as 
military or medical breakthroughs. A broad spectrum of society continued to defer to 
the authority of scientists (Gauchat, 2012), and environmental organizations, 
activists, philosophers, politicians, and academics joined in a discourse about 
environmental protection that coalesced into a social movement and mobilized 
society to halt and reverse environmental degradation (Johnson, 2006). 
 Sufficient numbers of the public and policy-makers were convinced of a 
looming environmental crisis to enact legislation to protect the environment. In 1969, 
the U.S. Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) “. . . to 
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive 
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and 
future generations of Americans” ("National Environmental Policy Act of 1969," 
1970). The first “Earth Day” was celebrated in 1970, and a plethora of revised and 
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new environmental legislation was enacted during the next decade: the Clean Air 
Amendments of 1970, the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency by 
President Nixon in 1970, the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 are examples (Goldstein, 2011). 
 Expanding environmental regulation was met with nascent but growing social 
and political resistance. By the end of the 1970’s, this resistance had grown and was 
centered within the conservative political movement called the New Right (NR), 
which helped sweep Ronald Reagan into the Presidency in 1980. Strong post war 
perceptions of scientific neutrality began to erode with the growth of the NR, which 
consisted of an odd alliance of the religious right and corporations that had vested 
interests in scientific outcomes. The religious right opposed science on moral and 
epistemological grounds while business resisted the growth in regulation (Gauchat, 
2012). 
 The 1970’s brought fundamental change to the relationship between science 
and society. The expectation of Vannevar Bush that science would improve social 
welfare began to pay-off but in unexpected ways. In the 1960’s, Rachel Carson’s 
criticism of DDT was resisted by the chemical companies involved, but less so by 
society. By the close of the 1970’s, the broad spate of new preventive policies that 
were implemented had garnered the attention of society and an energetic resistance 
to scientific prescriptions had commenced. The scientific community had become 
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unavoidably involved in normative policy battles and yet persisted with a traditional 
self-perception that associated its authority with Mertonian norms including 
disinterestedness, objectivity and neutrality. 
 An aggressive role in policy development was actively engaged by the 
scientific community as a natural response to its discoveries, and emanated logically 
from perceived scientific authority. Science had discovered important new 
information about a host of risks facing society and leveraged its credibility and 
authority to advocate for changes that would improve social welfare. However, 
society was not as certain, its trust in science was no longer ascendant; political 
conservatives in particular had begun to challenge scientific authority. 
 In addition, critical theorists had begun to question the growing domination of 
science and technology in political decision-making. The development of 
democracies made possible the formation of public opinion as a legitimizing force in 
politics (Held, 1990). Habermas referred to this as the public sphere and observed its 
disintegration with the ascendance of scientific and technological rationale in 
political decision-making. To an increasing extent, military and technological 
advances led to the scientization of politics, and politicians began to discount societal 
values, goals, and needs in favor of a reductionist rationale. With the scientization of 
politics, decision-makers had become dependent on scientists for the objective 
assessment of problems, as well as for strategies and rules for resolution (Habermas, 
1971). For some scholars, privileging scientific knowledge represented a 
technocratic ideology or scientism, and while it did not falsify reality in pursuit of 
particular interests, it was more pervasive than older ideologies. Moral, practical, and 
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political questions were transformed into technical questions, diminishing the public 
sphere as a political institution and creating a system of scientific and technical 
domination of political decision-making (Outhwaite, 2009). Rather than address 
practical and moral questions, politicians increasingly invoked scientific exigencies 
to make political decisions. However, scientists had begun to encounter complex 
problems that defied simple solutions. 
 In the 1970’s, scholars defined a distinction between ordinary tame problems 
and wicked problems (Rittel, 1973). The former, like engineering problems, had well-
defined rules for resolution and it was possible to know when they had been solved. 
The latter were defined by a plurality of conceptions about the problem, biases of the 
stakeholders, unforeseen trade-offs, and unintended consequences that could not easily 
be reversed. Rittel and Webber, who coined the term wicked problems in their 1973 
paper, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, claimed that the solutions to 
wicked problems were always political and never settled with additional empirical 
research or new data, but rather had to be continually deliberated or continually re-
solved. They argued that in a pluralistic society wicked problems could not be 
accurately defined, that the concept of indisputable public good did not exist, that 
equity could not be objectively defined, and there were therefore no definitive or 
objective solutions to wicked problems. Rittel and Webber thought science was ill-
equipped to solve wicked problems, yet, sustainability scholars would later embrace 
the concept of wicked problems, and expand the purview of science to include 
economic and social problems and claim an active role for scientists in solving them. 
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Although sustainability has its roots in the environmental sciences, during the 
early 1980’s, the discourse on sustainability began to include concerns about human well-
being. Social and economic dimensions were added to the dialogue and the term 
sustainable development emerged (R.W. Kates, 2011). Sustainable development was the 
central idea behind the 1987 Brundtland Report, Our Common Future (WCED, 1987). It 
was addressed to the public and called for education, debate, and public participation. The 
Brundtland Commission's mandate was threefold: 
1. To research critical environmental and developmental problems and develop solutions.  
2. To develop new ideas for international co-operation that would move policies toward 
needed changes. 
3. To improve understanding and increase commitment to action across global societies, 
and governments. 
The Brundtland Report was a defining work amid the 1980’s explosion of discourse 
about sustainability; it was adopted and promoted by a host of organizations within the 
United Nations, by NGO’s, and in universities (Scoones, 2007). The Brundtland Report 
transformed the idea of merely sustaining the physical output of forests or fisheries, into the 
idea of global sustainable environmental, economic, and social development. Linking 
environmental preservation to economic and social development was the foundation of 
the “triple bottom line” concept:  that sustainability is achieved when societies 
simultaneously achieve a sustainable economy, a sustainable environment, and a 
sustainable society (Mebratu, 1998). 
The Brundtland Commission called for action to bring about the changes needed to 
achieve sustainability. Its mandate explicitly called for promoting the implementation of 
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changes needed for sustainability and raising the level of commitment to action from 
individuals to governments. In other words, it enshrined a normative dimension for 
sustainability - to not just develop solutions or establish norms, but to promote the 
implementation of those solutions. Thus, sustainability was not only about discovering 
sustainability problems and finding solutions to them, but also about influencing values 
and goals, and raising the level of commitment to action. The normative role in 
sustainability has developed into an explicit expectation for practitioners and scientists to 
develop, promote, and implement their ideas for sustainable development. 
Sustainability is Explicitly Normative 
In his seminal 2001 paper "Sustainability Science" Robert Kates and his co-authors 
described the new field of sustainability science and established seven core questions for 
it. The first three questions dealt with the structure of scientific inquiry necessary for 
sustainability science, while the last four articulated a distinct normative role for 
sustainability science to: 
• Define limits and boundaries. 
• Establish incentive structures, markets, rules, and norms. 
• Provide useful guidance and decision support. 
• Teach society.  
These challenges were specified as roles for sustainability scientists. The authors 
conclude the paper by arguing: “Third (and most important), research itself must be 
focused on the character of nature-society interactions, on our ability to guide those 
interactions along sustainable trajectories, and on ways of promoting the social 
learning that will be necessary to navigate the transition to sustainability” (R. W. Kates 
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et al., 2001, p. 642). In "What Kind of Science is Sustainability Science?" (2011), 
Kates continues along the same lines: “…sustainability science is a different kind of 
science that is primarily use-inspired, as are agricultural and health sciences, with 
significant fundamental and applied knowledge components, and a commitment to 
moving such knowledge into societal action” (R.W. Kates, 2011, p. 19450). Wiek et 
al. (2011) argued for the importance of normative competence in sustainability, and 
defined it as: 
Normative competence is the ability to collectively map, specify, apply, 
reconcile, and negotiate sustainability values, principles, goals, and targets… 
Addressing sustainability problems and opportunities requires going beyond 
descriptive questions of how complex social-ecological systems have evolved, 
are currently functioning, and might further develop. The concept of 
sustainability is unavoidably value laden and normative, since it addresses the 
question of how social-ecological systems ought to be developed, so that they 
balance and even enhance socio-economic activities and environmental 
capacities (Wiek, Withycombe, & Redman, 2011, p. 209). 
This quote is reminiscent of President Theodore Roosevelt’s argument that society 
must manage its natural resources with foresight in order to provide for the needs of 
future generations. However, Roosevelt was arguing that the country as a whole negotiate 
how to do so, while sustainability scholars argued that scientists and practitioners 
diagnose the problems and direct the path to solving them. In the Wiek, Withycombe, and 
Redman (2011) review of sustainability literature, they cite many sources who recognize 
that sustainability “is problem driven and solution oriented… and links use-inspired 
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knowledge to transformational action…” (Wiek, Withycombe, & Redman, 2011, p. 203). 
Grunwald (2004) wrote that “Sustainable development is a normative societal principle, 
and science makes indispensable contributions to its realization” (Grunwald, 2004, p. 152). 
Gibson (2006) argued that sustainability requires the ability to negotiate trade-off rules and 
specify decision criteria, and identify appropriate options for decision makers, including 
choosing courses of action (Gibson, 2006).  
Science has long made an important contribution to environmental problem-solving 
and yet sustainability adds to this task a normative role for scientists to identify, specify, 
and choose actions to transform society towards sustainability. This role is primarily 
specified for sustainability scientists, to the exclusion of others in society. These scholars 
assume an unmistakable leadership role for scientists to diagnose problems, develop 
solutions, and persuade society to implement those solutions. There is some recognition 
that science cannot dictate action to society, yet there is little responsibility given to the rest 
of society for analyzing problems and developing solutions. The assumption appears to be 
that science is largely sufficient to the task. 
Another example of the normative dimension of sustainability is provided by the 
Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 2012).  This extensive set of global development 
objectives includes the enumeration of current global social sustainability problems and a 
description of the preferred state via specific set of objectives. One of the goals is the 
reduction of poverty which is also reflected in the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences (PNAS) characterization of sustainability science as an emerging field of research, 
and defining sustainability as “… meeting the needs of present and future generations while 
substantially reducing poverty and conserving the planet’s life-support systems” (PNAS, 
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2013). In this conception, sustainability necessarily involves decisions about trade-offs 
between the environment and poverty. For example; some scholars and many developing 
countries have argued for the continued use of cheap, but polluting fossil energy like coal, 
in order to lift populations out of poverty7 before these countries should be required to 
adopt cleaner energy systems. 
Considering that the roots of sustainability lie in perpetuating Earth’s life-support 
systems, the addition of poverty reduction to sustainability challenges is intrinsically a 
normative consideration and involves additional challenges. For example: The San 
Bushmen have lived sustainably as hunter-gatherers on the Kalahari Desert for millennia 
but now face contradictory cultural survival agendas perpetrated by outsiders (Robins, 
2001). No empirical scientific knowledge can determine the circumstances under which the 
San can be decreed poor or rich. Science cannot determine whether the San should be 
folded into a more western culture, or stripped of the vestiges of western civilization and 
returned to the Kalahari to live as hunter-gatherers. These decisions are value dependent. 
PNAS has published more than 300 scholarly articles in their section on sustainability 
science (Kates, 2011), which by their definition adds poverty reduction to the challenges 
that scientists are to tackle. Defining poverty, and deciding which peoples are poor, and 
                                                 
7 China, now the world’s leading emitter of GHG, makes this argument. Su Wei, a member of the Chinese 
delegation to the Conference of the Parties climate meetings in Qatar, told reporters in November, 2012: 
"For developed country parties like the U.S. and the European Union, the pledges and commitments put 
forward on the table are far below what is required by the science. And far below what is required by 
their historical responsibility. We are still in the process of industrialization. We are also confronted with 
the enormous task of poverty eradication. In order to eradicate poverty, to try to improve the living 
standards, certainly we need to develop our economy, so the emissions will need to grow for a period of 
time (Casey, 2012)". 
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what should be done to alleviate their poverty, and what kind of energy they will be 
permitted to use, are all normative questions which science alone cannot answer. 
 While it may seem logical that the scientists who discover sustainability 
problems apply their scientific expertise to develop solutions, questions about how 
social systems should evolve are unavoidably normative, and influenced by more 
than just the science of the problem. However, scholars idealizing sustainability 
largely assume that scientists will diagnose the problems, develop solutions, and 
persuade societies to action. 
Conclusion 
The scholarly literature on sustainability consistently implies or explicitly 
articulates a normative role for scientists to not only establish norms for preferred future 
states, but to persuade societies to abide by those norms. However, little scholarly discourse 
has been dedicated to the challenges and problems that arise when scientists attempt 
normative influence in society and are perceived as partisan actors advocating for select 
preferences. Kates et al (2001) called for participatory procedures “involving scientists, 
stakeholders, advocates, active citizens, and users of knowledge” (R. W. Kates et al., 2001, 
p. 641), and thought that combining different ways of knowing would catalyze advances in 
the abilities of different social actors to work together. In practice, combining difference 
ways of knowing has proven elusive, with scientists privileging scientific knowledge. 
Kates, et al proposed that scientists connect to the political process to influence decision-
makers, but they offered little recognition that scientist advocacy might result, nor any 
specific strategy to operationalize their envisioned normative influence. 
 A consistent theme in the sustainability literature is that scientists, academics, 
  52 
and sustainability practitioners should influence how social-ecological systems ought 
to develop, but there is less discussion of whether that influence is appropriate or 
democratically produced. Cash et al. (2003) proposed that scientists must establish 
credibility in dealing with society on sustainability problems (Cash et al., 2003), but 
scientists have habitually relied instead on traditional, a priori, scientific credibility and 
authority. In studying attempts to reduce tropical deforestation, Clark (2011) 
discovered several distinct boundaries between scientists and stakeholders that had to 
be spanned in order to establish credibility, salience, and legitimacy in advance of the 
research activity. In some cases the deforestation research strategy envisioned and 
planned by scientists and funding organizations was not acceptable to stakeholders and 
had to be re-negotiated and adjusted in order to then proceed with the normative 
objective of curbing deforestation (Clark et al., 2011). These and other scholars have 
begun to tackle the practical challenges that have arisen in sustainability, but have 
largely not recognized the challenges of scientist advocacy that are likely to arise when 
scientists attempt to influence the development of social ecological systems. 
 While scholars have articulated a normative role for sustainability scientists, 
transitioning from empirically based research to implementing social change has 
proven more difficult than simply connecting to the political agenda. Climate scientists 
have determined that GHG pollution from human activity is contributing to dangerous 
climate change and arrived at the logical conclusion that GHG emissions should be 
reduced. The scientific findings tend to indicate the solution and climate scientists 
have used this calculus to advocate for emissions reductions for more than two 
decades. Climate scientists are connected to the political process via the IPCC whose 
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purpose is to inform the climate policy process, but effective global action has been 
elusive and global GHG concentrations have continued to rise (IPCC, 2013b).  The 
difficulty lies in articulating and negotiating normative questions about what action 
should be taken and this discourse ranges beyond the scientific assessment. 
For the scientific method can teach us nothing else beyond how facts are 
related to, and conditioned by, each other. The aspiration toward such objective 
knowledge belongs to the highest of which man is capable, and you will 
certainly not suspect me of wishing to belittle the achievements and the heroic 
efforts of man in this sphere. Yet it is equally clear that knowledge of what is 
does not open the door directly to what should be (Einstein, 1950). 
Since Einstein wrote these words the environmental movement has blossomed 
into the triple-bottom-line conception of sustainability that sweeps in environmental, 
social, and economic challenges. From Brundtland through Kates to the present day, 
sustainability scholars have staked-out an ambitious normative role for science. Kates 
compared sustainability to other use-inspired science such as agriculture or health which 
also endeavors to move knowledge to action (R.W. Kates, 2011). However, agriculture 
and health challenges pale in comparison to sustainability because they are subsumed by 
it. The prescriptive reach of sustainability represents an important departure from 
traditional expectations throughout society about the role of science, and it is not clear 
that society will acquiesce. The sustainability literature reveals the abiding assumption 
that normative moral and political questions can be reduced to scientific questions, which 
some scholars characterize as the scientization of politics (Habermas, 1971) or the 
institutional idolatry of science (Wynne, 2006a). 
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Some sustainability scholars have suggested that solving sustainability problems 
will require dialogic negotiation among the stakeholders, yet scholars largely privilege 
science with the normative responsibility. The literature contains specificity regarding the 
role for scientists but comparatively little detail regarding the role for the other 
stakeholders. Scholars that have considered stakeholder engagement in detail have 
expressed concern that the involvement of stakeholders might compromise scientific 
integrity (Talwar et al., 2011), which despite the scholarly attention given to stakeholders, 
relegates them to a secondary role. As visualized in the literature, the role for diagnosing 
and solving sustainability problems is dominated by science, implying an authoritative 
flow of knowledge, values, principles, and goals from science to society (Wiek, 
Withycombe, & Redman, 2011). In practice however, segments of society have viewed 
scientists’ prescriptions as authoritarian and resisted in numbers sufficient to create 
policy inertia, as is the case with climate change mitigation. 
The literature on sustainability largely assumes that scientists will somehow 
successfully persuade society to follow their prescriptions, as though scientists need only 
demonstrate the truth of the science and people will agree to live by it (Jasanoff, 1999). 
Sustainability scholars have underestimated the challenges of the normative role and 
overestimated scientists’ capabilities; leaving them unprepared for the persuasive 
communication challenges of negotiating society’s transition to a sustainable trajectory. 
Sustainability scientists will require additional communication skills to more effectively 
realize the normative role that has been envisioned for them. The scientific community 
has begun to dedicate effort to improving sustainability communication and climate 
change communication (CCC) is exemplary. Chapter Four examines scholarly record on 
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science communication in theory and in practice, and specifically in climate science to 
explore its development and challenges in more detail.  
  56 
 
CHAPTER 4 
SCIENCE COMMUNICATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION 
Introduction 
Chapter 4 examines the scholarly literature on science communication with a 
focus on climate change communication (CCC). The chapter explores the linear 
tendencies of science communication, its scholarly criticisms, and ideas for improving it. 
The chapter then turns to CCC because it is the context for this research and it has 
garnered a great deal of public, political, and academic attention. The IPCC is prominent 
in CCC and this section outlines the IPCC, the scholarly assessment of its communication 
practice, and considers IPCC communication strategy in light of the literature previously 
reviewed. Given the importance of climate change, significant questions relate to whether 
CCC has been impacted by the scholarly criticisms of and recommendations for science 
communication in general, and by the attention given to improving CCC. The chapter 
concludes with a synthesis of the literature reviewed.  
How Science Provides its Expertise to Society 
With the growth of the environmental movement and sustainability, science 
communication has transitioned from a primarily internal scientific function, dominated 
by peer review publishing, to a visible public and political act when scientists work to 
persuade society to take action to mitigate risk. Some scholars question whether science 
is alone capable of assessing or managing risks in society’s best interest and suggest 
including input from all of the stakeholders. A common criticism found in the literature is 
that scientists tend to convey to society their knowledge and recommendations for action 
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in a largely one-way flow from science to society and, scholars argue, with potentially 
disastrous consequences. 
One of the more interesting analyses of the relationship between science and 
society can be found in Brian Wynne’s analysis of science-based restrictions imposed on 
Cumbrian sheep farmers in England following the Russian nuclear disaster at Chernobyl 
in 1986. The story takes place in the central highlands of England, in the vicinity of a 
cold-war era nuclear munitions and fuel processing facility at Sellafield that had suffered 
a major fire and release of radioactive cesium in 1957. The local population had been told 
very little about the accident but locals, including sheep farmers, had quietly suspected a 
perceived increase in the incidence of leukemia was related to the fire and long-term 
radiation leakage from the plant. Scientists and British government officials had assured 
them otherwise, and while the issue had ebbed, it had not gone away. 
After the Chernobyl disaster, British authorities predicted a temporary 
contamination of the central highlands with radioactive cesium from the stricken Russian 
nuclear plant and required sheep farmers to keep their mutton and milk products off the 
market for a few weeks until the contamination was sufficiently diluted and absorbed into 
the soils. Scientists and government officials misapplied previous soil research and 
grossly underestimated the decontamination time, resulting in a series of increasingly 
draconian restrictions on the farmers, many of whom suffered serious financial and 
physical damage to their farming operations as a result. The scientists followed up with 
additional mistakes in soil and animal testing procedures that could have been avoided 
had they heeded the farmer’s local expertise on farming and weather patterns. Although 
the scientists' mistakes were exposed, they never admitted to them, continued to discount 
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the farmers' knowledge and culture, and the farmers lost trust in the scientists and 
government. Wynne’s assessment is: 
Trust, or trustworthiness, and credibility are relational terms, about the nature of 
the social relationships between the actors concerned. They are not intrinsic to 
either actor nor to the information said to be transmitted… … the best explanatory 
concepts for understanding public responses to scientific knowledge and advice 
are not trust and credibility per se, but the social relationships, networks and 
identities from which these are derived. If we view these social relationships as 
incomplete, and open to continual (re)construction through the negotiation of 
responses to social interventions such as the scientists represented, we can see 
trust and credibility more as contingent variables, influencing the uptake of 
knowledge, but dependent upon the nature of these evolving relationships and 
identities. (Wynne, 1992a, p. 282). 
Wynne argued that the public acceptance of science depends on public trust in 
science, which is not a product inherent to the science but is rather a function of the 
relationship between the pubic and science. The scientific community defines credibility 
internally, according to scientific norms that may not be salient with the public or policy-
makers. Rather, public acceptance of science depends on the credibility that the public is 
willing to invest in science, which is mediated by the nature of the social relationship 
between science and the public, it is not intrinsic to either party or to the scientific 
information conveyed (Wynne, 1992a). Scholars claim that scientists tend to assume that 
their science is inherently credible and that problems with the public acceptance of 
science are attributable to a public deficit of some sort. 
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The Deficit Model 
Scholars who study the Public Understanding of Science (PUS) call this 
perspective the deficit model, in which problems in the public uptake of science 
necessary for effective risk assessment and risk management relate to the public’s 
inability to comprehend the science, or a public deficit in scientific knowledge. “A deficit 
perspective works on the assumption that those without scientific knowledge have a 
deficit that needs to be filled through the one-way transmission of information from 
experts to learners” (Cooper, 2011, p. 231). Sheila Jasanoff described this as the linear 
view of science communication that assumes: 
…reasonable people the world over will perceive environmental threats 
and challenges in the same way, especially if they are shown how to look at them 
by science. This perspective on risk and its scientific representation asserts itself 
with the confidence of a supreme artist. Just let science show people the truth, and 
they will acknowledge its power and agree to live by it (Jasanoff, 1999, p. 148). 
Studies concerning the PUS have pointed to the failure of the scientific 
community to accurately assess and effectively respond to the public, and have 
underlined the need to reconsider the assumed framework under which the scientific 
community engages the public (Wynne, 1992a, 1992b, 1993). Cooper (2011) claimed 
that democratic policy making requires that the public have trust in science in order to 
have any chance of dealing with urgent threats such as climate change. She suggested 
that science dispense with the notion that any shortfall in the public understanding of 
science be attributed to a public deficit and recommended more participative interaction 
between science and society (Cooper, 2011). 
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Proposed Improvements for Science Communication 
A variety of improvements for science communication have been proposed, many 
of which involve increasing public or stakeholder engagement. The CAISE Inquiry 
Group Project argued that Public Engagement with Science (PES) was a necessary 
strategy to include the views of all publics and policy makers in the deliberation of 
scientific activity and policy, and emphasized mutual learning and participation 
(McCallie, 2009). Cash, et al proposed ideas for linking science to action in which 
scientific information should be relevant to stakeholders by being credible, salient, and 
legitimate. They found one-way communication, from scientists to society, ineffective 
and recommended a communication process that was active, iterative, and inclusive 
(Cash et al., 2003). Other scholars who have impugned the deficit model have called for 
more public engagement in scientific communication (Groffman et al., 2010; Talwar et 
al., 2011). However, while calling for the inclusion of other ways of knowing and the co-
production of science with stakeholders, some scholars were simultaneously concerned 
about compromising the integrity of science with in-expert stakeholder involvement 
(Talwar et al., 2011). Other scholars have worried that a purely democratic development 
of science-based policy, unduly privileges inexpert perspectives and may lead to poor 
decision-making (Nelson, 2009). In discussing the democratic control of science, Kitcher 
(2003) argued that tutoring of decision-makers regarding policy-critical science would be 
necessary to avoid what he termed vulgar democracy in which ignorance or self-interest 
might be privileged (Kitcher, 2003). While some scholars express concern about 
involving non-experts in the production of scientific knowledge and in science-based 
decision-making, a great deal of the literature that is focused on improving science 
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communication suggests two-way communication between scientists and stakeholders, 
and a greater role for stakeholders in policy related science. 
A wide variety of examples can be found in which knowledge from other 
disciplines has been proposed to improve science communication. Some scholars have 
proposed using existing knowledge from the communication and behavior disciplines 
(Moser, 2010). Interpersonal competence, including advanced communication skills, has 
been identified as critical for sustainability practitioners (Wiek, Withycombe, Redman, & 
Mills, 2011). Research in facilitation suggests that ideologically divergent parties may be 
engaged productively through the co-creation of knowledge, which can produce 
relational empathy, new shared perceptions of the problem, and an emergent new culture 
(Broome, 1993). Cultural theorists who synthesized Mary Douglas’ typology of social 
relationships to create a new framework of environmental and social rationalities 
suggested that people with different philosophies and varying ideologies were necessary 
to decision making and to creating innovative outcomes (Schwarz, 1990). Similarly, in 
his study of wildlife management in the Pacific Northwest, Swedlow (2012) documented 
the efforts to preserve the Spotted Owl, and showed how the social and cultural 
transformations that occurred were co-produced by scientists, judges, and 
environmentalists and suggested that the inter-relatedness of Mary Douglas’ Four States 
may be necessary to the survival of each (Swedlow, 2012). 
The discipline of psychology has been considered for the potential of various 
communication strategies in influencing environmental behavior. Stern (2000) studied 
how psychology might be used to influence behavior (Stern, 2000). Arvai and Gregory 
(2003) found that a values approach was more successful than a technical approach in 
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aiding environmental decision making (Arvai, 2003). The psychologist Jonathan Haidt 
(2001) argued that reasoning with people may be less effective than appealing to a 
person’s morals and values (Haidt, 2001). Similarly, Kahan (2014) argued that people 
were unable to reason both as pure knowledge seekers and as cultural competitors who 
were attempting to protect their social identity (Kahan, 2014). Other research found that 
ideology could foster factual misperceptions which factual corrections would not correct 
but might even strengthen in the most committed ideologues (Nyhan, 2010). In addition, 
scientists are also actively experimenting with ideas to improve science communication 
including the use of various communication models, media, framings, vernacular, and 
interactive simulations. (Falk, 2011; E. G. T. Green & Clemence, 2008; Nisbet, 2009; 
Sondergaard, 2003; Sterman, 2011). The efforts to apply psychology are noteworthy 
because they are largely intended to improve scientists’ communication and do not address 
problems with linear communication that have been identified by other scholars. 
Synthesis of the Literature on Science Communication 
The literature on science communication contains emphatic criticism of the deficit 
model in favor of more participative approaches, but an abiding commitment in science 
communication remains the education of the public. Scholars have recognized that the 
public and policy-makers are not likely to support policy action without a clear 
conception of the critical science involved (Moser, 2010), thus reinforcing the need for 
effective science communication and an educated public. So while some of the literature 
devoted to improving science communication is critical of linear communication and the 
deficit model, some of it remains focused on facilitating the flow of knowledge from 
science to the public thus retaining some characteristics of the deficit model, making it 
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difficult to discern the point at which linear communication might become hegemonic. 
The legitimate need for communicating science to the public may easily form inadvertent 
cover for the continuation of underlying premises about the public that are enshrined in 
the deficit model. On this point Wynne proclaimed: “So, the deficit model is dead – long 
live the deficit model!” (Wynne, 2008) p 23. Important questions remain regarding how 
science provides critical expertise to society without compromising the science, and how 
science may avoid a hegemonic imposition on the public of select values and goals. The 
latter, scholars have argued, can result in the public losing trust in science, regardless of 
the internal perceptions of the credibility of the underlying science. 
In matters in which scientific knowledge is critical for good decision-making, it is 
in society’s interest that scientists assert their expertise, or society may face increased 
danger due to the failure to respond appropriately to looming risk. The scientific 
community has struggled to convince society about the risk of climate change and many 
researchers have linked the importance of science communication and public 
understanding, to the possibility for taking climate-related policy action (Boykoff, 2007; 
Diemberger et al., 2012; Greenberg, 2011; Jasanoff, 2010). Because of its importance, 
scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to climate change communication (CCC), 
which will be examined next. 
Climate Change Communication (CCC) 
Climate scientists have achieved a significant consensus that human activity is 
causing dangerous climate change (Cook, 2013; Farnsworth, 2012; IPCC, 2013b; 
Oreskes, 2005), but a smaller proportion of the public and policy makers agree with the 
scientific assessment (Leiserowitz, 2012; PEW, 2013). The 2013 Cook study shows that 
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97% of actively publishing climate scientists believe that anthropogenic climate change is 
real but a 2013 PEW survey shows that only 54% of the American public accept 
anthropogenic climate change. Many scholars view this as a communication failure and 
climate change communication (CCC) has emerged as a growing sub-discipline of 
science communication. 
Although research into the Earth’s climate and global warming has been ongoing 
in the scientific community since the 19th century, CCC largely did not reach the public 
until the 1980’s. Previously, most scientific research about climate had been performed 
by individual scientists or small groups and published through narrow scientific channels 
with little or no public exposure to the growing body of science that supported the idea 
that human activity might impact climate (Weart, 2008). During the 1980’s, climate 
scientists that were convinced of the need to take action began to organize to convince 
government leaders about the need for policy change to reduce GHG emissions. A variety 
of institutions brought climate science to bear on the policy process such as the United 
Nations Environment Program, the World Meteorological Society, and the International 
Council for Scientific Unions (Weart, 2008), but one has risen to unparalleled 
prominence in CCC; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
The IPCC is the world’s leading CCC organization and synthesizes climate 
science, develops consensus scientific opinion about the science, and prepares 
comprehensive reports called Assessment Reports (AR). In addition to the underlying 
climate science, the ARs contain scientists’ consensus opinion about risks to society from 
climate change and action that could be taken to mitigate or adapt to the risks. In this 
process, IPCC scientists practice a linear communication with society on climate change 
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(Beck, 2011), in which they determine the cause of the problem and possible solutions 
and communicate this assessment to policy-makers and the public. While IPCC policy 
requires its communication to be policy-relevant but policy-neutral (IPCC, 2011a), 
scholars are divided on whether the IPCC is indeed neutral and objective. The IPCC 
defends its objectivity and neutrality while critics accuse it of partisan behavior in 
support of a select climate change mitigation regime (Hulme, 2010). 
Despite a long established commitment to neutrality, commentaries from the 
chairman of the IPCC provide examples of partisan behavior and insight as to the intent of 
the organization that compromise claims of neutrality: In a 2009 newspaper interview, 
IPCC Chairman, Rajendra Pachauri argued in favor of a variety of select values and 
policies, such as the heavy taxation of automobile and airline travel, and claimed that 
western lifestyles were unsustainable (Guardian, 2009). This assessment and prescription is 
common within the scientific consensus, but it denigrates western societies and has been 
rejected by them for decades. 
Following the 2010 “Climategate” controversy (Bagla, 2010; Jasanoff, 2010; 
Schiermeier, 2010), the IPCC adopted formal communication policy that applies to all of 
their communication, verbal and written, establishes that the IPCC Chair speaks for the 
organization, and requires objectivity, neutrality, transparency, and balance (IPCC, 2011b). 
Then in December of 2011, Pachauri participated in a video-taped discussion panel with Sir 
Richard Branson and Governor Jerry Brown of California. During the discussion, Pachauri 
joked that “those who are becoming obstacles in implementing what is rational should be 
made the responsibility of Sir Richard to give (a) one-way ticket to outer space. Of course 
space would be unfortunate to get some of these fellows” (Pachauri, 2011min 55:23). In 
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this quote, Pachauri implied that only the scientific assessment was rational and he 
ridiculed those he considered obstacles to implementing the science-based 
recommendations. 
More important perhaps, are prepared closing remarks Pachauri made to the 
Conference of the Parties meeting in Doha, Qatar in November, 2012. Here Pachauri 
argued that societies should shape their actions on all aspects of climate change, on the 
basis of the scientific evidence which was more compelling than ever, and he conceded no 
other knowledge was necessary to meet the challenge of climate change (Pachauri, 2012). 
At the highest level, IPCC communication reveals support for only one class of policies, 
criticism for those who disagree, and the expectation that society should simply heed the 
voice of science. Not only is the behavior of the senior IPCC executive in conflict with 
official IPCC policy, it is a vestige of the deficit model, a one-way engagement in which 
society is deficient of the needed scientific knowledge and values. 
The IPCC emerged from the growing advocacy of the scientific community for 
global climate policy and was constituted expressly to provide climate change knowledge 
to the international policy process (IPCC, 1990b; Weart, 2008). While scholars continue 
to debate whether it is possible for scientists to provide neutral policy advice, the IPCC 
has a stated goal of providing policy relevant yet policy neutral assessments. In 
recognition of Mertonian norms, the IPCC goal of objectivity and neutrality is claimed to 
maintain IPCC credibility (IPCC, 2011c). However, recall that public audiences lose trust 
in scientists when they engaged in policy discourse. Policy advocacy by the climate 
science community is not only common; it may be its distinguishing feature. Yet despite 
clear policy advocacy from its highest level, the IPCC maintains that some dimension of 
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its communication is neutral and objective. The discordant IPCC parsing of the 
distinction between neutrality and advocacy is a practical manifestation of the scholarly 
disagreement about what precisely defines advocacy, along with the theoretical attempt to 
rationalize advocacy in order to comply with the social norms of science in service of 
claims to credibility. 
Whether or not the IPCC engages in policy advocacy, it has consistently aligned a 
growing body of scientific evidence largely with only one mitigation regime which 
compromise its claims to balance8. Each IPCC AR has produced growing confidence 
about the scientific consensus on climate change and the need for mitigation (Christ, 
2008), yet public dissent from these expert pronouncements about climate change 
persists. The imposition on society of ever more science in support of the scientific 
consensus reveals the premise that the public is deficient in a way that must be remedied 
with the application of additional scientific knowledge, which is a vestige of the deficit 
model (Wynne, 2008). Other scholars have expressed similar criticism: 
Supporters of the existing climate regime continue to believe that the problem is 
one of convincing the opposition about the truth of the science. One reason they 
believe this is that they can imagine no other policy approach than the one created 
at the 1992 UN Conference in Rio de Janeiro. After all, the science dictates the 
policy (Sarewitz, 2011). 
Some scholars have proposed alternatives to the consensus scientific assessment 
by arguing that much of the future climate change risk is associated with population 
                                                 
8 IPCC policy uses a variety of terms related to non-partisanship; objectivity, neutrality, transparency, 
balance; none of which they define. In this context balance may refer to equal consideration; which is 
related to, if not an aspect of, neutrality. 
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growth, and where people choose to build and live, rather than strictly a result of climate 
change (Pielke Jr, 2005). Other scholars have raised significant doubts about the 
consensus mitigation regime which targets a 5 percent reduction in global GHG 
emissions below 1990 levels. However, atmospheric GHG stabilization alone requires an 
85 percent reduction in fossil energy use, suggesting that the consensus mitigation regime 
is not only insufficient but implausible, and that other solutions, such as atmospheric 
carbon dioxide scavenging will be required (Broecker, 2010). Climate scientists have 
been aware of these daunting proportions for thirty years (Broecker, 2013) but have 
persisted with emissions reduction as the primary climate change solution. Two decades 
of societies' dissent with this policy idea represent the failure of the climate science 
community to contemplate critical stakeholder feedback and to consider other knowledge 
and other value systems. Sarewitz (2011) argued that tying science to only one climate 
change mitigation plan has damaged the credibility of science. “Meanwhile, and perhaps 
more dangerously, the cultural legitimacy of science as a source of disinterested, reliable 
insight into reality has been badly damaged” (Sarewitz, 2011). The term “cultural 
legitimacy of science” is reminiscent of Wynne’s (2001) assertion that scientific 
credibility in the public sphere is the credibility that society is willing to invest in science 
and not what scientists think is credible. 
Discussion  
Scholarly criticisms of science communication appear true of CCC: scientists tend to 
privilege scientific knowledge and assume that it is both necessary and sufficient to solve 
science-based problems for society. In this diagnosis, scientists’ communication with 
society is linear, and largely assumes that the public is deficient in some way that can be 
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remedied only with the application of additional scientific knowledge. Wynne (1992) 
claimed that scientists acting in this model do damage to both society and to their own 
credibility. The literature reveals a growing discourse that is focused on improving science 
communication, but the practice of CCC remains firmly entrenched in the deficit model – a 
one-way channel of communication in which climate scientists impose a select assessment 
and mitigation regime on society, and society’s divergence confirms the deficit premise. 
Wynne’s (2006) argument that the deficit model prevailed within the scientific community 
remains true in CCC: 
What is typically called ‘public rejection of science’ is properly described as public 
rejection of commitments based on value commitments that are misunderstood and 
misrepresented by scientists and policy experts as if solely scientifically 
determined. The same entrenched cultural assumption gives rise to the deeply 
problematic habit of describing public issues involving scientific questions as 
‘scientific issues’ (or ‘risk issues’, and public responses as ‘perceptions of risk’). 
This culture of scientism, or institutionalized idolatry of science, is bound to treat 
public rejection of those things done in the name of science, as rejection of science, 
because it has already so falsely narrowed its moral imagination to the idea that 
support for the policy stance is determined by scientific fact, and that no alternative 
is left. Thus, some kind of public deficit model explanation of public rejection or 
mistrust ‘of science’ is almost preordained as a function of this scientistic, culturally 
entrenched premise about the basic meaning of the issue at hand (Wynne, 2006b, p. 
214). 
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Wynne (1992) found that Cumbrian sheep farmers were no longer willing to 
concede the authority of scientific recommendations once it involved the heavy-handed 
restructuring of their cultural traditions and livelihoods. The mistakes and dismissive 
arrogance of scientists and authorities, the hegemonic, one-way nature of the 
communication with and treatment of the farmers, along with the detrimental policies 
they implemented, led to farmers completely losing trust in science and the British 
government on the matter: 
However, the dimension of this issue which drew in the farmers, and on which 
they had the most confidence to judge the outside experts and to criticize them, 
was the fact that this time, expert responses to the crisis constituted massive 
interventions, disruptions and denigrations of their normal practices and 
livelihood. The administrative restrictions introduced by the Government to 
prevent contaminated lamb from reaching the market were tantamount to large-
scale social control and reorganization, and denial of essential aspects of the 
farmers’ social identity, to an extent that the outside experts and bureaucrats did 
not remotely recognize (Wynne, 1992a, p. 295). 
Wynne’s analysis forebodes the present practice in CCC. In his 2009 Guardian 
interview, Pachauri denigrated western lifestyles and proposed interventions designed to 
control human behavior and achieve a particular solution to climate change. The IPCC 
chairman’s remarks reveal attitudes toward society that are similar to those Wynne 
(1992) found among the scientists and policy-makers toward Cumbrian sheep farmers, 
which proved to be damaging to the farmers and to the scientists’ credibility. There is 
sufficient scientific evidence about dangerous climate change to warrant urgent policy 
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discourse but the imposition of the scientific community’s assessments and 
recommendations have steadfastly failed to convince society sufficiently to create 
momentum for policy action. There is little evidence that the continuation of linear, 
deficit premised CCC will ultimately convince society to take action. 
Conclusion 
The attempt of scientists to persuade society is of interest in this dissertation 
because while scientific knowledge alone may not be sufficient to solve wicked problems 
like climate change, it is nevertheless critically important. Society may make 
catastrophically poor decisions without the contribution of scientists and it may yet prove 
tragic that society has largely not been moved to act to mitigate climate change. 
Compounding the problem for scientists are the Mertonian norms which discourage 
scientists from having a personal interest in their research and compel many to rationalize 
their work as neutral and objective. From their communication and behavior, it is clear 
that many climate scientists do have a personal interest and would like to see climate 
mitigation policy enacted, but the social norms of science inhibit their open advocacy for 
climate policy. This tension is evident when the IPCC chairman openly advocates, while 
his organization espouses objectivity and neutrality. 
Scientific credibility in the public sphere appears to be mediated less by scientific 
conceptions about it and more by the relationship which science negotiates with society. 
Although scientific knowledge is important to society, scientific hegemony may be 
harmful to both society and science. Public distrust of science appears to occur when 
science communication strays from the facts and ventures into policy discourse: in other 
words when scientists venture away from neutral and objective information about ‘what 
  72 
is’ and into discourse about what ‘should be’. If this is true, would it be possible to 
identify purportedly neutral and objective communication that is instead an expression 
about ‘what should be’? Chapter 5 examines selected IPCC reports to identify 
communication that is submitted as neutral and objective but that is instead an expression 
about ‘what should be’. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF IPCC REPORTS 
 “Yet it is equally clear that knowledge of what is does not open the door 
directly to what should be” (Einstein, 1950).  
 
Introduction 
Chapter 5 is a content analysis of IPCC reports that looks for purportedly neutral 
and objective communication about ‘what is’ that is instead an expression about ‘what 
should be’. Content from the First Assessment Report (FAR) is contrasted with content 
from the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5); both reports are examined for communication 
about ‘what should be’. Communication about ‘what is’ is essentially factual, or that 
which is verifiable in some way and therefore neutral and objective. Communication that 
deals with ‘what should be’ will be distinct from factual information by including 
subjective expressions of value, opinion, and judgment for example. Communication 
about ‘what should be’ is of interest in this dissertation because it is a distinguishing 
feature of sustainability science and CCC. 
IPCC intent has long been to provide policy neutral assessments but prior to AR5, 
the IPCC adopted communication policy that requires neutrality and objectivity (IPCC, 
2011a), thus apparently changing the standard to which their communicators would be 
held. Both FAR and AR5 should be policy neutral but differences between the two might 
reveal communication considered neutral for FAR that did not meet the new standard 
established before AR5. The chapter ends by drawing conclusions about the analysis and 
identifying and discussing its weaknesses. 
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In 2010, the IPCC suffered a credibility crisis when mistakes were found in AR4 
and leaked emails appeared to show that IPCC scientists had acted as partisans in order to 
advance an agenda (Bagla, 2010; Jasanoff, 2010; Schiermeier, 2010). In response to this 
credibility crisis, the IPCC adopted formal policy that requires their communication to be 
objective and neutral in order to assure its credibility (IPCC, 2011c). The new policy 
codified IPCC's intent to remain neutral; however, the IPCC still intended to provide 
policy relevant information. An important question is whether scientific information that 
is policy relevant can be neutral, or conversely whether neutral information can be policy 
relevant. The Co-Chair of IPCC Working Group Three echoed the latter and expressed 
frustration with the challenge: “The IPCC has a choice; either it can find a way to present 
the assessment of climate policies in government-approved summary documents or to run 
the risk of becoming less policy-relevant” (Edenhofer, 2014). 
Methodology 
This chapter analyzes IPCC reports in order to identify communication submitted 
as neutral and objective that may instead comprise some level of communication or 
persuasion or advocacy about ‘what should be’. Any of the three terms; communication 
or persuasion or advocacy will suffice as it relates to ‘what should be’ because the word 
should implies persuasion. But for this dissertation I will continue to use scientist 
advocacy to refer to scientists expressing support for what they think ‘should be’.  
Although the literature does not provide a coherent definition for scientist 
advocacy, one is needed for this exercise but it may be easier to first define what kind of 
communication is not advocacy and then argue why all other communication represents 
some level of advocacy. Accused of partisan behavior, the IPCC reified the Mertonian 
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norms of objectivity and neutrality (IPCC, 2011c), and I applied this standard and 
exempted from advocacy neutral and objective communication. In Merton’s context 
neutral is value-free and objective is factual. In this definition, communication that strays 
from the facts represented some level of advocacy, as did communication that included 
the expression of value. This definition may seem expansive unless we take Merton and 
the IPCC at their word. Furthermore, given that persuasion is a prominent feature of 
scientist activity relating to sustainability problems such as climate change, scientists 
might better prepare to persuade should they imagine that they are persuading anytime 
when they are not truly communicating in an objective and neutral manner. Operational 
detail for coding the IPCC reports can be found below. 
For this research, I analyzed CCC from the IPCC because it represents the 
consensus scientific view on climate change and it is based on the synthesis of current 
credible scientific climate research. The IPCC is the globally recognized voice on 
climate. Other non-government and government organizations, such as the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, and NASA, produce CCC, but none have dedicated as much effort 
to synthesize total climate research, none have worked as hard to achieve scientific 
consensus, and none is more representative of or more recognized as the scientific 
authority on climate change. Moreover, some U.S. agencies that publish CCC are 
formally precluded from advocacy, however they may define it. 
The IPCC is organized into three Working Groups (WG). WG1 synthesizes the 
scientific knowledge about climate change, WG2 uses that scientific knowledge to 
predict the human impacts of climate change, and WG3 considers the work from the 
other two WGs, and identifies and assesses mitigation and adaptation scenarios for 
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climate change. While based on the science from WG1, WGs 2 and 3 are in total the 
opinion of the panel about climate change effects and solutions. However, WG1 is the 
science basis for climate change and the most likely to contain policy relevant but policy 
neutral information and hence meet the IPCC goal of objectivity and neutrality. The WGs 
each provide a Summary for Policy Makers (SPM) which is co-authored by the scientists 
who produced the underlying reports, and government representatives. SPMs are a good 
choice for this analysis because they are carefully edited in a painstaking process that 
should result in their meeting IPCC communication standards. 
For this research, I examined IPCC WG1 SPMs in the 1990 and 2013 assessment 
reports because SPMs are targeted to policy makers and are more likely than the 
underlying reports to be read by the public and policy makers. The balance of this 
analysis deals with the Summaries for Policy Makers (SPM) for Working Group One 
(WG1) and compares those documents from the 1990 First Assessment Report (FAR) 
with those from the fifth assessment report in 2013, (AR5). I will henceforth refer to the 
1990 SPM and the 2013 SPM. 
I loaded the 1990 and 2013 SPM’s into the Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) 
software Atlas.ti, and coded the data to apply the definition of scientist advocacy 
described above and detailed below. Sections that were factual and value free were 
considered neutral and objective, and not advocacy. Communication that expressed value 
was coded as advocacy. Expression of value could be explicit or implicit, and could be 
found in opinion, in judgments, in normative statements, in statements that were linked 
mitigation policy, or to controversial matters. In controversial matters it is not possible to 
take a neutral position. I used the following definitions for basic codes: 
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• Factual: Citing facts and adhering to facts. A fact is something that has 
actually happened, or is actually the case. This would include IPCC 
uncertainty qualifiers when they truthfully reflect the scientists’ level of 
confidence in the related statement. Facts are verifiable which in science 
requires repeatability. Examples in this analysis include temperature 
observations, proven or broadly accepted scientific understandings of the 
natural world such as the greenhouse effect. 
• Controversial: Engaging subject matter that is publicly controversial, such 
as the human attribution to climate change. While there is little doubt in 
the scientific community that the human use of fossil fuels contributes to 
global warming, this has been challenged as rationale for supporting 
climate change mitigation by opponents of the scientific consensus, and it 
remains controversial. It is not possible to take a neutral position in a 
controversy. 
• Normative: Expressing a prescription. For example: “Limiting climate 
change will require substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas 
emissions” (IPCC, 2013b, p. 19). Such statements argue for a course of 
action and are advocacy for it, they are not neutral. 
• Value based: An expression of the (un)desirability of something. The key 
defining feature of this code is that these statements are not neutral about 
the subject and reveal information about the author’s values. In IPCC 
reports the expression of value commonly implies that something is 
undesirable. For example; ocean acidification bears a negative connotation 
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that the numerical pH data would not connote, except perhaps to a marine 
biologist. But IPCC SPMs are targeted to policy makers who may not 
understand the implications of the pH data but who would likely 
understand the implication that acidification was undesirable.  
• Opinion: A belief or way of thinking about something. Some examples 
include: “The long-lived gases would require immediate reductions in 
emissions from human activities of over 60% to stabilize their 
concentrations at today's levels… Carbon dioxide has been responsible for 
over half the enhanced greenhouse effect in the past, and is likely to 
remain so in the future ” (IPCC, 1990b, p. XI). These statements of 
opinion are not neutral and align the reports with the scientific consensus 
on climate change and to advocacy for mitigation. 
• Judgment: Drawing a conclusion. For example: “Continuation of present 
day emissions are committing us to increased future concentrations, and 
the longer emissions continue to increase, the greater would reductions 
have to be to stabilize at a given level” (IPCC, 1990b, p. XVII). These 
judgments are not neutral and align with the scientific consensus on 
climate change and to advocacy for mitigation. 
• Linked to mitigation policy: Scientific findings and assessments that are 
linked to the prevailing global policy initiative to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. These statements are not neutral. 
Data were coded for all the codes that might apply to a particular passage. For 
example, a passage could be simultaneously coded as controversial, normative, value-
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based, opinion, judgment, and linked to mitigation policy, but this passage would not 
likely also be coded as factual. However, a passage could be factual and controversial. I 
provide examples in my analysis for the application of combinations of codes. In 
addition, I developed a super-code by querying the data: Strictly factual identifies data 
that is coded factual but not assigned any other code. 
Analysis: 1990 Summary for Policymakers (SPM), Working Group One 
The executive summary of the 1990 SPM begins with a statement that is factual: 
“There is a natural greenhouse effect which already keeps the Earth warmer than it would 
otherwise be” (IPCC, 1990b, p. XI). This is an example of a statement that cites and 
adheres to established scientific fact, is not controversial, does not draw conclusions, 
does not express an opinion, is not normative, is not value-based, and is not linked to 
climate change mitigation policy. This passage was coded as factual and no other codes 
were applied, making the passage strictly factual, or an example of a neutral statement. 
Note that this statement is not policy relevant. In contrast, the executive summary cites 
the report’s purpose, which is reproduced below: 
The purpose of the Working Group I report, as determined by the first meeting of 
IPCC, is to provide a scientific assessment of  
1) The factors which may affect climate change during the next century, 
especially those which are due to human activity  
2) The responses of the atmosphere - ocean - land - ice system  
3) Current capabilities of modelling global and regional climate changes and their 
predictability  
4) The past climate record and presently observed climate anomalies 
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(IPCC, 1990b, p. XIII) 
This passage primarily describes an outline for the scientific assessment of 
climate change. But note that the reference to human attribution introduces policy 
relevance to the discourse. Recall from earlier chapters that human attribution to climate 
change has become publicly and politically controversial, as has climate modelling, and 
the idea that climate scientists are agenda driven. Thus, this passage was coded 
controversial. I applied the view of some scholars that when scientists engage in a 
controversial issue that a neutral position will not be possible and any communication 
will align to specific interests in the controversy and become tantamount to advocacy. In 
this analysis, the passage reveals some level of intent to persuade the audience by 
suggesting that humans may bear responsibility for climate change, which could justify 
human action to correct the problem. 
Indeed a response by some who are opposed to climate change mitigation has 
been to deny human attribution and claim that climate change, if any, was due only to 
natural variability. In addition, the accuracy of climate modeling has been challenged as a 
basis for scientists’ call for climate policy action. Other opponents have accused climate 
scientists of pursuing an agenda and the appearance of human attribution in the purpose 
statement of an IPCC report might reveal the presence of a preexisting agenda. 
Following a strictly factual first paragraph, the executive summary of the 1990 
SPM continues with a statement that is coded as controversial, judgment (drawing a 
conclusion), opinion (a belief or way of thinking about something), and it is linked 
(through human attribution) to the need for mitigation policy. Here it is: 
  81 
Emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the 
atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide, methane, 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and nitrous oxide. These increases will enhance the 
greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional warming of the Earth's 
surface. (IPCC, 1990b, p. XI). 
Although this statement represents the fundamental scientific consensus on 
climate change, it is not neutral and this assessment continues to be rejected by a 
significant U.S. population led by prominent opponents to climate policy such as the U.S. 
Senator from Oklahoma, James Inhofe, who authored the 2012 book: “The Greatest 
Hoax: How the Global Warming Conspiracy Threatens Your Future” (Inhofe, 2012). 
Inhofe’s opinion may be regarded by scientists as extreme and not worthy of 
consideration but this kind of opposition has slowed the development of climate policy in 
the U.S. The dismissal by scientists of extreme opposing ways of knowing has thus far 
not eliminated the impact that opposition continues to wield. Neither do all of those in 
opposition to climate policy deny the related scientific facts about climate change. A 
majority of Americans believe that global warming is happening, even though there 
remains resistance to climate policy in the U.S. (PEW, 2014), suggesting that it is not the 
science that Americans find objectionable as much as the policy recommendations.  
I expected to find in the 1990 SPM a high incidence of the code normative 
(expressing a prescription), however, the only code with lower frequency than normative 
with 16, was the super code strictly factual with 12. Otherwise, normative language was 
largely absent in the 1990 SPM. An example of a passage that was coded normative 
involved some form of prescription, in this case specifying a level of GHG emissions 
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reductions: “The long-lived gases would require immediate reductions in emissions from 
human activities of over 60% to stabilize their concentrations at today's levels, methane 
would require a 15-20% reduction” (IPCC, 1990b, p. XI). This statement pertains to 
mitigation targets that are the explicit purview of WG3, but it is based on the science. 
Nevertheless, the statement is not neutral, it is normative and in this analysis advocates 
for mitigation. 
Some passages were coded as factual and also coded as controversial because the 
material adhered to facts but has nevertheless become controversial. The example below 
cites scientific facts, however the use of paleo climatology has been challenged by 
opponents who claim that the Earth’s atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations have 
been as much as twelve times higher without coinciding with higher temperatures during 
periods millions of years ago that are not covered by the relatively recent ice-core data 
cited by the IPCC (Hieb, 2009). Without addressing this contravening argument, the 
passage below appears to selectively employ scientific evidence in support of a particular 
interpretation: 
Thirdly, measurements from ice cores going back 160,000 years show that the 
Earth’s temperature closely paralleled the amount of carbon dioxide and methane 
in the atmosphere. Although we do not know the details of cause and effect, 
calculations indicate that changes in these greenhouse gases were part, but not all, 
of the reason for the large (5 – 7º  C) global temperature swings between ice-ages 
and interglacial periods (IPCC, 1990b, p. XIV). 
The 1990 SPM made use of four different future emissions scenarios and I coded 
this data as controversial, judgment, linked to mitigation policy, normative, and opinion. 
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These emissions scenarios, shown in Figure 3 below, are controversial because they infer 
human attribution. The Business As Usual line represents judgment and opinion. 
Scenarios B, C, and D, are normative because they prescribe levels of mitigation policy 
for corresponding reductions (below Business As Usual) in GHG concentrations. 
Scenarios B, C, and D also emphasize the need for mitigation. 
 
Figure 4. IPCC Emissions Scenarios FAR 1990 (IPCC, 1990b, p. XX) 
I coded as value based any data that characterized the desirability of something. 
For example, this could be a reference to climate change induced extinction or to the 
commitment to future sea level rise, which both bear negative connotations that reveal the 
authors’ sense of its undesirability. There may be no way to express these kinds of 
scientific assessments without entanglement in questions of desirability, which 
underscores the difficulty of providing policy relevant information that is value-free. Yet 
these connotations are more contingent upon the values of the authors and the audience, 
(who may not agree) than on the underlying facts of the matter. 
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The code frequencies for the 1990 SPM are given in Table 1 and in Chart 1 
below. Though WG1 represents the scientific basis for climate change, codes for 
judgment and opinion were most frequent, followed by controversial. Factual and 
normative codes were recorded with the least frequency and there were comparatively 
moderate frequencies of the codes linked to mitigation policy and value based. Scientific 
assessments in this report largely provided indirect references to scientific facts that 
support the conclusions and opinion. Only nineteen passages were coded as factual, of 
which twelve were strictly factual. The 1990 SPM was intended to assess the science of 
climate change and not necessarily to advise or prescribe policy, and passages coded as 
normative were infrequent. I had expected to find more normative language. I argue that 
only language that is strictly factual may be considered neutral and objective, which 
comprised only twelve passages in the 1990 SPM. Strictly factual sections totaled 555 
words, or three percent of the 14,967 words in the SPM. 
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Table 1. 
Code frequency for 1990 IPCC FAR WG1 SPM 
Controversial Factual Judgment 
Linked to 
mitigation 





84 19 104 49 16 104 12 42 430 
Number of passages in the 1990 SPM that were assigned each code. Of the 430 codes 
assigned, only 12, or 3% of the word count, were considered neutral and objective. 
 
 
Chart 1. Code Frequencies for 1990 IPCC FAR WG1 SPM 
Analysis: 2013 Summary for Policymakers (SPM), Working Group One 
 The 2013 SPM, was produced under IPCC policy that increased the focus on 
remaining neutral and objective in order to preserve IPCC credibility. In my analysis of 
the 2013 SPM, I expected to find adjustments to IPCC communication practices that 
would reveal their application of this policy. Changes from 1990 to 2013 were expected 








Code Frequency: 1990 SPM
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in the past, while communication that remained unchanged would reveal language that 
IPCC authors believed was and continued to be neutral and objective. 
  The 2013 SPM does not provide an executive summary but begins in the 
introduction with a detailed description of the system employed by the authors to qualify 
their confidence in the assessments, and each main section of the report begins with an 
italicized paragraph that describes the scientific methodology that forms the basis for the 
assessment. Here is the description of the system employed by the authors to qualify their 
confidence in the assessments: 
The degree of certainty in key findings in this assessment is based on the author 
teams’ evaluations of underlying scientific understanding and is expressed as a 
qualitative level of confidence (from very low to very high) and, when possible, 
probabilistically with a quantified likelihood (from exceptionally unlikely to 
virtually certain). Confidence in the validity of a finding is based on the type, 
amount, quality, and consistency of evidence (e.g., data, mechanistic 
understanding, theory, models, expert judgment) and the degree of agreement. 
Probabilistic estimates of quantified measures of uncertainty in a finding are 
based on statistical analysis of observations or model results, or both, and expert 
judgment. Where appropriate, findings are also formulated as statements of fact 
without using uncertainty qualifiers. (IPCC, 2013b, p. 4). 
While references in the 1990 SPM to the scientific basis for the assessments were 
indirect, the system used in the 2013 SPM provides more precision with which to qualify 
the strength of the assessments. Note from the last sentence in the quote above that the 
IPCC has made a distinction between qualified assessments and what they believe to be 
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fact, which they would state without uncertainty qualifiers. It is a significant change from 
1990 that the IPCC chose to specifically distinguish factual information, and to qualify 
their confidence in other key findings that are not factual. Indeed, the most dramatic 
change from 1990 was the increase in codes for factual information.  
The 1990 SPM opened with a short statement that was coded factual but the 
second paragraph was coded as controversial, judgment, opinion, and linked to mitigation 
policy. In contrast the introduction of the 2013 SPM is clear and precise and I coded it 
strictly factual. Section B of the 2013 SPM recounts the observed changes in the climate 
system along with related assessments, and begins with the italicized paragraph, 
described above, that outlines the scientific methodology that forms the basis of the 
assessment. In contrast to the 1990 SPM, the description of methodology provides a clear 
and concise foundation for the factual observations about climate that follow, and it is 
reproduced here: 
Observations of the climate system are based on direct measurements and remote 
sensing from satellites and other platforms. Global-scale observations from the 
instrumental era began in the mid-19th century for temperature and other 
variables, with more comprehensive and diverse sets of observations available for 
the period 1950 onwards. Paleoclimate reconstructions extend some records back 
hundreds to millions of years. Together, they provide a comprehensive view of 
the variability and long-term changes in the atmosphere, the ocean, the 
cryosphere, and the land surface (IPCC, 2013b, p. 4). 
Each major section of the 2013 SPM begins with conclusive assessments about 
the material that follows and, as in the 1990 SPM, assessments in the 2013 SPM involved 
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judgment and opinion, and they were often value laden and controversial. While the 
observations on the climate are factual, the conclusions that lead from them do not adhere 
solely to facts. Here is the overall assessment leading into the 2013 SPM Section B on 
observations about Earth’s climate: 
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the 
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere 
and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level 
has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased. Each of the 
last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface than any 
preceding decade since 1850. In the Northern Hemisphere, 1983–2012 was likely 
the warmest 30-year period of the last 1400 years (medium confidence) (IPCC, 
2013b, pp. 4-5). 
This passage contains four sentences. The first sentence is stated as fact, with no 
uncertainty qualifier. But the statement was coded controversial because the subject is 
warming of the climate system and it suggests that warming since 1950 is unprecedented 
for millennia. A challenge to the scientific consensus on climate change that has gained 
traction with the public, claims that the Earth has been harmlessly warmer than the 
present for 9,000 of the last 10,000 years (Monckton, 2011). The characterization of 
unprecedented change was coded value based because it implies undesirability. The 
sentence was coded judgment because it draws a conclusion and opinion because it 
reveals a way of thinking about the Earth’s climate. The last sentence was likewise coded 
controversial, judgment, opinion, and value laden, but note how the authors qualified this 
statement as “medium confidence” thus conceding that the statement was not factual and 
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that it was rather something they believed with medium confidence. In other words, the 
authors conceded that the last sentence was opinion, which is itself a form of honesty or 
adherence to fact and may improve the credibility of the report. In contrast, the second 
and third sentences of the passage are examples of strictly factual language that is 
objective and neutral. Claims that the atmosphere and oceans have warmed are factual. 
The third sentence has a similar meaning to the first sentence, but instead of using 
adjectives like unequivocal and unprecedented, the sentence was worded to be factual. 
However factual they may be, the second and third sentences are also not policy relevant 
because they simply recount climate related observations. 
Section B, on observed changes to the climate system, continues through page 12 
of the 2013 SPM and covers the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere, sea level, and carbon and 
biogeochemical cycles. It includes a great deal of strictly factual observations worded 
like sentences two and three above, but interspersed with assessments that are variously 
controversial, opinion, judgment, value laden, normative, or linked to mitigation policy. 
Some of this material is fact–based and yet controversial and value laden. For example, 
Figure 4 below shows IPCC charts representing warming observations from the past and 
yet the material is controversial. Critically, the narrow time frame chosen for this chart 
does not cover the framing of decades to millennia used in the conclusive lead-in 
assessment to this section, thus overstating the observed temperature increases. The 
selective uses of time frames to produce charts with sharp temperature increases have 
become controversial (McLaughlin, 2009). “Hockey stick” temperature charts have 
become so controversial that that climate scientist Michael Mann, who may be most 
associated with the idea, has endured substantial public abuse and even death threats for 
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purportedly manipulating data for dramatic effect (McKie, 2012). Whether or not this is 
true, for many people the inconsistent application of analytical time frames appears to be 
the selective use of data for effect and it is controversial and has the appearance of the 
attempt to persuade. In the bottom figure, the authors could have chosen any color 
scheme to represent the global distribution of observed temperature increases but the 
colors of glowing embers have been deliberately chosen in other IPCC reporting to 
persuade the audience of risk or danger (Mahoney, 2012).  
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Figure 5. IPCC Observed Temperature Changes (IPCC, 2013b, p. 6). 
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The code frequency of the 2013 SPM compared to the 1990 SPM is given in 
Table 2 and plotted in Chart 2. Plausibly due to the continuing research since 1990, the 
2013 SPM contains a great deal more factual information. While individual statements in 
the 1990 SPM frequently combined indirect references to scientific fact to support a 
conclusion, the 2013 SPM contained more statements that appeared to be carefully 
worded to be strictly factual and entirely separated from assessments, that might be 
judgment, opinion, controversial, normative, etc. Indeed, the frequency of factual and 
strictly factual codes in the 2013 SPM both increased three-fold over the 1990 report, 
representing a dramatic increase in the authors’ emphasis on directly referencing factual 
information. In contrast to 1990, the 2013 SPM contained marginally fewer passages that 
were judgment, or opinion, but these remained the two most common of all codes for 
both reports. 
In contrast to 1990, the 2013 SPM contained a significant increase in value based 
statements suggesting that the authors perceived the expression of judgment, opinion, and 
values as complying with new IPCC policy that required its communication to be neutral 
and objective. Value based coding is commonly related to climate change impacts such as 
sea level rise, and the observed 2013 increase in code frequency could be the result of 
additional research producing growing evidence about climate change, but the authors 
would nevertheless have had to reconcile their communication with the new IPCC policy. 
Given the policy requiring objectivity and neutrality, the presence of value based (non-
neutral) communication in the 2013 report is more significant than the change. 
In contrast to 1990, the 2013 SPM contained a similar proportion of codes linked 
to mitigation policy but the change is less significant than the continuing presence of 
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policy related statements in a document ostensibly focused on science. The 2013 SPM 
contained an increase in controversial statements and the frequency of controversial 
statements remained high but the incidence of controversy may be beyond the sole 
purview of the authors, and mediated more by the prevailing political environment. As 
with the 1990 SPM, the 2013 SPM contained very little normative language and in 2013 
sections coded normative had dropped by nearly half to become the lowest frequency 
code. 
Table 2. 
Code Frequency for 1990 and 2013 SPM WG1 
  Contr. Factual Judge. 
Linked to 
mitigation 





1990 SPM 84 19 104 49 16 104 12 42 430 
2013 SPM 95 66 94 52 9 92 43 62 513 
Code frequency for the 1990 SPM and the 2013 SPM for WG1. 
The most dramatic change in communication practice from the 1990 SPM to the 
2013 SPM is the increase in factual statements. The IPCC intent to remain policy relevant 
may explain the continuing high frequency of judgment and opinion in the 2013 SPM, 
along with the growth in value laden language. Given the presence of IPCC policy 
requiring objectivity and neutrality, it is noteworthy that the three highest frequency 
codes in 2013 remained judgment, opinion, and controversial, which, in carefully 
prepared documents, implies that the IPCC believes this type of language complies with 
their policy. 
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Chart 2. Code frequencies for the 1990 SPM compared to the 2013 SPM for WG1. 
The communication patterns reflected in the 1990 and 2013 SPM’s support the 
idea that policy relevance requires more than strictly the facts of the matter, and demands 
commentary on the meaning of the facts, which requires the application of values, 
judgment, and opinion. Despite the presence of IPCC communication policy that required 
objectivity and neutrality, the bulk of the 2013 SPM contained language that was not 
objective and neutral and could be considered some level of advocacy, or intent to 
persuade as revealed in subjective expressions of judgments, opinions, and values. 
Conclusion 
 There is unresolved tension between the idea of being policy relevant and the idea 
of remaining policy neutral. Statements that adhere to the facts may enhance objectivity 
and neutrality, but statements without values, judgment, and opinion may not be policy 








Code Frequency: 1990 SPM vs 2013 SPM
1990 SPM 2013 SPM
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The globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature data as 
calculated by a linear trend, show a warming of 0.85 [0.65 to 1.06] °C, over the 
period 1880 to 2012, when multiple independently produced datasets exist. The 
total increase between the average of the 1850–1900 period and the 2003–2012 
period is 0.78 [0.72 to 0.85] °C, based on the single longest dataset available 
(IPCC, 2013b, p. 5). 
This statement is strictly factual; it simply conveys that certain datasets indicate 
that the Earth has warmed by a certain amount over a certain period. The statement does 
not indicate why the planet is warming, it does not indicate whether or not the warming is 
desirable, and it does not indicate whether or not anything should be done about the 
warming. The statement provides no information about policy, it is policy neutral. The 
problem for scientists who wish to influence policy matters is that facts alone can only 
state ‘what is’ and not ‘what should be’. Scientists who wish to derive meaning from 
facts are forced to negotiate facts and values and this necessarily involves their values, 
and those of other stakeholders, influencers and decision makers whose cooperation is 
required to advance policy. The negotiation of facts and values involves the attempt to 
persuade, or to advocate on some level, which will be revealed in the non-factual and 
non-neutral representations of the stakeholders thus negotiating. I argue that in IPCC 
SPM’s advocacy manifests in the author’s normative statements, judgments, statements 
of opinion, value based statements, in statements that are aligned to prevailing policy 
proposals; and statements that align the authors within a controversy; essentially 
everything that is not both factual and neutral. Despite the presence of IPCC 
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communication policy that requires objectivity and neutrality, my analysis indicates that 
the bulk of the 1990 and 2013 SPMs for WG1 contained some level of advocacy. 
Authors of the 1990 and 2013 SPMs either believed that their work remained 
neutral and objective or they perceived no other option for achieving policy relevance, 
which suggests that it is not possible to produce policy relevant communication that is 
also policy neutral. In policy relevant discourse, the facts will quickly be colored with the 
values, opinions, conclusions, and normative frameworks of the stakeholders, a process 
from which scientists are not exempt, regardless of their claims to neutrality and 
objectivity. 
I do not propose that scientists do not make claims about the meaning of scientific 
fact, quite the reverse; scientists must assert their expertise or society may make 
catastrophic decisions. However, I do argue that scientists recognize the truth in 
Einstein’s words; “that knowledge of what is does not open the door directly to what 
should be” (Einstein, 1950). As such, I argue that scientists recognize when their 
communication ceases to be neutral and objective, and that they develop skills to 
negotiate facts and values more effectively. This is the crux of the challenge for climate 
scientists and sustainability scientists; they must find a way to negotiate facts and values 
or risk becoming less policy relevant (Edenhofer, 2014). Conversely, scientists cannot 
make policy relevant assessments without engaging in some level of advocacy (Sarewitz, 
2012). It seems prudent that scientists engaged in policy, and sustainability scientists 
generally, develop skills of persuasion and negotiation for the likelihood that stakeholder 
engagement in service of problem solving will involve scientist advocacy.  
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A weakness of this analysis relates to subjectivity in the coding scheme. For 
example, it cannot be asserted unequivocally that a statement is value based; the decision 
involves a matter of some judgment, and another researcher may code differently and 
arrive at significantly different numbers. However, the value in this analysis is found 
more in the phenomena than the numbers and I do not believe numeric differences would 
invalidate the conclusions of this analysis unless a researcher were to use entirely 
different definitions for neutral and objective, which is plausible due to the range of 
opinion about advocacy visible in the academy. In carefully crafted reports that are 
purportedly neutral and objective, the substantial presence of non-neutral and non-
objective communication is meaningful. Furthermore, questions about coding precision 
quickly become an extension of the intractable debate in the academy about scientist 
advocacy. There does not appear to be a solution in sight, and rather than engage the 
advocacy debate, I propose the novel approach of assuming that one is advocating 
whenever one strays from strictly neutral and objective communication. Finally, 
dismissal of these conclusions would not obviate the need for scholars and scientists to 
deal the problems identified in this research. Challenges with scientist advocacy and the 
normative dimension of sustainability are important and I welcome the idea of 
subsequent investigations and that they might employ more robust methodology. 
This chapter has examined the plausible manifestation of scientist advocacy in 
IPCC communication, but without the communicator’s input on the subject. Chapter 6 
continues the discussion of scientist advocacy with structured interviews of scientists and 
non-scientists who were professionally engaged in climate change communication.  
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CHAPTER 6 
STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH PROFESSIONALS ENGAGED IN CLIMATE 
CHANGE COMMUNICATION 
Introduction 
Chapter 6 analyzes structured interviews9 with scientists and non-scientists who 
were professionally engaged in Climate Change Communication (CCC). The purpose of 
this research is to observe how the views of these professional climate science 
communicators compared with the scholarly views found in the first three chapters and 
with the IPCC analysis in Chapter 5. My primary interest remains the normative 
dimension of sustainability communication as manifested in climate science, and this 
research has steadily focused on the challenges of scientist advocacy and its conflict with 
objectivity and neutrality. Following a description of the methodology for this research, 
the chapter explores the interviewees’ opinions about scientist advocacy, scientific 
credibility, and targeted audiences. Each section first analyzes the views of scientists, 
followed by non-scientists, and closes with commentary about the subject, contrasting the 
views of the two groups. The chapter concludes with commentary on this interview 
research and synthesizes it with the earlier chapters. 
Methodology 
I conducted twenty one structured interviews with scientists and non-scientists, 
who were all professionally engaged in CCC. The subject group was a convenience 
                                                 
9 I found these interviews interesting and informative and I am deeply grateful for each person’s 
cooperation and for their openness. Evident with every interviewee was a deep caring for humanity and the 
environment, and a sincere desire to contribute in a positive way to the struggle to solve the climate change 
problem. My remarks in this chapter are in no way critical of individuals and rather seek to understand their 
views on CCC, and the tension between advocacy and the social norms of science. 
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sample. Eighteen subjects were recruited at the American Geophysical Union Chapman 
Conference Communicating Climate Science: A Historic Look to the Future, in June of 
2013, and three subjects were otherwise known to me. Outside of the interviews, no 
subjects were associated with or had any interest in my research. Nine subjects were 
natural scientists, who in the course of their work on climate change had become active in 
CCC. The remaining twelve subjects were non-scientists, with professional training in 
disciplines other than climate science, which included writing, communication, video 
production, public relations, weather forecasting, web-design, blogging, and journalism. 
Materials and Procedure10 
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Arizona State University granted 
approval for this Human Subjects research. The interviews were in the form of structured 
questionnaires, with open-ended questions, and all interviewees were asked the same 
questions. All were adults; their participation in - and my recording of - the interviews 
was voluntary, and, although none did, they could have stopped the sessions at any time 
if for any reason they were uncomfortable. The interview questionsi were non-
controversial and all interviewees were offered copies of the IRB approval and 
information letterii that outlined the research and provided contact information for my 
research supervisor and the IRB at Arizona State University. The identity of the subjects 
will be kept confidential, the original recordings and transcripts have been destroyed, and 
effort taken to not reveal through the quotations, or by my characterizations, the identity 
of any subject. In this effort, some inconsequential details in the quotations have been 
omitted or changed to generalities.  
                                                 
10 IRB documents, interview questions, and coding structures are reproduced in the Appendixes.  
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The interviews totaled 469 minutes and most lasted about 25 minutes. Some 
subjects were less talkative and progressed through the questions in as little as fifteen 
minutes, while one or two lasted nearly an hour. All interviews were transcribed into 
Microsoft Word documents and corrected to the original digital recordings for accuracy. 
Punctuation was based on context and inflection, in order to best convey the intended 
meaning which in most cases was clear. The data were read and marked for key themes 
and to develop conceptual ideas for coding. The documents were then saved in rich-text 
format and loaded into the ATLAS.ti Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) program which 
enables a systematic coding of the data and facilitates the retrieval, querying, and 
analysis. 
The data were coded in two cycles using methodology described in (Friese, 2012). 
In the first cycle, primarily descriptive codes were developed while processing roughly a 
third of the data. At this point, the original descriptive codes were structured into a 
hierarchical and more conceptual scheme and the documents were recoded in this scheme 
of about sixty codes. With the exception of introductory or tangential remarks, all of the 
interviews were coded in their entirety and the majority of the dialogue was analyzed. In 
the qualitative analysis, the code structure was again reviewed, and many codes with only 
one or two quotes were reconsidered, and either reassigned or eliminated. All codes were 
organized into seven code families to reflect the interviewees’ responses regarding (in 
alphabetical order): advocacy, audience, challenges of climate science, climate change 
communication, interviewee background, media, and science. Each of these code 
familiesiii comprises several sub-codes. The data in each code were then examined to 
highlight descriptive characteristics about the interviewees and their views, and to 
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develop the more conceptual analyses and comparisons revealed in the interviewees’ 
perspectives. 
Opinions on Advocacy in CCC 
How scientists discussed advocacy. Scientists freely revealed their support for 
climate policy and a motivation to solve climate change, to save the earth, to influence 
society and to take action to mitigate climate change. They recognized that there was a 
difference between communicating empirical findings such as the fact that the Earth was 
warming, and communicating recommendations about what society should do about 
global warming. Some scientists thought that they should be honest with their audience 
when giving their opinion about policy and thought that avoiding advocacy was 
important. But there was a wide variation among the scientists' views about how to 
discuss policy or recommendations for action, and when that activity might be considered 
advocacy. Many scientists thought that it would be unethical to have gained the technical 
understanding of climate change and not warn society about the danger. For example: 
And in my mind, and that’s I guess where my morals are, if we knew something 
and we didn’t tell you, didn’t tell the rest of us who can’t see it, it is a form of 
negligence, it is a form of, I guess, cheating (P21 S 79)11. 
Most scientists held a negative connotation of some sort about advocacy and 
tended to avoid it, but they also blurred the distinction between warning society (risk 
assessment) about danger and advocating action to mitigate that danger (risk 
                                                 
11 To keep the identities of all interviewees confidential they are referred to in the following manner P21 
refers to the primary document number (or interview transcript), S indicates that the interviewee is a 
scientist (NS for non-scientist), and 79 refers to the paragraph in the document where the quotation is 
located. 
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management). In the process of answering questions about objectivity and neutrality, the 
scientists expressed a variety of nuanced views about the definition and appropriateness 
of advocacy. Here scientist P18 made a distinction between their scientific work and 
advocacy but described their own advocacy without hesitation or prejudice. But they 
would later eschew advocacy. 
(I was researching) a high resolution coastal (glacial) core. And that’s when I 
think I became very involved in the disconnect - was very intrigued by the 
disconnect - between the science that we knew then, which was pretty robust, and 
the lack of policy. And so I’ve been flitting between Antarctic science and 
advocacy ever since, largely through an incredible passion for Antarctica, a 
passion for the planet (P18 S 17). 
Scientists’ conceptions of advocacy were often related to their ideas about whether 
or not it was acceptable behavior. Most scientists felt compelled to warn society about 
climate change and call for action to mitigate, but in doing so to somehow avoid the mantle 
of the advocate. Many revealed an aversion to advocacy and defined it in terms that 
excluded their own behavior. Here scientist P18, who had readily admitted to advocacy 
above, thought that scientists should discuss policy solutions more willingly but then 
explained how just calling for mitigation would not be policy prescriptive, that it would not 
be advocacy: 
I think that it’s an easy out for particularly climate scientists to say well, here’s 
the science and I’m not going to comment on the policy because I’m not an expert 
in that area. And I think it’s much simpler than that: because I’m a climate 
scientist, I know what the risks are. I know what’s happening. I can still say we 
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need to mitigate. That’s not being policy prescriptive, that’s just stating what I 
think for most climate scientists is an obvious fact. There wasn’t anyone on the 
panel today who had any trouble saying mitigation has to happen, so I think it’s 
tough to call that advocacy. I think advocacy is when you’re being really very 
policy prescriptive (P18 S 69). 
Below, scientist P21 thought they had an obligation to perform a risk assessment 
role for society but it seemed important for them to establish in the same breath that just 
warning society about problems was not advocacy: 
You know, I mean, I’m using tax dollars to do my research. I am, you know, in a 
position to teach, or whatever, other folks. I see it as my obligation to society to 
perform this particular function of being part of the immune system that detects 
that there’s something wrong here. So, you know, I don’t think that, in and of 
itself, is advocacy (P21 S 79).  
However scientist P21 had earlier characterized the desired climate change 
engagement with society as an intervention: “I think we might actually get enough people 
in the right places to set in motion the large scale interventions” (P21 S 63). On the one 
hand they endorsed intervening, which is more partisan than simply warning society, and 
on the other hand they distanced themselves from advocacy, and they seemed unaware of 
the contradiction. As in the above examples, scientists commonly demonstrated an aversion 
to advocacy accompanied with reasoning that certain behavior was not advocacy. It is 
noteworthy that scientists’ expressions eschewing or rationalizing advocacy occurred in 
conversation dealing specifically with scientist advocacy. Scientists who had revealed 
support for interventions or advocacy offered rationalizations absolving their behavior of 
  104 
advocacy when questioned directly about objectivity and neutrality. It was when the 
context of the conversation involved the social norms of science that negative connotations 
about advocacy and related rationalizations emerged. 
Many scientists described their role as providing scientific information to their 
audiences and they expected an informed audience would advance climate policy. 
Tension was evident between scientists’ self-image as solely knowledge providers, and 
their desire to see climate policy enacted. Most scientists argued for their preferred policy 
action but then avoided characterizing their intent to persuade as advocacy, and rather 
continued to describe their roles as providing information: “I mean, we don’t - we don’t 
really discuss solutions, we just discuss science issues” (P13 S 93). However, their desire 
to change minds was sometimes evident even while discounting their intentions: 
My primary goal is to get people to be thinking differently on what they’ve locked 
themselves into thinking. My goal isn’t to convince them that everything that they 
believed up until now is wrong and I’m right, and like a pied piper they should 
follow me around, it’s to get them to thinking, open up their eyes and ask them to 
actually question their own beliefs (P16 S 41). 
How non-scientists discussed advocacy. As with the scientists, the non-scientists 
all supported climate policy action and most explained that they or their organizations did 
not recommend policies or tell people what to do. The non-scientists seemed more direct if 
not casual about eschewing advocacy, often stating it in a matter-of-fact manner along with 
a quick, perhaps practiced explanation. In contrast with scientists, non-scientists were not 
as encumbered with negative connotations nor were they as defensive about advocacy and 
they often did not use the term at all. The following quote from a consultant is reminiscent 
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of the deficit model by implying that the addition of knowledge about climate change 
would result in more intelligent choices, but they did not prescribe action: 
We try to not tell anyone what to do, but to provide them enough information - we 
have this opening statement we make pretty much when we talk to anybody by 
saying our goal is to increase your ability to engage in a reasoned discourse about 
climate change. And when you have that ability, then you can make more 
intelligent choices about what you do. So we’re not telling anyone what to do (P8 
NS 109). 
The following non-scientist described how their organization defined advocacy as 
direct support for specific legislation. They claimed that careful phrasing would permit 
them to discuss mitigation without advocating for a specific policy. While their 
recommended phrasing does not unequivocally prescribe mitigation, it is positively 
aligned to it as opposed to the reverse. The logic below is similar to that employed by the 
IPCC in the use of ‘if – then’ statements that are linguistically structured to be neutral. It 
is notable that although P20 was not a climate scientist, they represented a scientific 
organization. The quote bears characteristics of the deficit model: 
I mean, at (my organization), traditionally more scientists have discussed, (or) 
focus on the science and then, in terms of advocacy, they’ve phrased if – then 
statements. For example: ‘if we want to reduce the effect of climate change, then 
it would behoove us to reduce our CO2 emissions’, and that’s typically as far as 
(our) scientists go in their statements. They don’t typically prescribe: ‘we need to 
pass X bill’ or whatever. And certainly, in my writings, I’ve been out in the same 
vein, you know. I tend to be more of an explainer and a perspective setter and I 
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like to think that simply, you know, helping people to become better informed and 
doing what I can do in that realm would then help them to make informed 
decisions and choices (P20 NS 71). 
In the next quote, non-scientist P3 claimed to avoid advocacy and directly aligned 
their organization’s views with the IPCC, specifically that climate change was happening 
and that it was human induced. However, the IPCC not only holds that climate change is 
human induced but that mitigation is necessary if we wish to avoid the direst 
consequences of climate change. By aligning to the IPCC, they are also aligned with the 
prevailing mitigation regime. P3 also represented a scientific organization: 
If we were asked about climate change, I would cite the IPCC report. I would say 
our scientists concur with, you know, the majority of the scientists as represented 
in the IPCC report, that climate change is happening and its human induced. But, 
we don’t recommend policies (P3 NS 127) 
 While most of the non-scientists used simple terms and logic, some offered more 
complicated explanations to explain their stance on advocacy. The logic in the next quote 
is convoluted, but seems to argue that they can act like advocates without truly 
advocating. The quote bears characteristics of the academic struggle with advocacy, 
although rationalizing about advocacy was uncommon among the non-scientists who 
mostly eschewed it in simple terms. 
Or just even saying a fifty percent clean energy renewable standard in the United 
States, you know [...] We’re merely, you know – we’re not advocating in the strict 
sense of being an advocate, in terms of advocating a particular policy. No, we’re 
not an advocate. In the sense that maybe we’re advocacy actors or political actors 
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in that we’re trying to generate public will for actual climate change, we are. 
There’s a distinction in there. Maybe it’s worth highlighting because, you know, 
we don’t talk to people, we don’t – we never suggest or advocate policies in any 
of our communications (P2 NS 113). 
Non-scientist P11 below argued in favor of scientists providing policy advice 
unless ideologically motivated, however they offered no rationale for identifying when 
subjectivity might enter the discourse: 
But I just think that, you know, people think advocacy - or scientists have begun 
to describe advocacy as being, as if it was a problem. But advocacy is just simply 
advising on a way forward, right? The issue here is about advocating policies 
based on the evidence and a clear set of policy objectives, rather than on an 
ideological stance and that’s the separation (P11 NS 161).  
Normative Views on Advocacy in CCC 
Scientists largely thought the scientists should not advocate. However, they 
also offered a variety of reasoning to explain why their behavior was not advocacy. 
Similar to the views expressed in the literature on scientist advocacy, there was no 
consensus regarding what scientist advocacy was or whether or not scientists should 
advocate. One scientist declared simply: “I don’t want to prescribe to them how they 
should think about things” (P19 S 21). Similar to views found in the literature, some 
scientists thought that science and advocacy were distinct activities: “You know, when 
the leader of this conference gets up and says ‘we’re right and we’ve got to get the word 
out,’ you know, I mean, okay, there’s something non-scientific about that” (P12 S 281). 
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Scientist P19 recounted a common academic argument against scientist advocacy that is 
grounded in the social norms of science: 
Once you start advocating, you’ve essentially already given up your objectivity. 
So you - and you need to be open. If you’re not objective about what you’re 
getting - what - you want to follow the data. You don’t want to follow where you 
think the data should take you or where you expect the data to take you. You need 
to be able to be surprised and go back and reassess and go oh, okay, well now I’ve 
learned something new and I’ll move on. Again, somehow when you start doing 
advocacy, you kind of dig in and entrench yourself in a viewpoint and I don’t 
think that’s - that’s not where I want to be. I don’t think that’s appropriate (P19 S 
45). 
While scientist P19 above mentioned losing scientific objectivity, references by 
other interviewees to the social norms of science were largely vague or dismissive, for 
example: “I think it’s one of the grand illusions of science that, you know, especially 
natural science, that they’re somehow value free or something like that” (P21 S 85). 
Others revealed that advocacy was not allowed in their organization: "So we were set up 
to provide science to the people who make the policy. But it was kind of made clear that 
(advocacy) wasn’t our role and the university doesn’t want us in that role either. And we, 
I don’t feel comfortable acting in that role" (P17 S 69). Nevertheless, there was an 
evident belief, mainly among most scientists, that advocacy; however they defined it, was 
not appropriate scientist behavior. 
Non-Scientists largely thought that scientists should advocate more. Many of 
the non-scientists I interviewed thought that scientists should be vocal about not only 
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what the science indicated were the threats of climate change, but also about what they 
thought societies should do to mitigate that threat. A filmmaker encouraged scientists to 
be active in the climate change debate and dismissed the idea that scientists’ credibility 
would be damaged if they were too vocal: 
Scientists’ credibility remains high. Every poll shows that they are among the 
most trusted sources for the general public. So I don’t think - I mean, you can 
argue that maybe certain scientists carry a little bit of baggage due to the high 
visibility or controversial past or whatever, but scientists in general have not 
suffered from becoming more visible on this and I think that there’s a general 
recognition that they need to do more of that (P7 NS 59). 
 Other non-scientists expressed clear support for scientists becoming more 
involved in the dialogue about solutions to climate change, with many claiming that 
scientists had a moral obligation to not only warn society about the threat but to also 
recommend solutions. P10 characterized this moral aspect as follows: 
You might just say, well, ‘that person’s about to shoot that other person. Isn’t that 
intellectually interesting? You know, and I don’t want to interfere in that because 
I need to stay objective and I’m not going to do that,’ you know. I think if you see 
somebody about to shoot somebody else, you ought to probably at least call 911, 
if not, leap on the gunman (P10 NS 90). 
Some scholars have argued that scientists should avoid advocacy in order to 
preserve their credibility, however the following non-scientist argued that scientists 
damaged their credibility by avoiding advocacy, if they proclaimed the danger of climate 
change and then had no opinion about what society should do to deal with the danger. 
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However, they also conceded that scientists should be honest about what was not within 
their area of expertise. The full quote is salient: 
There’s one other aspect of the debate which I have even more difficulty getting 
across to scientists is that when they talk to politicians or the public and they 
explain the scale of the problem, they’ll be facing the risks that we face, and then 
the natural response from any sane person is: ‘oh, my God, what shall we do?’ 
And then the scientists say: ‘well, I’m sorry, that’s not my area of expertise. I 
can’t tell you.’ Not only is that incredibly unhelpful, but it actually sends a 
message to the person well, if you really believed what you just told me, you 
would have found out what you thought we might do. You wouldn’t have just 
expressed no view on it. It’s like saying: ‘well, I think the house is on fire.’ ‘Well, 
what should we do about it?’ ‘Well, I don’t know, ask somebody who knows 
about how to deal with fire’ (P11 NS 141). 
I’ve had these arguments with, in particular, Richard Pielke, Jr., who has a 
particular view on this… which is essentially scientists should, you know, be of 
course honest brokers, that they have no other place. I don’t buy that. I mean, I 
just don’t. I think it’s asking scientists to behave in an - not behave as citizens. I 
mean, they have to be clear about what is their area of expertise and what is not 
(P11 NS 155). 
P11’s perspective in paragraph 155 is reminiscent of some scholar’s arguments 
that no behavioral norm of science should require scientists to waive their rights as 
citizens to advocate for the change that they believe is necessary. Many non-scientists 
thought that scientists should not be precluded from advocating, that it was their right as 
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citizens to be involved. Others thought that scientists had a moral obligation to not only 
warn society of risks like climate change but to advocate for changes that would reduce 
those risks. 
Commentary re: Opinions on Advocacy in CCC  
My interviewees all understood that advocacy fundamentally entailed some form 
of support for a particular outcome. However, as with scholarly perspectives on scientist 
advocacy, my interviewees showed no consistent agreement as to what specific behavior 
comprised scientist advocacy or whether scientists should or should not advocate. Their 
views were often contradictory, some were convoluted, and overall they offered no 
coherent position. All of the interviewees revealed a support for climate policy action, but 
most reasoned or simply claimed that they did not advocate. Remarkably though, many 
of the non-scientists thought that scientists should advocate. The scientists’ objection to 
advocacy was loosely grounded in the social norms of science, and scientists seemed 
motivated to preserve their credibility by reasoning that their behavior was not advocacy, 
thus preserving their objectivity and neutrality. Some scientists expressed frustration with 
the encumbrance of the social norms of science, and yet reified them by explaining that 
they did not advocate.  
Chart 4 shows a pronounced difference between the views of scientists and non-
scientists about scientist advocacy. Although most non-scientists denied advocating 
themselves, the majority of non-scientists supported scientists becoming more active 
advocates. The majority of scientists thought that scientists should not advocate.  
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Chart 3. Number of quotes on advocacy comparing scientists and non-scientists. Non-
scientists favored scientist advocacy while scientists did not. 
There was no marked difference between scientists and non-scientists among the 
other codes in the chart. Both groups largely agreed that science and advocacy should 
somehow be kept separate. The following quotes are exemplary: “I think it’s conceivable 
for scientists to be advocates, but maybe not simultaneously” (P20 NS 85). “…and 
maybe they might say, okay, I’m putting on a different hat now. I’m speaking as a 
concerned citizen who happens to know about soil science or whatever” (P5 NS 121).  
Opinions on Credibility in CCC 
Scientists held a variety of views on credibility. A few scientists took the 
traditional view that credibility depended on scientists remaining neutral and objective; 
“And the credibility part - certainly, you know, if you go too far over into advocacy, you 
will undermine credibility” (P14 S 351). Many scientists thought that science was 
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credibility, 18 were from scientists, half of which claimed that the scientific process and 
peer review were the source of credibility for scientists, and P21 makes this point: 
We have satellites, we can, you know, we do the measurement of all these things. 
So, I mean, you know, I’ll give you the simple example, long before probably we 
even talked about it, there were people - people who live on the land who, you 
know, are very close in contact with the natural environment who probably 
detected changes, but, you know, nobody puts any credibility in them.  So I am 
vested with credibility, I feel like it’s my end of the trust, you know, relationship 
that I have with society to say I’m seeing something that I think you at least want 
to pay attention to (P21 S 81). 
It is notable that P21 seems to confirm, at least in their view, that scientists do not 
imbue the public with any credibility. The argument above is similar to the scholarly 
view that scientists’ authority is their expertise. However, in subsequent paragraphs, P21 
challenges the traditional commitment to neutrality and objectivity, which they argue is 
illusory and cumbersome if not inconvenient. Above they claimed a special expertise that 
others did not have; below they questioned whether scientists should claim a special 
stance due to their objectivity and neutrality. While these passages seem discordant it 
portrays a scientists wrestling with the tension between their aspiration for normative 
influence and the social norms of science, which is salient in sustainability, given its 
normative dimension. 
I actually don’t think that trust only hinges on neutrality and objectivity. I think 
it’s one of the grand illusions of science that, you know, especially natural 
science, that they’re somehow value free or something like that. And I don’t think 
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actually people expect me to be value free. In fact, if I were value free, I think 
people would probably freak out, you know (P21 S 85). 
Well, you know, what I find really intriguing is - like the question for me 
would be how do we shift the perception in science, you know? This self-delusion 
that we seem to perpetuate that we are somehow neutral and objective and the rest 
of them aren’t and that we therefore have some special stance to begin with (P21 
S 97). 
While the mainstream climate science community and the IPCC argue that the 
strength of consensus provides credibility, scientists P12 and P19, below, thought that 
credibility could suffer from myopia in being too committed to the mainstream view and 
not open to the possibility that new knowledge might be relevant and might significantly 
alter the existing paradigm. This is reminiscent of some criticism of the IPCC, both by 
scholars and opponents of the scientific consensus.  
There are quacks out there who are pot - you know, firing pot shots, you know, 
and don’t really do first-person research, but there are also Jack Eddy’s12 and how 
is one to know? And the mainstream is always vulnerable to shooting, you know, 
somebody that, you know, and I think this environment that we have in climate 
communication right now smells of that possibility (P12 S 401). 
We spend an awful lot of time focusing on greenhouse gasses… We know almost 
nothing about many of the other things. Why don’t we spend some time 
                                                 
12 Jack Eddy was a solar astronomer who was ostracized for challenging the scientific orthodoxy about the 
stability of the sun. In a 1976 paper called The Maunder Minimum, that was published in the American 
Journal of Science, he argued that sun spot cycles which were thought to be stable were actually variable 
in important ways that had impact on Earth’s climate ("Jack Eddy," 2009). 
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researching those? They might make the situation way worse than we think it is 
now. They might make it better. We don’t know because we don’t spend any time 
studying those things (P19 S 77). 
Non-Scientists thought that climate scientists simply were credible. Many 
non-scientists associated credibility with prestigious organizations, or the peer review 
process, or simply from the weight of the evidence. Non-scientists tended to imbue 
scientists with credibility: “Scientists’ credibility remains high. Every poll shows that 
they are among the most trusted sources for the general public” (P7 NS 59). Others 
referenced prestigious institutions as sources for credible information: “We try to imply 
that either by giving a credit line on the graphic that we use that this is from NASA or 
from NOAA or it’s a Science Magazine article XYZ” (P4 NS 97). Some thought that the 
sheer weight of the evidence about climate change provided credibility: “I think it’s clear 
that global temperature is increasing. That’s fairly unequivocal. You’ve got to do 
something very perverse to convince yourself that it isn’t” (P11 NS 127). Non-scientists 
used this reasoning to argue that scientists should advocate more. 
However, non-scientists thought that credibility would suffer from dishonesty, 
and they cited honesty and openness as necessary ante for credibility: “Well, we’re very 
open, so, you know, we’re publishing our data so we’re giving you access to the same 
data that we’re looking at” (P23 NS 135). P2, below, argued for accuracy which is similar 
to honesty in validating objectivity, or adherence to facts. Given the common aversion to 
advocacy it is interesting that P2 seemed to reveal their role as an advocate by implying 
there were advocates on both sides of the climate change debate:  
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You need to have your I’s dotted and your T’s crossed because if you don’t, 
you’re going to, you know, you’re – people who oppose what you – you know, 
the advocates on the other side will call you out and will attempt to discredit you 
simply because you have your facts wrong (P2 NS 121). 
Some non-scientists thought that factual information should be kept separated 
from politics or advocacy in order to preserve credibility: “What does climate change 
mean? Is it something we should pay attention to and why is that, what’s causing it? And 
when it gets to solutions, that’s where it comes into the political process” (P4 NS 63).  
For non-scientists the social norms of science were not salient and some were 
unequivocal about objectivity being impossible: “Well, I might say that in my field, in 
my discipline, nobody believes that objectivity is possible and that they haven’t for a long 
time. So, objectivity is not an issue for us” (P10 NS 138). 
Of the 45 quotes on scientific credibility in CCC, 27 were from non-scientists and 
were distributed across a variety of ideas. Notably, no non-scientists thought that 
scientists should remain neutral and objective, the concept was not a concern. Instead the 
dominant idea expressed by non-scientists was that scientists simply were credible. The 
second most cited theme was that honesty and openness were vital to preserve credibility, 
followed by the need to remain carefully true to the facts of the science. 
Commentary re: Opinions on Credibility in CCC 
The scientists that I interviewed all valued their scientific credibility in some way, 
and they understood Mertonian norms whether they accepted the requirement for 
objectivity and neutrality or not. Only a few of the scientists thought they could openly or 
truly advocate for climate policy without damage to their credibility. Most scientists 
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reasoned that their credibility remained intact because, based on their definition of it, they 
did not truly advocate. Most non-scientists seemed perplexed that scientists were 
concerned about credibility and thought that scientists could advocate openly, and that 
scientists could do so without damage to their credibility, because scientists’ credibility 
was simply inherent to them. Non-scientists were either dismissive of or they did not 
understand scientists’ frustration with the norms of objectivity and neutrality. 
The CCC Audience 
Scientists were strategically focused on decision-makers. Subjects were asked 
who their CCC audience was, why they mattered, and what their objective was in 
targeting that audience. While scientists often listed the public among their audiences 
they largely did so as a matter of fact, often within a list rather than as a deliberate 
choice: “My audience - it varies. It’s a lot of - its government people, so people in 
agencies, congressional staffers, congress people themselves, it’s the public, students, K-
12, college students, it’s - I want to say everybody” (P17 S 25). Only one scientist 
mentioned communicating with the general public in order to build support for climate 
policy, but they then indicated that this was at the request of local government rather than 
their own choice, and they characterized the effort as informing their audience. However, 
most scientists identified decision-makers as their target audience, and that they were 
important because decision-makers could enact policy or lead change, and most 
scientists’ stated goals were to persuade decision-makers to support climate policy. 
Scientists repeatedly identified policy-makers as an important audience: “We 
scientists can talk until we’re blue in the face about what’s going to happen, but the 
people who are making the decisions are ultimately going to be the ones who need to sign 
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off on these solutions” (P17 S 33). This scientist identified only decision-makers as 
necessary to approve solutions; the public was not recognized as important. Other 
scientists expanded their focus on policy-makers to include other influencers. “So, I’m 
making sure that those people, leaders in industry, leaders in society, leaders in 
governmental sectors at all levels. To me those would be the audience” (P16 S 37). 
“Policy makers is one big place, engineers and land use, you know, folks (who) set a lot 
of the policies of how we actually, you know, where we emit (GHG). Technology folks, 
engineers, corporate, you know …” (P21 S 71). “I mean, that’s my hope that we reach 
out to (influencers) and policy makers who will set the right tone” (P21 S 73). 
Scientists focused their communication strategically on those who could make 
decisions on behalf of society, whether or not there might be broader public support. “It’s 
a social change process, and to start that, you don’t need ninety percent of the population 
to get there, you need ten percent… And so, you know, if we can target the right folks, 
the right (influencers)” (P21 S 63). 
I think, you know, this is like paraphrasing some remark by Margaret Mead that 
change has always been, you know, the agency of change has always been some 
committed five or ten percent of society. Kind of drags the rest along, kicking and 
screaming or something along those lines (P14 S 113). 
Scientists P14 and P21, above, described a social change process that could be led 
by perhaps ten percent of the population. However P21, below, describes the scale of the 
required social change in terms of a total and distressing social transformation. But no 
evidence was offered to suggest that such precipitous social change could be led by such 
a small group. P21 observed a disconnect between what climate scientists were 
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suggesting for mitigation and what was truly necessary, which is reminiscent of 
Broecker’s criticism that the mainstream mitigation regime was implausible (Broecker, 
2010).  
It’s hard to get used to and submit to, you know, change just because its change, 
not because, you know, you might not like the outcome, it’s because the change is 
hard. I have to give up every one of my habits. I have to do things very differently 
and whatever. So I think, you know, the magnitude of the transformative change, 
I don’t think even communicators have realized what that all implies and I think 
even physical scientists who study climate change understand it better than most 
of them. I think they haven’t quite understood what that all implies and why 
people aren’t just like flocking to them to oh, great, let’s bring it on. And then to 
manage a population that will be deeply in distress (P21 S 57). 
Non-scientists were strategically focused on the public. Only two non-scientists 
identified policy-makers as their audience, and they characterized this as merely the 
nature of their work rather than as a deliberate choice. A consultant indicated: “We’re 
providing messaging to people who are - have - a lot of them are water resource 
(planners), that’s my audience at the moment” (P8 NS 61). The other identified policy-
makers as simply one among their audiences. Most non-scientists did not deliberately 
pursue policy-makers, but when they gave their reasons for focusing on the public 
audience, several referred to the need to build public support for climate policy as a 
prerequisite for policy-makers to be willing or able to support it. The following quotes 
show how non-scientists were strategically focused on public audiences: 
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We talk a lot about the general public and particularly the conservative segments 
of the general population, and I see that as a very important audience because 
without bringing the public as a whole, we can’t shift attitudes in the Unites States 
(P8 NS 29). 
But often what you can find is an issue with a politician where they feel that they 
could not introduce a measure or policy because they feel that the public would be 
hostile to it, although they would find it difficult and what they seek is the expert 
community to create conditions in terms of public debate in which they are able to 
make those recommendations (P11 NS 63). 
While the non-scientists were largely focused on the public audience, there was 
no consensus regarding communication tactics. For example: some non-scientists thought 
that it was important to directly address climate deniers while others thought deniers 
should be avoided:  
We also need to speak to people in the middle and also, quite frankly, we need to 
speak to the people who, you know, deny or oppose anything around climate 
change, if only to neutralize them. So, that’s our approach (P2 NS 37).  
So in one sense, it’s - we’re writing for people who are in danger of being 
influenced by misinformation. We’re either inoculating them or disabusing them 
of misconceptions, so our target audience is definitely not climate deniers because 
the psychology tells us, that it’s almost impossible to change those people’s minds 
anyway (P6 NS 57).  
No empirical evidence was offered in support of claims such as: “We’re either 
inoculating them or disabusing them of misconceptions” (P6 NS 57),  or “we need to 
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speak to the people who, you know, deny or oppose anything around climate change, if 
only to neutralize them” (P2 NS 37). It is more accurate to characterize these statements 
as aspirational rather than factual. Many of the non-scientists described communication 
tactics, offering only anecdotal, if any, evidence of effectiveness. 
Commentary re: The CCC Audience  
 
Most interviewees felt that the objective of CCC was helping their audience to 
understand the scientific consensus about the risks that climate change posed for 
humanity, and persuading their audience of the urgent need to take action to mitigate 
climate change. Perhaps the common purpose in CCC is best reflected in this quote from 
a scientist: 
I have realized how crucial it is to be able to connect science with decision 
makers… There’s this problem (climate change) and we’re causing it, and instead 
of squabbling over [it] - I don’t even want to call it a debate and give it that 
legitimacy, but instead of squabbling, something’s happening, we need to do 
something about it. We’re causing it and now it’s time for solutions. (P17 S 17) 
 The two most common audiences cited for CCC were the public and policy-
makers. In addition, interviewees communicated with scientists to help them stay abreast 
of developments in other disciplines, they communicated with journalists to provide 
newsworthy information on climate change, and they communicated with students and 
faculty in the course to teaching climate science. However, when communicating with the 
public or with policy makers, their common stated purpose was to influence the audience, 
to change minds, to encourage action, and they considered certain audiences as critical to 
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meeting their objective. Notably, a distinction emerged between the views of scientists 
and those of the non-scientists as to which of the two audiences were important and why. 
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Chart 3. Number of times that scientists and non-scientists identified various audiences 
for Climate Change Communication. Non-scientists were more focused on public 
audiences, while scientists were numerically split but strategically focused on policy-
makers. Scientists identified the public with equal frequency; however they largely did 
not view the public audience as important to their communication objectives. 
Non-scientists were strategically focused on the public in order to build public 
support for action to mitigate climate change while scientists were strategically focused 
on decision-makers in order to convince them to lead change on behalf of the rest of 
society. The scientists largely did not view the public as important in the discourse 
regarding what should be done to battle climate change. 
Conclusion 
 All of the scientists and non-scientists that I interviewed were motivated to 
improve CCC effectiveness. At a fundamental level, they shared the objective of 
improving societies’ capability to make policy decisions that would reduce the risks that 
climate change posed for humanity. However, beyond improved decision-making, most 
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desired a particular outcome to emerge from that decision-making process, and they 
approved of the prevailing global climate policy initiative. Most argued for the prevailing 
climate change mitigation regime but did not think of themselves as advocates. Non-
scientists simply stated that they did not tell people what to do, while many of the 
scientists provided rationalizations that reconciled their behavior with the social norms of 
science. Although scientists generally denied they were advocates, many nevertheless 
focused their communication on policy-makers with expressed intent of influencing them 
to enact climate policy. As with the IPCC analysis in Chapter 5, there was an evident 
belief that scientists I interviewed could engage in policy deliberation, or provide policy 
advice, and remain neutral and objective. 
As with the scholarly views in Chapter 2, there was no consistency among my 
interviewees about scientist advocacy. AAAS conferees essentially punted the advocacy 
issue, leaving scientists and organizations to develop their own perspectives and norms 
(AAAS, 2012). Not that the AAAS would or could be the authority, nor that it is their 
responsibility to attempt it. Rather it is emblematic of the conundrum scientists face when 
confronted with the tension between advocacy and the social norms of science. 
Arguments on both sides of the advocacy issue are compelling and a clear choice is not 
readily apparent. There simply is no useful consensus about advocacy to guide scientists. 
With no universally accepted definition, the scientists I interviewed tended to define 
advocacy in personally satisfying terms. 
The scientists I interviewed appeared torn between their desire to protect 
humanity from dangerous climate change and the norms of objectivity and neutrality. 
While some scholars continue to insist that the social norms of science are imperative, 
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some of the scientists I interviewed regarded these norms as a sort of Mertonian 
hangover, a restrictive relic, and a barrier to their desire to advance climate policy. And 
yet most scientists interviewed continued to rationalize that they did not personally 
engage in advocacy. Although they coveted freedom from the Mertonian norms, many 
reasoned that they did not violate those norms. The non-scientists were largely puzzled 
and dismayed by scientists’ tendency to rationalize and eschew advocacy and most 
thought that scientists simply were credible and would remain so, and that scientists 
should simply be more active policy advocates. In fact, many non-scientists argued that 
scientist advocacy was urgently needed and some argued that it was scientists’ moral 
responsibility to not just warn society of the danger but to actively advocate for climate 
policy to the best of their ability. 
 Research has shown that public trust in science falls when scientists engage in 
policy discussions (Krosnick, 2012), and IPCC authors have expressed concern that the 
pressure on them to remain neutral could limit their policy relevance (Edenhofer, 2014). 
The stakes for scientists who advocate are real and the challenges are complicated, and 
unresolved. The conflict between advocacy and the social norms of science is likely to be 
unavoidable for sustainability scientists who wish to exert a normative influence in 
solving the problems that they study.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Synthesis of earlier chapters 
Without the influence of scientists, societies may make catastrophically poor 
decisions and sustainability science specifically intends to guide societies along a more 
sustainable trajectory. Sustainability scientists are challenged with wicked problems like 
climate change, which take them beyond traditional descriptive science and into 
exploring solutions. From the dawning realization of its risks, climate change has 
fundamentally involved scientists persuading the rest of the world to implement ideas for 
managing those risks, and scientists have moved casually between science and solutions 
but the distinction is profound. Beyond a relatively orderly, peer reviewed scientific 
process, exists a disorderly, un-refereed persuasion space in which stakeholders, 
including scientists, selectively color the facts and advocate for their own interests and 
value systems. The negotiation among stakeholders necessary for the development and 
implementation of solutions entangles scientists in advocacy, creating a host of problems 
and challenges for which scientists are poorly prepared. 
Scientist advocacy is thought to violate certain social norms of science and 
society largely expects scientists not to act as partisans. However, because scientists are 
subjective, some level of advocacy is likely, and in environmental controversies scientists 
may be perceived to advocate regardless of their intent. Since they are solutions-focused, 
sustainability scientists are even more likely to engage in advocacy than other scientists, 
as they develop and promote solutions or provide policy advice. However, sustainability 
scholars have largely presumed that these scientists possess the capacity to influence 
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society, while in practice stakeholder resistance has stymied scientists’ efforts to persuade 
society to change, as is the case with climate change. 
Many sustainability scientists have been frustrated with the limited response to 
their proposals, while some PUS scholars have questioned whether science should expect 
to prescribe assessments and solutions to society. Scientists’ concern about policy inertia 
in climate change has led to the study of CCC with an eye toward increasing its 
effectiveness. Although CCC has generated discourse about revolutionizing its practice 
with more participative communication, scientists have revealed a continuing preference 
for linear communication and privileging scientific knowledge.  
 While scientific knowledge remains important to society, an abiding challenge 
remains in establishing the appropriate level of influence for science in policy making. 
The practice of IPCC communication reveals the difficulty scientists face in producing 
policy relevant but policy neutral information. My analysis suggests that the articulation 
of judgment, opinion, and values within the climate change controversy in IPCC reports 
represents the effort of the authors to persuade the audience of their reading of the matter. 
Conversely, perfectly neutral language, devoid of opinion, values, and judgment, will not 
be policy relevant. Essentially policy relevant but neutral communication is impossible 
and any language beyond the factual will likely entail an attempt to persuade in some 
way. In applying this conception of advocacy, my analysis of the WG1 SPMs from 1990 
and 2013 reveals that while the use of factual information tripled by 2013; both reports 
were still dominated by the authors’ opinions, values, and judgments suggesting that the 
effort for policy relevance necessarily entails some level of intent to advocate for the 
scientific consensus assessment and policy recommendations. 
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My interviews of professional climate science communicators revealed that all 
argued for climate policy, most denied that this was advocacy, and most scientists 
struggled with the pressure to remain neutral and objective. Scientists often defined 
advocacy in terms that exempted their behavior from it, thus reconciling with the social 
norms of science. While eschewing advocacy, most scientists revealed that they 
nevertheless strategically focused their communication on policy makers, with the stated 
intent of influencing them to enact climate policy. On the other hand, most non-scientists 
that I interviewed were not concerned that scientists remained neutral and objective, and 
they thought that scientists should advocate more actively, with some insisting that it was 
scientists’ moral obligation to advocate to prevent social harm that might occur if they 
did not act. 
“Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more”  
(Shakespeare's Henry V, Act III, 1598.) 
Salient Conclusions About Scientist Advocacy 
 Societies value and depend upon the influence of scientists and the debate 
about scientist advocacy interferes with the contribution that many scientists wish to 
make to important science based policy decisions. Many scientists feel morally obliged to 
warn society about danger they discover through their research and scientists have the 
right to advocate for action that they believe will reduce that danger. The behavioral 
norms of science should not prevent scientists from exercising their rights as citizens to 
advocate for policy changes if they choose. Scientists who engage in policy discourse 
will advocate in some way and likely damage their credibility in the process. Scientists 
will have to individually reconcile the normative questions about advocacy and determine 
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whether to assume the risks that accompany their engagement in policy discourse or 
advocacy. 
Scientists concerned about advocacy face a conflicting array of ideas about it but 
at a fundamental level it is understood to involve scientists urging a course of action or 
expressing public support for a particular cause or policy. However, there is considerable 
disagreement among scholars about precisely what behavior advocacy entails. Given this 
confusion, it may be more helpful for scientists to assume that advocacy is nearly 
unavoidable and that scientists are very likely advocating once their discourse ceases to 
be purely factual (verifiable), and value-free. Once policy relevant discourse begins, 
some level of advocacy will likely be revealed through the scientists’ expressions of 
opinions, judgments, and values. 
Proposed Concepts 
Based on this research, and for reasons detailed below, I propose that only 
communication that is objective and neutral be considered free from advocacy. 
Objectivity requires adherence to facts (the verifiable), and neutrality means value-free. 
Communication that strays from the facts or becomes value-laden will then involve some 
level of intent to persuade, and when scientists do this, it is scientist advocacy.  
This research provides the opportunity to propose a framework of the salient 
components of scientist advocacy as presently manifested in concept and in practice. In 
Figure 5 below, a table displays the components of advocacy arranged in columns, and 
levels of advocacy in rows, with the level of advocacy increasing vertically. For example, 
the bottom row describes the lowest level of advocacy scientists might normally engage 
in the course of routine scientific activity. Examples are given for the kind of activity, 
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characteristic motivation for the scientist, probable audiences, how credibility is 
mediated, and the likely perception of internal (scientific) versus external (public, 
including policy-makers) audiences regarding whether the activity is neutral and 
objective or whether it is advocacy. 
At the lowest level, scientist advocacy is largely uncontroversial, audiences are 
internal, credibility is mediated internally via scientific norms, and both internal and 
external audiences likely view the activity as neutral and objective. As advocacy levels 
increase, so too does the likelihood of controversy; audiences become increasingly 
external and credibility is decreasingly mediated internally, and increasingly mediated 
externally. With increasing advocacy, scientific credibility and authority as determined 
by internal scientific norms, decreases until nearly irrelevant in the highest levels of 
scientist advocacy. Even with modest forms of risk assessment or risk management, 
public audiences perceive scientists to be advocating in some way while internal 
(scientific) audiences may continue to view the activity as neutral and objective until a 
scientist is clearly advocating for specific policy proposals. 
Thus the point at which scientists’ activity becomes advocacy is blurred between 
internal and external perspectives, yielding a significant area for disagreement regarding 
what is or is not objective and neutral. In the second and third levels, risk assessment and 
risk management activities that scientists may view as neutral and objective and solely 
scientifically determined may be viewed by public audiences as advocacy. Only in the 
very lowest level of advocacy, in which scientists are performing routine scientific work, 
do both internal and external audiences mostly agree that the scientific activity is neutral 
and objective. Even then, the public may perceive scientists advocating in their own 
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interests, perhaps for grants but this would rarely become controversial. This lowest level 
of advocacy provides potential areas of agreement upon which scientists and the public 
and policy makers may build consensus in negotiating policy. However, there is not an 
objectively determined set of facts and even at the lowest level of advocacy; the accepted 
facts may be a matter of negotiation between scientists and the public and policy makers. 
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Figure 6 below, is a diagram that depicts the concept of scientist advocacy as 
commonly practiced and which became apparent through this research. The intent of the 
representation is to show how little activity is presently considered by scientists to be 
advocacy. Outside of direct advocacy for specific policy proposals, a great deal of risk 
assessment and risk management is variously rationalized by scientists as solely 
scientifically determined, neutral and objective thus bearing the credibility and authority 
of science, and therefore not advocacy. In denying advocacy, scientists minimize the 
contribution of their own biases, opinions, values, and judgments to the development of 
their policy ideas. By imbuing their ideas with the credibility and authority of science 
they minimize the credibility of other stakeholders, and often view a public rejection of 
their ideas as a rejection of science.  
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Figure 7 below, is a diagram that depicts a proposed framework for scientist 
advocacy, one that may avoid a great deal of the problems described above, and offers 
scientists the opportunity to improve the effectiveness of their advocacy in the 
negotiation of public policy. Supported by the foregoing research, scientists in the 
proposed framework assume that they are advocating when their communication is not 
strictly factual (that is verifiable) and value-free. Scientists assume that science is 
necessary but not sufficient for solving problems such as climate change. Scientists 
assume that they cannot impose their facts on the public and policy makers. In some 
cases even the facts of the matter may be negotiable among the stakeholders but once 
agreement is achieved, form a framework upon which policy decisions can be based. In 
this proposed framework, a much smaller proportion of public decision making criteria 
are determined by science and the balance is assumed to be mediated by negotiation and 
persuasion. Scientists still leverage the credibility and authority of science but learn to 
find its limits, and know that science cannot trump the other stakeholders. In assuming a 
weak position, scientists may prevent presuming strength that is truly not available to 
them. Scientists who accept these assumptions will afford themselves the opportunity to 
better prepare for an engagement with the public and policy makers in which there are no 
rules and no referee. 
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Discussion 
Since history and logic indicate that advocacy may be unavoidable in 
controversial issues, it may be easier to identify communication that is not advocacy. The 
eighteenth century Scottish philosopher David Hume argued that one could not make 
normative statements based on facts about the world. This is considered the “is – ought” 
problem and Hume argued that the shift from what is, to what ought to be, could not be 
achieved based on facts alone and required the application of sentiment. For Hume, the 
“is” was not controversial but the “ought” was (Morris, 2014). Scientific facts, what is, 
may be considered objective and neutral and free from advocacy, however only if not 
linked to what ought to be.  
Scientists who assume they may be advocating once they depart from factual 
discourse, may then conceptually separate fact based science from advocacy and treat the 
two activities as being distinct with different governing norms. Many of my interviewees 
thought that science and advocacy should somehow be kept separate, and some attendees 
to the AAAS conference on scientist advocacy also endorsed this deliberate separation 
(AAAS, 2012), but this requires establishing when advocacy occurs. Short of an 
authoritative definition, scientists may dispense with a great deal of rationalization by 
assuming that advocacy takes place whenever they stray from factual and value-free 
discourse. In this way, scientists may preserve and even enhance the credibility of their 
science by maintaining its objectivity and neutrality, and isolating that from subjective 
and value-laden discourse. 
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In Chapter 5 I argued that strictly factual communication in the IPCC 2013 SPM 
increased threefold over the 1990 SPM. The IPCC authors stripped those factual 
statements of subjectivity, which significantly added to the credibility of the report by 
providing a great deal more verifiable information. For example: “The atmosphere and 
ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, 
and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased (IPCC, 2013b, p. 4). The 
sentence is worded to be factual and offers documentation to support the claims. In 
contrast, similar material in the 1990 SPM was prefaced with: “It is our judgment”, 
without distinguishing what might be factual and what was not. Certainly climate science 
knowledge had increased by 2013 but recall that the IPCC deliberately chose for the 2013 
report to assert verifiable information as fact and to use uncertainty qualifiers for the rest. 
This is a move in the direction that I suggest is prudent. Scientists may still be challenged 
about their factual claims; however if not mingled with subjective expressions, statements 
that can be verified to the satisfaction of stakeholders could form a foundation for further 
dialogue.  
For example, repeatable scientific experimentation can verify the fundamental 
physics of global warming; the natural greenhouse effect, enhanced greenhouse effect, 
the global warming trend, and the human fingerprint of fossil carbon in the environment, 
to name a few (IPCC, 2013a). The accepted factual basis then can include predictions that 
with continued GHG emissions global temperatures will increase and sea level will rise. 
Such verifiable information may form a basis for policy negotiation provided it is not 
mingled with conclusions, opinion, and values not shared by the other stakeholders. Thus 
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the negotiated factual basis for policy development may be smaller than scientists hope 
for, but more credible with audiences that are critical to policy development.  
In this model, climate scientists’ focus on the science would be to maintain its 
credibility as verifiable, and their focus on the balance of their communication could be 
to improve their persuasive effectiveness in advocating for climate policy. For example, 
if one were to decide that beyond the underlying empirical science, the fundamental 
purpose in climate science was persuading society to take action to mitigate climate 
change, then one could focus on the objectivity, neutrality, and verifiability of the science 
and separately focus on persuasive effectiveness in advocating for climate policy. A 
caveat however requires that scientists not conflate their science with their policy ideas, 
which also requires the concession that the facts about the science cannot dictate policy 
prescriptions. Conversely then, a rejection of scientists’ policy ideas does not necessarily 
comprise a rejection of the underlying science. 
In the past scientists have moved casually from facts to policy but in this model 
they would view the two as distinct and avoid mingling facts about the science with 
subjective representations of any kind. In policy discourse scientists could then recognize 
that their policy ideas will be informed by their opinions, values, and normative 
frameworks, as it will for other stakeholders who may consider the facts and develop 
significantly different conclusions. If scientists guard against the idea that science dictates 
policy, they may be more flexible, more persuasive, and more effective at ultimately 
advancing their policy objectives. 
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Science/Policy Interface 
There is a great deal of academic interest in the challenges associated with the 
development of science based policy. Sustainability scientists have embraced the 
challenge of problems like climate change which are termed wicked not just because of 
unforeseen trade-offs and unintended consequences, but also because they are perceived 
differently through the biases of the stakeholders, their solutions are political, not likely 
to be settled with additional scientific facts, and have to be continually deliberated (Rittel, 
1973). Work with boundary organizations and stakeholder engagement has advanced the 
understanding of the dynamics at play in the interface between science and the public 
(Clark et al., 2011 for example; Talwar et al., 2011). Scholars have advanced theories and 
frameworks to improve our understanding of the dynamics of stakeholder interaction, and 
to identify opportunities for improvements in the process of public policy development 
(A. Schneider, Ingram, H., 2007). Any of these tools may be helpful in the existing 
science/policy paradigm, yet like CCC, proposed improvements are largely tactical and 
still encumbered with the conflicting conventions of neutral and objective science versus 
a values dominated policy process.  
The science/policy interface is particularly challenging in sustainability science, 
which has been described as a new kind of science because it is normative and 
specifically intended to influence policy development (R.W. Kates, 2011). Yet its simple 
characterization as normative may understate the paradigm shift truly implied. In tackling 
problems like climate change, scientists have chosen nothing less than to reorder the 
world. For example: stabilizing GHG emissions requires an eighty-five percent reduction 
in fossil fuel use (Broecker, 2010) and ultimately solving climate change requires a 
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completely carbon-free energy system and may require carbon capture and sequestration 
(Broecker, 2013).  
 Few objectives imaginable could more definitively situate sustainability scientists 
as solution-oriented as choosing to solve climate change. But the discipline of 
sustainability may not be optimally deployed given the task at hand. Recall how IPCC 
authors struggled with the challenge of engaging policy matters and remaining neutral, 
and how most of the climate scientists that I interviewed resisted open advocacy. The 
social norms of science are an impediment to sustainability scientists’ unrestrained 
advocacy for the transformative social change they may covet, and this challenge has 
largely been skirted in conceiving of the normative role for sustainability scientists. 
Comparatively simpler problems have yielded to present conceptions for science/policy 
development. For example: the Vienna Convention and related Montreal Protocol were 
successful in mitigating stratospheric ozone depletion and were the model used in 
planning for a similar climate change convention (IPCC, 1990a). But the UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol designed to tackle climate change have not shown the potential to 
appreciably impact the problem. While climate change may not quickly yield to human 
intervention and there are no magic bullets, other disciplines that focus on achieving 
results offer organizing principles and norms that may improve goal attainment for 
sustainability scientists. 
Results Oriented Management 
 Results Oriented Management (ROM) has become a sub-discipline of 
management that is employed to organize and deploy in the most effective manner 
possible to achieve primary objectives. While its roots are in business, in 1993 the U.S. 
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Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) in part as a 
response to the demand for accountability in federally funded Community Action 
Agencies (CAA). Based on a system designed by the Drucker Foundation, some CAAs 
developed a process for strategic planning and accountability called Results Oriented 
Management and Accountability (ROMA) which “incorporates the use of 
outcomes/results into the administration, management, operation and evaluation of 
human services” (CAMP, 2007, p. 7). Effective ROM begins with strategic planning 
which involves establishing answers to key questions about the organization’s purpose, 
customers, desired results and plan, which is ubiquitous in business but has recently 
found application in government organizations with the specific intent of improving their 
results attainment. 
One key aspect of ROM is accountability for results (thus the A above), which is 
viewed as critical and is commonly characterized as “what gets measured is what gets 
done”. Other reasons for measuring results include the need to recognize success and 
distinguish it from failure, to reward success instead of failure, and to learn from both 
(Osborne, 1992). Results are always measurable and articulated in the planning process 
of setting goals. However, goal setting occurs later in strategic planning, preceded by 
more important steps that have been shown to be critical in impacting overall 
achievement. 
Through five years of research for their 1994 book Built to Last: Successful 
Habits of Visionary Companies, James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras studied eighteen 
companies whose performance since 1925 had outperformed the general stock market by 
a factor of twelve. They found that these organizations had formally established an 
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unchanging core ideology about their values, purpose, and vision for success. Purpose, 
called "mission" by the Drucker Foundation, answers the question: “Why do we exist?” 
Vision is a vivid description of success, and answers the question: “What does success 
look like?” Purpose and vision are centered on some sort of audacious long-term goal. 
Collins and Porras found that these successful companies’ core ideologies consistently 
informed behavior throughout their organizations to which they attributed their success 
(Collins, 1996). At this stage in the ROMA planning process, the Drucker Foundation 
also considers and identifies the customer and their values. While in practice strategic 
planning varies in some details, it remains fundamentally a question of establishing a 
purpose and a vision for long term goals, such that they effectively inform the rest of the 
organization’s activities. 
An important part of strategic planning, from whence it derives its name, is 
strategy development and it is poorly understood and often mistakenly tackled before the 
organization has achieved clarity about its purpose and vision. Essentially strategy is the 
decisive deployment of resources and is usually defined by scarcity and opportunity 
costs; one never possesses all of the resources one might like, and must choose carefully 
how they are used. Strategy is rather pointless if not informed by clarity of purpose and 
vision. Tactics then are employed within a strategy and determine how resources are 
used. 
The literature revealed a great deal of attention given to improving CCC, however 
most of it was focused on the tactical level, which cannot establish clarity for an 
individual scientist or their organization about important questions of purpose, vision, 
goals, and how to deploy resources. These questions can only be answered via difficult, 
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often soul-searching work in strategic planning. In solutions oriented science such as 
sustainability science, little effort is presently dedicated to results-oriented planning and 
organization above the tactical level. Top performing organizations focus deliberately 
and intently on organizational purpose, vision, and goals and on effective planning and 
managing for results. 
There is no guarantee of success as the result of performing strategic planning, 
and many organizations that do plan create material that merely populates the walls of 
corporate lobbies and has little guiding effect on the organization. Collins and Porras 
sifted through hundreds of companies to find eighteen that were exceptional. However, 
the fundamental aspects of strategic planning and ROM have found traction in a variety 
of organizations beyond business that are focused on achieving results. Publicly funded 
CAAs have yielded to demands for better results and accountability for results, and have 
found value in the employment of strategic planning. The process has helped CAAs to 
transition from merely performing services because funding was available to developing 
a firm foundation for their strategies that is guided by their purpose/mission and vision. 
Strategic planning helps these organizations develop and coordinate comprehensive 
activities that can increase their achievement and reduce unintended consequences. 
Importantly the ROMA process is iterative, with any aspect of it available for revision 
when necessary (CAMP, 2007). 
While in sustainability the goals may be noble and audacious, the normative role 
envisioned for sustainability scientists lacks specific guidance that could help scientists 
organize more effectively to identify and achieve their goals. Given the common routine 
for funding scientific research, formal strategic planning for each project may be 
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cumbersome; however any strategic thought seems apropos given the lofty ideals of 
normative influence that have been proposed, claimed, assumed, for sustainability 
scientists. Collins and Porras’ conception of an unchanging core purpose and vision may 
find useful application within the scope of any level of leadership from the individual to 
the IPCC. 
As such the comments that follow could apply to an individual scientist or an 
organization such as the IPCC. Indeed, ROM is frequently applied in business from the 
individual to the organizational level. Scientists who desire a normative influence in 
society could apply ROM with the potential to improve results attainment but this 
requires a deliberate application of ROM principles, including articulating core purpose 
and vision, performing strategic planning, and managing for results throughout. Rather 
than moving haphazardly from one research proposal to the next, a scientist or a scientific 
organization might benefit from formally establishing clarity regarding their core purpose 
and vision for success, and then planning and managing each project accordingly.  These 
guiding principles would be considered permanent, while strategies, tactics and specific 
goals could then vary as necessary with each project. Core purpose is thought to be the 
fundamental reason an organization exists and its vision for success is typically a long-
term, aspirational goal and distinct from project specific goals which will change with 
each project. 
For example: A possible outcome of ROM might be that a Southern California 
urban-planning institute establishes that its core purpose is to improve the livability of 
urban Los Angeles, and that purpose is held to be unchanging for the institute and to 
permanently guide the kind of work it undertook. Likewise, its values could be 
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established as: livable, walkable, shady, safe, medium-density urban spaces with 
convenient and sustainable public transportation. The institute would then deliberately 
seek projects that fit its purpose and values, while forgoing all others. A common practice 
in ROM is to express goals in the present tense, as though already attained. For example, 
the institute’s long-term vision for success could be that "its recommendations are 
accepted by the city council, developers, banks, and the greater community and that its 
projects are implemented". This core ideology would inform all other activity; the kind of 
projects undertaken and the goals and strategies associated with each project. The 
institute would identify key customers and their values; which in this case would be 
influencers and decision makers, for example the city council, developers, banks and 
community leaders. The institute would engage those customers from the inception of 
each project and work with them throughout to reconcile the institute’s purpose, values, 
and goals with those of their customers. Most importantly, the institute would be 
continuously guided by clarity of purpose, vision, and long-term goals. Clarity about 
these questions has been shown to improve the attainment of desired results but the ROM 
process also includes strategic planning and results oriented management. 
Strategic planning would require the institute to assess its resources and deploy 
them in the most effective manner deemed possible, which would include an honest 
assessment of the institute’s capabilities such that it would forego projects for which it 
was fundamentally unprepared. For example, an urban planning project might involve a 
sustainable livelihoods component for which the institute was ill-prepared. In this case, a 
logical strategy might be to partner with another organization that possessed 
complementary capabilities, or to develop in-house the needed resources for the project at 
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hand. In any case strategic planning involves the decisive deployment of resources and is 
guided by core purpose and vision for success. 
Finally, ROM requires establishing project level goals that are specific, 
measureable, attainable, results-oriented, and time-phased, and holding the organization 
accountable for those goals. Accountability for results involves assessing attainment 
versus objectives at specific stages, and at the completion of the project, and helps the 
organization celebrate success, and identify failure and learn from both. For example, the 
institute’s recommendations might be accepted by every customer except the developers 
who reject the ideas, and an honest appraisal of this failure presents an opportunity for the 
institute to establish the reason for the failure and to act to prevent its reoccurrence.  
 Climate change is a problem of unimaginable scale and complexity, and yet 
organizations like the IPCC may benefit from the same strategic planning exercise. 
Disciplined planning could produce an honest internal appraisal of the IPCC’s authentic 
purpose, which appears to be reflected in their chief executives’ consistent advocacy for 
climate policy. The planning process itself cannot force honesty and rather provides the 
opportunity, however more clarity about the organization’s purpose can relieve its 
members from conflicting roles such as providing policy relevant assessments that are 
policy neutral. The primary activity of climate scientists appears to have transitioned 
from empirical discoveries of disinterested scientists to the fundamental purpose of 
persuading society about the urgent need for mitigation. Honesty about their purpose has 
the potential to refocus IPCC energy that is presently dedicated to rationalizations about 
neutrality, to focus on the policy advocacy its members consistently pursue. 
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Vendor/Customer Norms  
 In addition to establishing a guiding ideology, the norms of productive advocacy 
offer sustainability scientists operational guidance for improving results attainment. 
While attendees to the AAAS conference on scientist advocacy expressed disdain for any 
aspects of advocacy that resembled acting like a salesman (AAAS, 2012), in its business 
to business (B2B) manifestation the sales function provides a meaningful correlation to 
the challenges of advocacy in science. Not to be confused with negative sales stereotypes, 
the character and performance requirements for a professional B2B sales person compare 
favorably to those required for effective advocacy in science. Recall that scientists have 
scoured other disciplines for relevant knowledge that might improve science 
communication, and in the spirit of trans-disciplinarity they should not overlook 
potentially useful knowledge from business. 
 A great deal of the best practices for effective B2B salesmanship are tacit, and 
following more than two decades of successful sales management, I can authoritatively 
articulate its important components which I believe are relevant to the normative 
dimension of sustainability. I empathize with the frustration experienced by sustainability 
scientists when they struggle to persuade the public that present investment will yield 
important future benefits because this is precisely the challenge that B2B sales people 
routinely face. Convincing a customer to invest in new, but more productive or efficient 
products correlates with convincing policy makers to implement costly change in the 
present to secure a future benefit. Certainly, with climate change the stakes are higher 
than any in business, and the challenge more daunting, yet all the more reason to leave no 
stone unturned in pursuit of effective advocacy. 
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Through centuries-long development, the customer/vendor interface is marked by 
fundamental conventions that mediate the value derived for both vendor and customer. 
The effective B2B salesperson is the consummate advocate; their customer knows they 
will attempt to persuade them of something and the sales person makes no secret of their 
intent to persuade. Sustainability communication will be improved via similar honesty 
regarding the intent to persuade and by separating that from the scientific facts involved. 
Scientists would first ascertain or establish the commonly understood factual basis with 
their audience, and maintain that as credible and distinct from their efforts to persuade. 
Scientists would recognize that beyond the factual, some level of persuasion was 
involved, and assume that the scientific facts did not dictate outcomes, which are instead 
value-based and thus negotiated with the audience. 
In the vendor/customer interface, the understanding of both parties is that any 
negotiated agreement will ultimately be beneficial to both. Either party or both may 
consider interim sacrifices for future benefit; for example the sales person may offer an 
introductory discount or the customer may agree to bear the significant up-front cost of 
the transition to a new product. Both are common and sales people often find they are 
persuading the customer to assume up-front costs for future benefit. The results of 
scientist advocacy can be improved by recognizing that the outcome is negotiated and 
that the audience must agree to the perceived benefits and to the up-front costs, and that 
scientists may need to make some concessions in order to advance their agenda. 
However, neither vendor nor customer will contemplate unbearable costs and 
both parties possess values that are non-negotiable. As a result, sometimes the 
vendor/customer relationship is not productive but ideally remains intact, and no key 
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customer is ever entirely abandoned. The sales person may occasionally check with 
inactive customers to see if anything has changed. Scientists may improve their 
normative impact by respecting their audience’s non-negotiable values and by avoiding 
the prospect of advocating solutions with unbearable costs. In any case, the rejection of 
scientists’ recommendations should not cause scientists to denigrate or permanently 
damage their relationship with important audiences.   
The sales person knows that the only prospect for their success involves proposals 
that make sense to the customer according to the customer’s value system and worldview 
and that changing the customer’s value system is unlikely. Failing that, the sales person 
must regroup and return to try again to persuade the customer. The sales person must be 
sufficiently knowledgeable about the customer to develop plausible proposals and the 
sales person’s credibility with the customer is thus negotiated in the continuing 
relationship. The sales person’s credibility is earned and can be quickly lost by making 
proposals that are inconsistent with the customer’s goals or worldview. The sales person 
must continually earn the customer’s trust and the continuing right to return, and for this 
to occur the sales person must constantly be honest, respectful, attentive, and responsive. 
The sales person may never denigrate or disrespect the customer. Rejections, objections, 
or other feedback from the customer must be taken into consideration in ongoing 
proposal development, and sales people know they cannot repeatedly return with the 
same rejected proposal in the hope that the customer will eventually relent. In the same 
way, scientists who wish to influence public policy must be sufficiently knowledgeable 
of their audience to propose plausible recommendations. Scientists must earn and 
maintain credibility with their audience, which is reminiscent of Wynne’s 1992 assertion 
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that credibility was not inherent to either party or to the information conveyed but was 
rather a product of the relationship between science and society (Wynne, 1992a).   
 Ultimately sales people recognize they have no control over the customer and 
cannot dictate action. The only behavior the sales person can control is their own, and 
while this seems a simplistic observation, it is the root of accountability for results. In the 
same way, scientists may improve their normative impact by recognizing that the 
scientific facts do not dictate policy outcomes, and that public rejection of scientists’ 
recommendations is not a rejection of the underlying science but a rejection of the 
scientists’ proposals. In contentious sustainability problems such as climate change, 
scientists possess the prerogative and therefore the responsibility for the outcomes they 
seek. In this way, the accountability for results may improve the normative effectiveness 
for scientists who accept the burden for outcomes and ceaselessly work to achieve 
progress against their core purpose and vision for success. 
These norms may be effective in improving results attainment for solutions 
oriented scientists, for example in considering customer feedback to develop plausible 
proposals. Climate scientists have understood for about thirty years the depth of GHG 
emissions reductions that are required just to stabilize atmospheric carbon dioxide 
(Broecker, 2013). The 1990 FAR SPM claimed the reduction necessary for stabilization 
was sixty percent (IPCC, 1990b) and in 2010 Broecker thought it to be eighty-five 
percent (Broecker, 2010). These numbers are breathtaking considering the suggested cuts 
are essentially in the use of fossil energy.  
The linkage between global warming and GHG emissions is probably undeniable, 
yet without a substitute for fossil energy these reductions are not plausible and if that was 
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not apparent from the beginning then it might have become clear in the consistent 
practical rejection of the idea by global societies that have steadfastly refused to cut 
energy use in numbers remotely close to those required. A good sales person may not 
have recognized the proposal as implausible in advance but they would have quickly 
understood its rejection and set about developing new ideas. They would have understood 
that they could not return repeatedly with a failed proposal, the customer would not 
entertain it and it would damage the credibility of the sales person. Any of the other 
norms might apply as well but the last one certainly does and it is the most important: 
commitment to results. 
In the best sense of trans-disciplinarity a good sales person will learn new skills, 
and exhaust every resource to find a way to convince the customer to accept their 
proposal. Climate change may be the most threatening and complex problem facing 
humanity and it is laudable that scientists have shouldered the burden of solving it. 
Sustainability scholars and scientists have recognized the transdisciplinary demands for 
solving wicked problems like climate change and scoured other disciplines for helpful 
knowledge. Results oriented management and the norms of B2B salesmanship have a 
great deal to contribute to organizations and individuals that are challenged with and 
committed to producing measurable results. 
Final Comments 
Sustainability scientists that are solution focused may attain improved results if 
they decide that beyond the verifiable, they may attempt to advocate in some way. They 
may maintain their science as credible because it is verifiable, and in other discourse; 
focus on improving their advocacy skills. Some scientists may have to overcome negative 
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connotations with business practices but there is an enormous trove of knowledge 
covering ROM, strategic planning, and effective salesmanship and much of it will be 
helpful to those interested in planning, organizing, and managing for results in the 
context of sustainability. 
I proposed a broadly expansive definition for advocacy that leaves a very narrow 
space for the neutral and objective, and thus credible. I believe this concept to be useful 
for sustainability scientists to better prepare them for advocacy when they engage in it. 
My analysis of the 2013 IPCC SPM revealed that under this definition, factual passages 
had tripled in number from the 1990 report and this had the effect of improving the 
overall credibility of the report in my view. Furthermore, the strict definition for the 
factual lent those passages the strength of verifiability that could better withstand 
challenges. It seemed useful therefore to contemplate establishing and guarding a careful 
distinction between the purely factual and the subjective as a means to both protect the 
credibility of science and to facilitate advocacy. There may be potential in this idea but it 
needs further development. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the strict conception of advocacy is useful to 
improve the awareness of sustainability scientists of the likelihood that they may overlay 
their empirical science with subjective representations and thereby slip seamlessly in to 
advocacy with the attendant credibility problems and the conflict with some of the social 
norms of science. Scientists who are aware of this likelihood may then take action to 
protect the integrity of their science and improve the effectiveness of their advocacy for 
the solutions they develop. 
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This dissertation has exposed unresolved tension between the social norms of 
science and the persuasive demands of the normative role in sustainability. I did not 
propose to resolve this problem, nor do I think that I have, but I ultimately proposed an 
approach that may permit scientists or their organizations to maintain the credibility of 
their science, while advocating for the solutions that they develop. Some scholars and 
some of the CCC professionals that I interviewed proposed that science and advocacy be 
somehow kept separate and the idea may have potential for resolving this dilemma. At 
the very least, this dissertation can serve as a way to open a discussion rather than come 
to closure on the subject. 
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INFORMATION LETTER-INTERVIEWS 
For professional climate science communicators 
 
“Communicating Climate Science” 
 
Date: June 5th, 2013 
 
 
My name is Scott McClintock, I am a PhD Candidate under the direction of Drs. Nalini 
Chhetri and Sander van der Leeuw in the School of Sustainability at Arizona State 
University.  I am conducting a research study to determine the characteristics of present 
climate science communication by professionals to the public and policy-makers. 
 
I am inviting your participation, which will involve a structured interview that will take 
approximately 45-minutes and can be done by phone, Skype, or in person. Questions will 
relate to your experience and views about climate science communication and will be 
used to frame my dissertation research. There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts to 
your participation. You must be 18 years old to participate. 
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any 
question, and to stop the interview at any time. I would like to audiotape this interview. 
You will not be recorded, unless you give permission. If you give permission to be taped, 
you have the right to ask for the recording to be stopped at any time. The recordings will 
be kept digitally in my research files, only long enough to complete the study at which 
time they will be erased. 
 
Identities of participants will be kept confidential at all times. The results of this research 
will be analyzed to identify common themes, trends, and challenges and may be used in 
reports, presentations, or publications but your identity will not be divulged in any case. 
 
This is important work given the risks of climate change and the challenges of conveying 
those risks to the public and policy-makers. Although there may be no benefit to you 
personally, possible benefits of your participation include a better understanding of the 
challenges involved in climate science communication which can lead to better strategies 
for future communication. 
 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact the research team 
at: 
 
Global Institute of Sustainability 
Arizona State University 
PO Box 875402 
Tempe, AZ 85287 
Mail code 5402 
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Principal investigator: Dr Nalini Chhetri   480-965-3099 
Nalini.chhetri@asu.edu 




If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if 
you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects 
Institutional Review Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, 






School of Sustainability 
Arizona State University 
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Outline for Structured Interviews 
 
Professional Climate Science Communicators 
 
Dissertation research: “Climate Science Communication” 
Principal Investigator: Dr Nalini Chhetri 
Co-investigator: Scott McClintock 
The goal of these interviews is to record the experiences and views of working 
professionals that are involved in climate science communication. 
1. I’d like to ask you a few questions about your experiences and views regarding 
climate science communication. I will maintain strict confidentiality; your identity 
will not be divulged in any case. Do I have your permission to record this 
interview? 
2. Tell me about yourself. 
a. How did you become involved in climate science communication? 
b. Why do you care about climate science communication? 
c. What is your present job and how does it involve climate science 
communication? 
d. Describe a remarkable or defining experience in climate science 
communication. 
3. In your view, what is climate science communication? 
a. Who is the audience? 
b. Why do they matter? 
c. What is the goal of climate science communication? 
d. What media is used? 
e. What have been the results of your experience in climate science 
communication? 
4. What are the challenges? 
a. Of handling scientific uncertainty? 
b. Of educating the public and policy-makers? 
c. Of communicating risk? 
d. Of recommending policy, or social change? 
5. What Lessons have been learned? 
a. About scientific objectivity and neutrality? 
b. About scientific credibility? 
c. About audiences? 
d. About competing voices? 
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6. What is the future direction of climate science communication? 
a. What is the danger of the present course, if any? 
b. What changes would you recommend, if any? 
c. Do you have any other thoughts or experiences you’d like to share? 
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CODE STRUCTURE FOR IPCC REPORTS 
Atlas.ti code report: All current codes 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
HU: Chapter 5 
File:  [G:\Chapter 5.hpr7] 




Created: 2014-10-14 21:15:35 




Statements that are any combination of Controversial, Judgment, Linked to 




Created: 2014-10-12 12:31:40 




Subject matter that has become publicly controversial, such as the human attribution 
to climate change. While there is little doubt in the scientific community that the 
human use of fossil fuels contributes to global warming, this has been challenged (as 
rationale for supporting climate change mitigation) by opponents of the scientific 
consensus, and it remains controversial. Arguments for human attribution are aligned 
with the need for mitigation policy and therefore tantamount to advocacy for it. The 
basis for this code is the scholarly view that when scientists engage in a controversial 
matter they will unavoidably align with and advocate for one side in the debate or the 
other. The scientific community may already view human attribution as a scientific 
fact but that alone does not prevent the matter from remaining controversial, resulting 
in scientists unintentionally advocating (AAAS, 2012; Sarewitz, 2012). Thus some 
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Created: 2014-10-12 13:17:21 




Statements citing facts and adhering to facts. A fact is something that has actually 
happened, or is actually the case. This would include uncertainty qualifiers when they 
truthfully reflect the scientists’ level of confidence in the related statement. Facts are 
verifiable which in science requires repeatability. Examples in this analysis include 
temperature observations, proven or broadly accepted scientific understandings of the 




Created: 2014-10-12 12:33:02 




Statements drawing a conclusion. For example: “Continuation of present day 
emissions are committing us to increased future concentrations, and the longer 
emissions continue to increase, the greater would reductions have to be to stabilize at 
a given level” (IPCC, 1990b, p. XVII). These judgments align with the scientific 
consensus on climate change and to advocacy for mitigation. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Linked to mitigation policy 
Created: 2014-10-12 12:36:33 




Statements about scientific findings and assessments that are linked to the prevailing 
global policy initiative to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. For example: References 




Created: 2014-10-12 12:30:06  
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Statements expressing a prescription. For example: “Limiting climate change will 
require substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions” (IPCC, 




Created: 2014-10-12 12:32:17  




Statements revealing a belief or way of thinking about something. Some examples 
include: “The long-lived gases would require immediate reductions in emissions from 
human activities of over 60% to stabilize their concentrations at today's levels… 
Carbon dioxide has been responsible for over half the enhanced greenhouse effect in 
the past, and is likely to remain so in the future ” (IPCC, 1990b, p. XI). Warming of 
the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes 
are unprecedented over decades to millennia (IPCC, 2013c, p. 4). Human influence 
on the climate system is clear” (IPCC, 2013c, p. 15). These statements of opinion 





Created: 2014-10-14 20:55:10 
Modified: 2014-12-12 17:34:58 
 
Quotations: 57 
Super Code Search Term: NOT ((((("Controversial" | "Judgment") | "Linked to 
mitigation policy") | "Normative") | "Opinion") | "Value based") 
Comment: 




Created: 2014-10-12 12:30:38 




A statement of the desirability of something. For example: “Business-as-Usual 
emissions will make global mean temperatures higher than they have been in the last 
150,000 years” (IPCC, 1990b, p. XXVIII). Such statements in IPCC reports 
frequently imply that something is undesirable and represent the attempt to persuade. 
Other examples discuss flooding, ocean acidification, or interference with the eco-
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system for example, in ways that characterize the subject’s (un)desirability. This code 
identifies statements that reveal information about what the authors value by what 
they deem undesirable and/or desirable. If the authors did not value the subject in 
question then they would be ambivalent about outcomes and would not reveal 
preferences. Many scholars assert that scientists' values permeate their work from the 
selection of their research to the interpretations of their research results and this 
coding reflects that. These statements are rarely explicit expressions of value and yet 
they reveal the authors' preferences for certain outcomes over others. For example, 
the authors generally argue that climate impacts are negative and they prefer 
sacrificial mitigation in the present despite its costs to others who value present 
economic well-being more than the authors. It is emblematic that many countries in 
climate negotiation have favored their near-term economic well-being to the 
mitigation levels proposed by scientists. These values revealed by IPCC authors are 
not universal or comprehensive and thus these statements are an intent to persuade the 
audience of the authors' value based reasoning. Typically these coded statements are a 
continuation or a component of a larger value based argument made by IPCC authors. 
Passages coded as value based effectively argue the desirability of something. For 
example; ocean acidification bears a negative connotation that implies undesirability. 
The same material could be covered by providing numeric pH data which would not 
bear the connotation of the word acidification. In another example, human attribution 
to climate change is inherently critical of human activity, which is not a universal 
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Atlas.ti code report: All current codes 
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HU: Chapter 6 
File:  [C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Documents\Scott's Docum...\McClintock 
Dissertation.hpr7] 
Edited by: Scott McClintick 




Created: 2014-02-26 10:15:33  
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Families (1): ADVOCACY 
Quotations: 5 
Comment: 
Arguments that it's difficult to discuss science and the problems that scientific 
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Comment: 
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Interviewees who claimed they do not advocate because what they are doing is not 
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Arguments that because they are publicly funded, scientists have an obligation to 
advocate for changes that would mitigate the risks to society that scientists discover 




Created: 2014-01-15 15:58:46  
Modified: 2014-07-10 20:28:18 
 
Families (1): ADVOCACY 
Quotations: 22 
Comment: 





  181 
ADV_should 
Created: 2014-01-16 11:36:26  
Modified: 2014-07-30 16:10:23 
 
Families (1): ADVOCACY 
Quotations: 21 
Comment: 
Arguments that scientists should advocate; they have a moral obligation to warn 




Created: 2014-01-18 16:31:26  
Modified: 2014-07-10 14:10:23 
 
Families (1): ADVOCACY 
Quotations: 18 
Comment: 
Arguments that scientists should NOT advocate; they should remain neutral and 




Created: 2014-01-15 15:36:47  
Modified: 2014-03-11 15:20:38 
 
Families (1): CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE SCIENCE 
Quotations: 10 
Comment: 
Arguments that people respond more easily to things that they can experience, like 




Created: 2014-01-16 19:26:05  
Modified: 2014-03-03 16:54:09 
 
Families (1): CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE SCIENCE 
Quotations: 8 
Comment: 





  182 
CHAL_scale_complexity_of_problem 
Created: 2014-03-03 15:28:05  
Modified: 2014-03-03 15:37:29 
 
Families (1): CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE SCIENCE 
Quotations: 8 
Comment: 
Comments that the scale and complexity of climate change creates problems for 
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Comments about adhereing to the facts in the science. 
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Modified: 2014-07-30 16:03:41 
 
Families (1): SCIENCE 
Quotations: 45 
Comment: 




Created: 2014-01-18 10:20:03  
Modified: 2014-02-27 14:29:12 
 
Families (1): SCIENCE 
Quotations: 7 
Comment: 
Comments about the possible resistance of mainstream scientists to non-mainstream 
views, or discoveries that may challenge the mainstream climate science. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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SCIENCE_objective_neutral 
Created: 2014-01-16 11:35:29  
Modified: 2014-07-30 16:16:29 
 
Families (1): SCIENCE 
Quotations: 14 
Comment: 
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